

JPRS-UMA-94-008  
23 February 1994



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Central Eurasia**

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***Military Affairs***

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## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-94-008

### CONTENTS

23 February 1994

#### CIS/RUSSIAN MILITARY ISSUES

##### ARMED FORCES

Kolesnikov: Current Draft 73% Fulfilled [SEGODNYA 21 Jan] .....	1
---	---

##### POLICY

Kokoshin Presents Arms Plan to Security Council [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 20 Jan] .....	1
Chief of Reforms Directorate Interviewed [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 8 Feb] .....	2
Contractees Authorized for 1994 [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 20 Jan] .....	4
Ministerial Assistant for Soldier-Internationalists Appointed [VOYENNNYY VESTNIK YUGA ROSSII No 50, Nov] .....	4
Housing Construction Noted [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 20 Jan] .....	5

##### STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Votintsev: Development of Missile Attack Warning System [VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 10, 1993] .....	5
--	---

##### GROUND TROOPS

RPG-7 With PG-7VR 40/105-mm Warhead [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Feb] .....	12
Grachev Praises Volga MD Troops' Combat Readiness [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 Feb] .....	13
Grachev Examines Situation in Volga MD [ITAR-TASS 10 Feb] .....	14
Radio Communications in Motorized-Rifle Battalion [VOYENNNYY VESTNIK No 9, Sep] ...	14

##### AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Russia Lags in Airborne Reconnaissance [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 Feb] .....	18
MiG-29's Stationed in Transbaykal Military District [Moscow TV 11 Feb] .....	19

##### NAVAL FORCES

Adm Gromov Summarizes 1993 Training Year [FLAG RODINY 12 Jan] .....	20
Adm Kalinin: Navy and New Russian Military Doctrine [FLAG RODINY 4 Jan] .....	24
Fire on Northern Fleet Nuclear Sub At Murmansk Ship Repair Yard [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 1 Feb] .....	26

##### BLACK SEA FLEET

V-Adm Svyatashov on Future of Fleet [FLAG RODINY 18 Jan] .....	26
Russia Willing to 'Compensate' Ukraine for Fleet, Infrastructure [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Feb] ..	28
Rear Services: Flight Ration Shortages [FLAG RODINY 19 Jan] .....	28
Chief of Engineer Services on Ukrainian Subornation [FLAG RODINY 20 Jan] .....	29
Press Center Statement on Reinstatement of Colonel Yermakov [FLAG RODINY 21 Jan] .....	31
Press Center on Ukrainian Subornation of Engineer Units [FLAG RODINY 12 Jan] .....	32
Ship Repair Workers Appeal to Fleet on Financing [FLAG RODINY 12 Jan] .....	32
Fleet Problems With AWOLs [FLAG RODINY 4 Jan] .....	32

## REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Political Side of Housing Problem [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Jan] .....	33
Transport Network Problems in Terms of New Military Doctrine [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 8 Feb] .....	35

## PEACEKEEPING FORCES

Col-Gen Kondratyev on Russian Peacekeeping Forces [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Feb] .....	37
--	----

## STATE AND LOCAL MILITARY FORCES

### UKRAINE

'Rising Tensions' Over Military Economic Crunch .....	40
Finance Directorate Head Comments on Shortages [NARODNA ARMIYA 22 Dec] .....	40
Measures for State Support Projected [NARODNA ARMIYA 5 Jan] .....	41
Regional SOU Leader Discusses Military Doctrine [VILNU UKRAYINU 1 Feb] .....	44

### BALTIC STATES

Current Status of Latvian Armed Forces [IZVESTIYA 4 Feb] .....	45
Baltic States Plan for Military Cooperation [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 15 Jan] .....	47

### CAUCASIAN STATES

Georgian Artillery Fires Into Abkhazia [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 8 Feb] .....	50
--	----

## GENERAL ISSUES

### ARMS TRADE

V-Adm Kravchenko of Baltic Fleet on Auction of Obsolete Equipment [KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA 8 Feb] .....	51
Ukraine Offers Submarine to Iran [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Feb] .....	51

### DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Voronin on Industrial Crisis, Naval Construction Halt [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 10 Feb] .....	52
Ministry of Defense Appeal on Unpaid Arms Debts [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Feb] .....	54
Antonov Aviation Complex Role in Ukraine's Military Industry .....	54
Radetskyy Visits Design Bureau [NARODNA ARMIYA 17 Dec] .....	54
Radetskyy, Oliynyk Briefed on Design, Production [NARODNA ARMIYA 21 Dec] .....	55
First An-70 Result of Interrepublic Cooperation [NARODNA ARMIYA 22 Jan] .....	56

### SECURITY SERVICES

Yeltsin Names Deputy Counterintelligence Directors [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Feb] .....	56
Duma Security Committee's Agenda Outlined [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 15 Feb] .....	56

## ARMED FORCES

### Kolesnikov: Current Draft 73%Fulfilled

94UM0206A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian  
21 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer under the "Army" rubric: "Ministry of Defense Sees Normal Call-Up, Armed Forces Up to Strength by 1995"]

[Text] In a press conference held yesterday in the Ministry of Defense, Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian General Staff, stated that this is the third month that he has been starting his day at 7 AM by reading the latest call-up tabulation. This past autumn the Army discharged at the same time those men who had served 18 months and those 24 months, a situation that could have brought on a disaster in the form of a virtually total loss of combat capability, if the call-up were unsuccessful. This would hold true for Army large units proper and for the other Armed Forces in Russia (MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], Border Troops, etc.).

Therefore, the abovementioned undesirable event was prevented and the Army manpower stabilized. The Army's average strength presently consists of conscripts in the amount of 54 percent, while in especially important, elite large units (VDV [Airborne Troops], strategic nuclear triad), this figure runs at 70 to 90 percent.

The present call-up plan is 73 percent fulfilled. This, however, is not the final tally, since students about to graduate from tekhnikums and PTU's [professional and technical schools], who were granted the opportunity to undergo accelerated instruction for the purpose of earning their diploma, will be called up for induction into the service as far in the future as April.

The poorest situation obtains in the case of manpower of the Russian troops stationed in foreign countries. The General Staff has virtually ceased sending replacements to Germany and the Baltics, whence troop withdrawal is nearing completion, and to the Dniester area, where, in the words of Mikhail Kolesnikov, "Army Commander Lebed persists in causing us problems." The Troop Grouping in the Transcaucasus (Georgia, Armenia) is receiving a minimum of replacements, and only volunteers, at that, since the Russian General Staff is of the opinion that the situation in that area poses no threat. At the same time the Ministry of Defense is attempting (also on a volunteer basis) to improve the strength of the 201st Division stationed in Tajikistan, the spot that is the "hottest" at the present time. There is a distinct manpower shortage there (the 201st Division consists of slightly more than 5,000 men - P. F.).

By and large, on 12 December Russian citizens voted for the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia], communists, and for other ultra-and simply patriotic candidates, but, when it comes to the personal level, they tend to shy away from civil deeds associated with sacrifice,

continuing in the General Staff's opinion to employ on a mass scale any means at their disposal to avoid being called up. The Ministry of Defense (working with law enforcement agencies) is taking measures to apprehend deserters, and, in addition, will do all it can to restrict the legal means for obtaining a draft deferment.

Also to continue in 1994 is recruitment of professional soldiers: contract servicemen. They presently number somewhat in excess of 120,000 men in the Army (amounting to 10 percent of the total number in the lower grades). In this connection, the 1993 contract servicemen recruitment plan was fulfilled in literally several months. The Ministry of Defense generally did not anticipate such a large number of persons desirous of serving in the Army for money (the minimum pay for a contract private as of 1 January 1994 was 110,000 rubles.) On 18 January President Yeltsin signed a ukase calling for the recruitment of 150,000 additional contract servicemen for 1994. By the beginning of 1995, the General Staff hopes to bring the total number of professional soldiers, including women and personnel in extended service, to 400,000 (to 32 percent of the authorized strength).

In addition, the Ministry of Defense officially submitted to the government a proposal calling for additional cuts of the Armed Forces manpower limit to 2 million men to replace the 2.1-million manpower figure that was planned for 1994. As a result, assuming that the call-up will be successful, the manpower needs of the Army, MVD, and Border Troops by the end of the year will be met in the amount of 90 to 95 percent. In that case, all Russian Armed Forces subordinated to the government will assume complete combat readiness, standing, if necessary, fully ready to deal with possible difficulties and conflicts, whether the latter occur on the borders or in nearby countries.

## POLICY

### Kokoshin Presents Arms Plan to Security Council

94UM0210A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 Jan 94 p 1

[Article by Valentin Rudenko: "Meeting of Security Council Took Place"]

[Text] A regular meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation took place 19 January in the Kremlin under the chairmanship of Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation.

First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Andrey Kokoshin presented a report at the



meeting. In accordance with the report by Andrey Kokoshin, the Security Council approved the basic directions and priorities of the long-term Arms Program.

Also presenting reports were Viktor Glukhikh, chairman of the State Committee for Defense Branches of Industry, and Viktor Mikhaylov, minister of the Russian Federation for Nuclear Energy.

### Chief of Reforms Directorate Interviewed

PM0902132294 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 8 Feb 94 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Gennadiy Ivanov, chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Directorate for Military Organizational Development, by Oleg Falichev under the rubric "Interlocutor of the Day"; date and place not given: "Military Reform: Assignment for Tomorrow"—first six paragraphs are introduction]

#### [Text] Calling Card: Gennadiy Dmitriyevich Ivanov

Born 15 September 1945 in the city of Zernograd in Rostov Oblast. Graduated in 1968 from the Riga Command Engineer School.

He served in the Strategic Missile Troops for more than 13 years. He worked his way up from gun crew member to missile regiment commander. He graduated from the F.E. Dzerzhinskiy Military Academy Command Faculty. In 1984, after completing postgraduate studies by correspondence he submitted his dissertation for the degree of Candidate of Military Sciences.

From 1985 he worked in the Armed Forces General Staff Center of Operational-Strategic Research.

After graduating in 1990 from the General Staff Military Academy he became Senior Tutor at the Department of Strategy and a Senior Lecturer.

Since June 1992 he has been Chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Directorate for Military Organizational Development and Reforms. He holds the rank of Lieutenant-General.

[Falichev] Gennadiy Dmitriyevich, the Directorate of Military Organizational Development and Reforms which you head was one of the first directorates set up in the Russia Ministry of Defense, and it was there at the very beginning of the elaboration of the Concept of the Russian Armed Forces' Organizational Development. Evidently this is why interest in the directorate, and in you personally, is so great.

[Ivanov] Yes, the Directorate's main task is to develop and validate conceptual theses in various spheres of military organizational development. The adoption of decisions on the practical implementation of these theses is the prerogative of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Defense Collegium, and sometimes the supreme organs of state power also.

Public interest in us is indeed high. Only I would say that the interest is not in the Directorate but in the Armed Forces, in the processes taking place in the Army, in army reform. Our positions have frequently been explained to journalists. There are articles in the newspapers and magazines which have covered the progress of the Russian Armed Forces' organizational development, the creation of its legislative fundamentals, and the results of military cooperation in the framework of the CIS—in other words, the questions which come under our directorate's jurisdiction.

[Falichev] The Russian Armed Forces will very soon be two years old, and evidently it is possible to do some summing up.

[Ivanov] The main result of Defense Ministry activity in this period is the fact that the Russian Federation right now has its own Armed Forces, which are disciplined and capable of performing the tasks assigned to them.

Now let us recall where it all actually began.

Despite the fact that, in line with the President's 1992 decree, a significant proportion of the troop groupings of the former USSR became part of the Russian Armed Forces, they did not constitute an integrated military organism. The existing troop command and control and material/technical supply systems were disrupted; there was virtually no military infrastructure on Russia's European territory....

These were the conditions in which our Armed Forces were set up and in which the foundations for maintaining Russia's military security were laid.

The importance and complexity of this problem is shown by, for example, the fact that even in the first three months of the Russian Armed Forces' existence the concept of their organizational development was examined at two sessions of the Security Council.

The changes in the military-political situation and Russia's geostrategic position and the reduction in the size of the Armed Forces necessitated the elaboration of new approaches to the organization of troops. Today it is no longer expedient to have troops all along the border, as was the case before. The principle of mobile defense is the cornerstone of the reform of force groupings. This principle posits the existence of small but sufficiently strong forces that are ready for effective use wherever a real threat to Russian security arises.

The Ministry of Defense's proposals for the combat strength, structure, and size of the Armed Forces and its approaches to the location of force groupings were approved by the president and formally expressed as the Concept for the Organizational Development of the Armed Forces and the corresponding plans and programs which are currently being implemented.

New force groupings are being set up and the previously existing ones strengthened; this applies first and foremost to the Moscow and North Caucasus Military Districts. The number of fully staffed, combat-effective combined formations and units has been increased through a drastic reduction of the number of understrength combined formations and units. The creation of Mobile Forces has begun. The transition to a mixed system of recruitment is being implemented. The system of military education has been restored, and reform in this sphere has begun.

At the same time the Armed Forces are performing a number of other tasks.

One of the most important is the phased withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of other states. In 1993 alone more than 100,000 servicemen, more than 5,000 units of armored equipment and artillery systems, and around 700 airplanes and helicopters were withdrawn. This year the withdrawal of troops will be largely completed. Everyone knows that our troops are performing peacekeeping functions in accordance with Russia's international commitments. The social problems of servicemen and their families are being resolved.

All this is the result of the very considerable efforts of the whole Army. What was formerly elaborated and implemented over many years has taken the newly formed Russian Armed Forces not quite two full years.

[Falichev] Do you think that the charges made by certain newspapers that the doctrine appeared too late are just?

[Ivanov] Elaboration of the doctrine began from the moment the decision to form the Russian Armed Forces was made, that is to say from May 1992. An interdepartmental commission was formed under the Security Council to create this doctrine, and we took the most active part in its work, in conjunction with other General Staff and Ministry of Defense structures. All our plans were presented to the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Defense Collegium, and the chief of the General Staff, all of whom made several amendments and criticisms. I should remark that representatives of many state structures, including the military, worked on the doctrine. The document that was adopted is the fruit of collective efforts.

Was the doctrine too long emerging? I wish to explain that several of its provisions were reflected in the very first presidential edicts on the formation of the Russian Army. Subsequently, military questions were frequently examined at sessions of the Security Council and the government and in organs of the representative power.

The main provisions of the Russian Federation's military doctrine, adopted in November 1993, above all constitute a composite document incorporating military-political, strictly military, and military-technical aspects of ensuring the state's defense capability.

[Falichev] The doctrine treats the possibility of employing the Armed Forces within Russian Federation territory to suppress armed conflicts. In some sections of the mass media the Armed Forces are described as policing forces, no less. Could you clarify this?

[Ivanov] Yes, the Army, as an attribute of the state, is designed above all to defend it from external aggression. But in certain circumstances danger to state institutions can come from within. Why then should the Army remain on the sidelines in such a situation?

In developed democratic countries, for example in the United States, Germany, Britain, and France, the possibility and necessity of employing Armed Forces to safeguard internal security are legislatively enshrined. The difference is only in the formulas, which take account of the specific features of those states.

I should stress that, first, the Russian Army is allocated only an auxiliary role in the performance of internal functions, since the accent in suppressing conflict is mainly on the Russian Federation's internal troops and security forces. Second, the Army is mainly intended to localize the area of conflict. Thus the use of the Armed Forces to safeguard internal state security is strictly limited. The question of the Army's direct participation in a conflict can only arise in the event that the internal troops and security forces in the crisis zone are insufficient to defend the interests of the state, Russian citizens, and society in that region.

[Falichev] Today the process of creating a military doctrine is behind us. The main avenues of the organizational development of the Armed Forces in the long term have also been defined. Does this mean that your directorate will be left with no work to do?

[Ivanov] I will reveal to you the directorate's "secret" work plan for 1994. It envisages:

- the elaboration of conceptual proposals for bringing previously adopted laws into line with the Constitution and the fundamental provisions of the Russian Federation's military doctrine;

- the preparation of drafts of essential new laws in the sphere of defense and of draft normative-legal acts providing for their realization;

- the development of a Concept of Armed Forces Military Law Reform;

- the elaboration of approaches to ensure the realization of the Treaty on the Collective Security of CIS Member Countries.

Much needs to be done in the organizational development of the Armed Forces also.

We are taking part in the elaboration of options for the structure of the Armed Forces in the period after 1995. I stress, options, so that they can be submitted for discussion. A whole range of scientific research work is being

carried out to validate the prospects for the organizational development of the Armed Forces.

But there is a subtle point here. Each branch of the Armed Forces will probably envisage the existence of its structures in their former capacity and in the long term. But a narrow departmental approach must be avoided. And this is not easily done.

As for the lack of competence of which we are accused, let me show you by way of example a selection of the directorate's cadres.

Of the 45 staff members three are doctors of sciences, 14 are candidates, and 10 have academic titles. People serving in the directorate mostly possess a wide experience of working in the troops, the General Staff, and the staffs of branches of the Armed Forces. I assign to the directorate's "gold fund" the consultants and specialists among the civilian personnel and people who have served in the forces for more than 30-35 years in leading positions of the Ministry of Defense structures.

Judge for yourself whether we have knowledge, experience, and professionalism.

[Falichev] Don't you have too many tasks and commitments, Gennadiy Dmitriyevich? This way you could become a ministry within a ministry, subsuming other structures...

[Ivanov] I think that that is an "outsider's" point of view. We have already read comments to that effect.... I believe that our directorate is only a part of a complex machine whose name is the Ministry of Defense. Everything that is created here is a common product, and that is all.

[Falichev] Gennadiy Dmitriyevich, I cannot help asking you about articles which have appeared in recent times. They concern the defense minister's inner circle. What do you feel about them?

[Ivanov] I believe that such publications pursue only one goal—to compromise the country's military policy, the Army, and the Defense Ministry leadership. If you analyze the articles on this topic, you will easily be convinced that they bear a self-serving character and appear at times when important events are taking place in the country and in society: the referendum, the elections.... Typically the authors of these articles always refer to various mythical sources of information, trying to hide their own uninformed opinions and elementary ignorance in military questions. Let us leave these articles to the consciences of the authors, who either do not understand or, on the contrary, understand only too well that the Army is one of the few state institutions which, in this highly difficult period, are guarantors of stability.

As for the defense minister's inner circle, you will agree with the following: Any leader comes with his own team, relying above all on those people he knows well. This is a worldwide standard, a generally accepted practice, and

there is nothing surprising in the fact that there are such people in the minister's entourage.

### **Contractees Authorized for 1994**

94UM0210B KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 Jan 94 p 1

[Article by RIA: "President Blessed 'Contractees'"]

[Text] On 18 January, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "On the Contract Recruitment of Citizens for Military Service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 1994."

In accordance with the decree, the Ministry of Defense is instructed to accept up to 150,000 men for military service by contract in 1994 for the purpose of ensuring the gradual transition to manning of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with citizens recruited by contract.

### **Ministerial Assistant for Soldier-Internationalists Appointed**

94UM0194A Rostov-na-Donu VOYENNY VESTNIK  
YUGA ROSSII No 50, Nov 1993

[Unattributed article in the "North Caucasus Military District Press Center Reports" column: "New Ministerial Assistant Appointed"]

[Text]

### **Creation of Position: Assistant to Russian Federation Minister of Defense for Soldier-Internationalist Affairs**

To establish coordination of the work performed by military administrative agencies and to organize ties between the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and soldier-internationalist social organizations, the minister of defense of the RF [Russian Federation] has issued an order creating, in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Airborne Troops, military districts, groups of forces, and fleets, within the existing manpower limitations, groups whose mission will be to deal with soldier-internationalist affairs, with the latter to be subordinated to the respective commanders-in-chief of each branch of service (or other commanders).

The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense has set up within its structure the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Guidance Group for Soldier-Internationalist Affairs, which consists of 10 service members. The position of assistant deputy minister for soldier-internationalist affairs, Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, has been established to exercise direct supervision over the activity of the Guidance Group and to organize ties to soldier-internationalist groups and to soldier-internationalist councils in the Army and Navy.

Colonel-General B. V. Gromov, Russian Federation deputy minister of defense, has been assigned the



responsibility of providing general leadership for matters pertaining to Russian Federation Armed Forces' soldier-internationalists.

### Housing Construction Noted

94UM0210C KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 Jan 94 p 1

[Article by Lt-Col Beltsov, Press Center of the Air Force of the Russian Federation: "10,000 Apartments for Military Pilots"]

[Text] Today 11 construction firms from Germany, Finland, Turkey, South Korea, and India are building comfortable housing on the territory of four military districts of Russia for air force officers and warrant officers withdrawn from the Western Group of Forces.

Most of the housing is being built in the Moscow and North Caucasus military districts. A town with 1,058 apartments has already been turned over in the garrisons of Shaykovka (Moscow Military District) and people have moved into cottages at Siverskaya Air Base (Leningrad Military District). Altogether 9,400 apartments for pilots will be put into use by the end of 1994.

## STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

### Votintsev: Development of Missile Attack Warning System

94UM0225A Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY  
ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, 1993 (signed to press  
15 Oct 93) pp 32-42

[Article by Col-Gen (Ret) Yu.V. Votintsev: "The Unknown Troops of the Disappearing Superpower".]

[Text]

### Missile Attack Warning System

The launch of the first Soviet ballistic missile on 18 October 1947 turned out to be a complete surprise for the U.S. military-political leadership. Two years later, when the first nuclear device was created and successfully tested in the USSR, we crossed out the Americans' monopoly on these weapons.

The United States set about creating nuclear missile attack warning systems at an accelerated pace. In the 1960's, it began to deploy them on and outside its own territory. The first echelon was IMEWS satellites, designed to detect missile launches and locate nuclear explosions. The experimental launch of the IMEWS-1 satellite took place in 1968, and by 1970 a space-based system of six IMEWS-2 satellites in orbits 35-40,000 km high, two each over the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans, was already deployed. This system today monitors the entire surface of our planet, ensures detection of any missile launch, determines launch time, coordinates,

and flight direction, and passes the information to command posts in no more than 3-5 minutes.

The second echelon—based on the BMEWS over-the-horizon radar—was created between 1960 and 1963 to cover the main directions of a likely missile attack—northeastern, northern, and northwestern (from the territory of the Soviet Union). This system includes three sites, modernized in recent years, deployed at Foilingdales-Mure (Great Britain), Thule (Greenland), and Clear (Alaska). This system uses a multifunctional PAR radar from the Safeguard ABM system.

The increase in the number of our nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles forces the United States to create and deploy in the 1980's new powerful over-the-horizon Pave Paws radars on the east and west coasts and also on its southern borders.

Operational command and control of the nuclear missile attack warning system is exercised by the NORAD command post located in Cheyenne Mountain at Colorado Springs, Colorado. Higher national command and control facilities of the United States and its armed forces are notified from this same command post.

In our country, development and creation of over-the-horizon radars for missile attack warning and monitoring outer space were done at the Scientific Research Radiotechnical Institute of the USSR under the direction of Academician A.L. Minets (chief designer Yu.V. Polyak). The first "Dniester" radars were deployed in Kazakhstan and Siberia. Together they formed a solid radar barrier 5,000 km long that ensured accurate detection and tracking of space objects.

Simultaneously, in 1961 this same institute began developing the modernized "Dniester-M" over-the-horizon search radar and a missile attack warning system lead complex on the main northern avenue of likely missile attack (from U.S. territory) with location of these radars in the Arctic and Latvia, and a command post in the vicinity of Moscow.

Work on these centers and command posts began in 1963-1964. The Chief of the directorate, Lieutenant-General M.M. Kolomiyets, directly subordinate to the Chief of the Fourth Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, Colonel-General of Aviation G.F. Baydukov, was charged with organizing military units for them.

It is noteworthy that in the summer of 1967, General of the Army S.L. Sokolov<sup>2</sup>, recently appointed Deputy Minister of Defense, deemed it necessary, together with G.F. Baydukov and me, to visit the centers in Latvia and the Arctic that were in the stage of installation and adjustment of the production equipment. Paying no attention to the fact that they did not "polish up" things at the centers prior to his arrival, he thoroughly, calmly, and with splendid competence looked into the state of affairs, learned what was needed, and promised to help. And he carried out the promise.

In late 1968, a commission chaired by the First Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of Air Defense, Colonel-General V.V. Druzhinin, conducted state testing of the "Dniester-M" radar at the center in the Arctic. In the Far North, the radars operated in an extremely complex interference environment, caused by the constant chaotic disturbance of the ionosphere, resulting in brief blips coinciding in nature to trajectory segments of ballistic missiles. This did not preclude the generation and issuance of false warning information.

In 1970, A.L. Mints said concerning my fears: "Yuriy Vsevolodovich, your concern is not without foundation. But remember: the leading designers of our institute and I will always be with the troops. We will do all that is necessary to guarantee that false warning information about a missile attack will not be issued."

Indeed, the combat programs were constantly worked on as statistics were collected. Chief designers Yu.V. Polyak and V.M. Ivantsov<sup>3</sup> systematically worked at the centers, and other specialists were always there. There were not cases of false warning information being issued in the northern and northwestern avenues of likely missile attack.

Already in 1976, I had occasion to test the lead complex at full strength: The radar centers in the Arctic and Latvia, and the command post near Moscow, which became the command post for the missile attack warning system. Later it was possible to technically connect the A-35 early-warning ABM system (subsequently removed from service and dismantled), Dunay-3, and Dunay-3U to the missile attack warning system command post and to finish combat programs, ensuring a mutual exchange of information about ballistic missiles and space objects.

However, this was not easy. Over-the-horizon warning systems (A.L. Mints) and early-warning equipment of the ABM system (G.V. Kisunko) were created independently of one another. This resulted in the equipment operating in a different system of coordinates determining the parameters of a ballistic missile's trajectory. Various computers were also used. Mints used the 5E-73 computer of chief designer M.A. Kartsev<sup>4</sup>, and Kisunko used the computer of chief designer V.S. Burtsev. The automated data transmission systems were also different. Such a lack of coordination required a significant working up of combat algorithms and computer programs at the ABM and missile attack warning system command posts, which took up about 30 percent of their memory and speed. Later on, it was precisely these circumstances that made it necessary to increase the number of computers and replace them with new-generation computers. The result was considerable additional expenditures.

The various forms of self-spontaneity by the Ministry of the Radio Industry and the lack of requirements for standardization of arms have been unjustifiably costly for both the troops and taxpayers and have impeded the commissioning of new installations.

This disconnection was overcome to a considerable extent in the early 1970's. V.G. Repin<sup>5</sup> was appointed Chief Designer of the Missile Attack Warning System. A draft project of an integrated missile attack warning system was developed and approved in 1972 under Repin's direction. It coordinated and distributed the requirements for characteristics of above-the-horizon, over-the-horizon, and space-based warning equipment and defined the principles of combining and mutual monitoring of their data and rules for generating and presenting output data. Later, all the work for creating the system was done in accordance with this project. Clarifications were made in the process of developing new proposals for detection assets.

The first stage was the above-mentioned interfacing of radar warning center and the A-35 ABM system at a single command post, accomplished in 1973. The second stage was the creation of an updated command post and the first section of the warning system in 1976. The principles developed in the integrated system project were confirmed during the course of this work, and experience acquired in creating and commissioning super-complex information systems. The collective of chief designer V.G. Repin, his deputies, and closest assistants, doctors of technical sciences A.V. Menshikov, B.A. Golovkin, and V.P. Traubenberg, were the first, and long before the Americans, to solve the most complex tasks of complete automation of obtaining, processing, and consolidating data from various means of ballistic missile detection, generating and presenting warning information. At the same time, it was also possible to manage the problem of high-speed and high-reliability transmission of data about ballistic missiles and space objects with the aid of systems created under the direction of chief designers F.M. Lipsman, V.I. Shvartsman, and I.M. Mizin. B.A. Poluektov, a senior headquarters officer, participated directly in this work.

It must be noted that despite certain complexities in relations with the chief designers of individual warning equipment, A.I. Savin<sup>6</sup>, F.A. Kuzminskiy<sup>7</sup>, Yu.V. Polyak, and V.M. Ivantsov, the chief designer of the system, V.G. Repin, was able to define fairly clearly the requirements for the equipment and to achieve, basically, their fulfillment. In those instances when the basic parameters of the new equipment did not correspond to the desired parameters, they managed to bring the system characteristics to the required level through skillful use of reserves and a systematic approach.

Special note should be made of the role of officers of the combat algorithms and programs departments and battle task allotment officials, many of whose proposals were adopted by the chief designers of the system and equipment and helped to improve their quality.

Between 1968 and 1972, a project of a solid continuous above-the-horizon detection field on the western, southwestern, and southern avenues of likely missile attack was being developed. New centers were created in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Siberia based on the Dnieper



radar. At that time A.L. Mints and V.M. Ivantsov were working on a fundamentally new "Daryal" above-the-horizon phased-array radar. An reduced model of the receiver portion of this radar was successfully tested at the center in the Arctic.

In 1984-1985, centers with the "Daryal" radar began to be put on alert duty in the North and in Azerbaijan, 5-6 years later than the originally established timeframe. This occurred due to the costs of construction organizations, interruptions in deliveries of equipment by plants, and primarily due to the lack of readiness of algorithm software. Despite the repeated demands of the commander in chief of the National Air Defense Forces, the Main Contracting Directorate, and me, a computer base was not created in the design bureaus and Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of the Radio Industry. This resulted in the fact that algorithm software with the use of authorized computers had to be delayed 3-4 years.

I would go against the truth if I did not tell about how the above-the-horizon radar center was created on the northeastern avenue of likely missile attack. It was supposed to ring the outer border of the USSR with a continuous radar field. According to our prognosis, it was near the U.S. west coast that American nuclear-powered submarines with Trident and then Trident-2 missiles, capable of reaching the entire territory of the Soviet Union, were to be based precisely on this axis, which was also later confirmed.

According to studies and modeling of the Scientific Research Department of the Institute of the National Air Defense Troops, under the direction of Major-General of Aviation Ye.S. Sirotinin, doctor of technical sciences and professor, such a center could be placed in the vicinity of Norilsk or Yakutsk. Due to a shortage of electrical power, Yakutsk was no longer a choice. The management of the Norilsk Ore-Dressing Plant guaranteed assistance in creating the center. However, expenses increased since delivery of construction materials and equipment was by sea.

The question of the location of the center was discussed several times with Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov. I knew Nikolay Vasilyevich [Ogarkov] well as a man of high culture, reasonable, and able to delve deeply into the essence of a problem and make the correct decision. Therefore, I was astonished when, supported by Deputy Minister of Defense for Construction Colonel-General of Engineers N.F. Shestopalov, he did not agree with the Norilsk variant, but demanded that the new center be created only in the vicinity of Yeniseysk. This point was mentioned in the project of the Ministry of the Radio Industry, but was immediately rejected by us due to the fact that it was a flagrant violation of provisions the 1972 ABM Treaty with the United States on limiting ABM systems, according to which over-the-horizon missile attack warning system equipment could be deployed in the immediate proximity of the state border with the antenna turned outward. Yeniseysk

was located deep within the country approximately 3,000 km from our maritime border.

Unfortunately, associates of the General Staff prevailed, arguing that this installation could be considered not to be a warning center but a means of satellite detection. Despite all our objections, at the next large meeting, D.F. Ustinov stated for all to hear that if someone in air defense still dared to object to Yeniseysk, he would be relieved of duty.

The Americans focused their space reconnaissance assets on the progress of work on the center on a literally daily basis. When its basic structures became visible, they lodged a protest, which our government ultimately accepted.

The lesson taught us by the American side proved to be quite costly, and not only in the material respect. It is natural that is also affected the country's defensive capability.

Today, some of the structures already erected are being dismantled and being made into a furniture factory. We will be satisfied if only it begins to produce a product. But there was not and is not any above-the-horizon detection assets on the northeastern axis.

On the other avenues of likely missile attack, Dnieper radars have been operating continuously for more than 20 years now; they are obsolete. In the mid-1980's, construction of new Daryal-U and Volga radars began at the same sites at centers in Latvia, Belorussia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Siberia.

By 1992, more than 50 percent of the allotted appropriations were acquired. Now, financing of the installations located in the 'near abroad' was stopped, and work was suspended. In these republics, particularly in Ukraine, steps are being taken to privatize missile attack warning installations.

The obsolete Dnieper radars will be able to operate for another 2-3 years, 5 years at most, and then the entire Commonwealth will be left without some of the most accurate means for detecting attacking missiles on their flight trajectories with identification of the launch area and the place and time until the missiles fall.

In 1972, when the Missile Attack Warning System project proposed by V.G. Repin was being implemented, it became obvious that its high reliability could be achieved only by employing a complex of equipment using different physical principles. They include over-the-horizon radar and spacecraft capable of detecting missile launches and issuing information 2-3 minutes after their launch.

In 1970, favorable results were obtained from an experimental model of the Duga-2 over-the-horizon radar in the Ukraine when detecting launches of domestic missiles from areas of the Far East and the water areas of the Pacific Ocean over the test range on Novaya Zemlya. This circumstance enabled the Ministry of the Radio

Industry to submit the project to the Scientific Research Institute for Long-Range Communications (NIIDAR) for creating two centers in the Ukraine and the Far East (chief designer F.A. Kuzminskiy). The project asserted that these centers were able to detect the launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles from bases on U.S. territory. The decision was made and the centers created, but a miscalculation was made, leading further work to an impasse.

As chairman of the commission examining the project and supporting the creation of the centers, it is my fault that the effectiveness of the over-the-horizon was assessed based on results obtained from an experimental model of the radar detecting missiles in conditions of a middle-latitude path and relatively calm ionosphere. In conditions of northern-latitude paths, in the presence of the polar cap and the constant chaotic ionospheric disturbance, the probability of detecting the launch of single and small groups of missiles at these centers turned out to be quite low. And a massive missile launch from U.S. territory is reliably detected only in favorable ionospheric conditions. An important condition of an objective assessment of the effectiveness of these centers was the use of a mathematical model developed at the SNII [Special Scientific Research Institute] under the direction of Major-General of Aviation A.S. Sharakshane<sup>8</sup>, doctor of technical sciences. This very complex model contained ionospheric parameters in which comprehensively took into account the 11-year cycle of solar activity during various times of the year and day.

Despite the long and expensive process of tests and modifications, the centers were not accepted into service. The facility in the Ukraine essentially was returned to industry, and the Polar Program of modifying equipment and programs designed to improve substantially the detection characteristics was carried out there. Due to a plot at the Ministry of the Radio Industry, F.A. Kuzminskiy was removed at the most critical moment. The program was carried out under the direction of the new chief designer, F.F. Yevstratov<sup>9</sup>.

During the course of carrying out this program and introducing a number of modifications, the NIIDAR collective under the direction of F.F. Yevstratov and G.A. Lidley achieved stable detection by the center in the Ukraine of launches of the U.S. Shuttle at a distance of 9,000 km.

The Shuttle catastrophe on 28 January 1986 was observed in real time as a bright flash on the display screens and a stoppage of tracking the trajectory at the moment of the explosion and when the rocket engines stopped operating. I immediately reported the results of the work to Commander-in-Chief of the National Air Defense Troops A.I. Koldunov and USSR Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov, which confirmed the report from the United States.

The thrust of the Shuttle's engines considerably exceeds that of the engines of Minuteman ballistic missiles, which leads to an increase in the size of the ionized trail and, consequently, the size of the radar cross-section of the missile being launched. After examining these results, the commission agreed with the calculations on the mathematical models of the over-the-horizon radar centers for detecting group and massive launches of ballistic missiles from U.S. territory.

Work on the center continued right up until the catastrophe at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. The center ended up in the sequestered area and was mothballed.

Somewhat earlier, in 1978, the CINC of the Air Defense Troops P.F. Batitskiy made the start of joint testing of the center in the Far East conditional on the requirement of real and reliable detection of Minuteman ballistic missile launches from the U.S. Western Range at Vandenberg to the range on Kwajalein Island in the Pacific Ocean.

After repeated postponement of the launch of a Minuteman missile for technical reasons, automatic detection took place on 24 February 1980, and the commission under my direction, making a detailed inspection of the results obtained, began its work. However, further tests showed that the center was able to reliably detect ballistic missile launches from U.S. territory only under favorable geophysical conditions.

After considerable modifications, the center in the Far East was placed on alert duty on 30 June 1982. It was periodically used to detect missile launches from the U.S. Western Range at Vandenberg. Now this center has also been taken off alert duty.

At that time, many believed that the path I covered together with the designers of over-the-horizon radars was both unexplored and fallacious with respect to northern-latitude paths. This should be recognized. However, one must not ignore the fact that when the centers were in operation, all nine missile bases located on U.S. territory constantly felt their effect. In other words, they were under the "cap" of our electromagnetic radiation. Unfortunately, the dream of F.A. Kuzminskiy, who said "We will handcuff American imperialism," did not fully come true. Further work showed that the over-the-horizon radar in conditions of middle-latitude paths and calmer ionosphere is undoubtedly an effective means of long-range detection of missile launches, aircraft, and surface ships at distances of approximately 3,000 km.

Development of a space-based system was more successful, although not without difficulties, the general designer of which was A.I. Savin. Violation of the established time periods was determined primarily by working out algorithm software and the low reliability of the first spacecraft (chief designer V.M. Kovtunenکو)<sup>10</sup>.

The system was placed on alert duty at reduced strength in 1978 and at full strength in 1982; however, its combat

capabilities left much to be desired both in performance and operating characteristics. For example, based on information received from aboard the spacecraft, the command post of this system made a false conclusion about a massive missile launch from U.S. territory. It is not hard to imagine what kind of decision the leadership of the country and the armed forces could have faced. The cause was an unfinished combat program for conditions of heightened solar activity. Fortunately, at that time a true professional was fulfilling duties of the operations duty officer at the system command post, Lieutenant Colonel Engineer S.Ye. Petrov<sup>11</sup>, deputy chief of the office of combat algorithms and programs. Instantly analyzing and evaluating the environment and situation, he did not permit false information to be issued to the command post of the missile attack warning system. By order of the Minister of Defense, a commission chaired by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General V.I. Varennikov, was appointed for this emergency. A.I. Savin and I were his deputies.

I had occasion to meet fairly often with Valentin Ivanovich [Varennikov] on duty matters. In my view, he is intelligent, well-educated, firm-willed, courageous, and good-natured. He is a man of duty, honor, and conscience. He conducted the investigation objectively and competently.

Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Troops A.I. Koldunov and I had occasion to be present during his report to D.F. Ustinov on the results received by the commission. Judging from the atmosphere of the meeting, the relations of the minister of defense with the leadership of the General Staff were strained. But despite this, Dmitriy Fedorovich [Ustinov] accepted Varennikov's report without questions, remarks, or organizational conclusions. Most likely, D.F. Ustinov knew general designers A.I. Savin and V.M. Kovtunenکو well and treated them with respect and trust.

A.I. Savin, unquestionably a talented scientist and designer, together with the collective from the Kometa Central Scientific Research Institute undertook the task of detecting the launch of ballistic missiles from the territory of continents and ocean and sea water areas. The complexity consisted of the fact that spacecraft from orbits 35-40,000 km in altitude were to be detected with a high degree of reliability 2-3 minutes after their launch, and the information was to be passed to the space system command post.

It is not worth talking about how complicated it is to identify missile launches at night from U.S. territory, literally illuminated by powerful light sources. On a daily basis the spacecraft observed literally thousands of aircraft takeoffs on afterburner. The electromagnetic disturbances in space as a result of unpredicted solar flares and also during the spacecraft's crossing of the so-called "terminator," when it leaves the space illuminated by the sun and goes into the earth's shadow, were still not fully known.

Checking out the system by the method of experiments developed for the most critical situations in order to reveal and eliminate flaws in the spacecraft's detection equipment, onboard computer programs, in the equipment complex, and especially in the command post combat program.

All work was analyzed in detail by A.I. Savin directly at the command post. I was struck by his self-control, intelligence, and ability to analyze his own miscalculations principally and critically. Incidentally, this was instructive for certain other general and chief designers, who during failures tried without basis to shift the blame on whomever, including the combat crew, considering themselves to be without guilt.

We military people were impressed by the fact that A.I. Savin always first listened to the opinions of combat crew officials, specialists of the SNII of the National Air Defense Troops, and then his deputies and immediate assistants—K.A. Vlasko-Vlasov, V.G. Khlitko, and Ts.G. Litovchenko. He consulted M.I. Nenashev and me. He thoughtfully worked out proposals and made modifications, which were repeated checked.

V.M. Kovtunenکو preferred to examine the circumstances associated with the failure of the spacecraft in his own office at the Scientific Production Association imeni S.A. Lavochkin, since there was a mockup of the spacecraft there on which the situation that arose during the failure could be reproduced, and then repeatedly check the effectiveness of the modifications. It was not easy for Kovtunenکو to work; he had to conduct a fierce debate with managers and designers of many design bureaus and plants manufacturing component parts for the spacecraft. Each of them believed someone other than their own firm was at fault for the failure of the spacecraft. Moreover, it was necessary to consider: the rigid requirements of the general designer of the system, A.I. Savin, who was always supported by the military—the chief of the contracting directorate M.I. Nenashev, SNII specialists, and representatives of the Main Space Systems Directorate. The question of a claim always arose; those at fault were to pay the Ministry of Defense approximately three million rubles for the spacecraft failure.

I will note that for the general designers and for me, too, the unsuccessful launch or premature failure of a spacecraft was not only a tragedy but also useful experience. With a negative result after a thorough analysis, an opportunity appeared to determine the causes and take steps to increase the reliability significantly.

The CINC of the National Air Defense Troops A.I. Koldunov reacted differently toward this. He had to sign the reports to the Minister of Defense, and they were naturally impartial. Many times he rudely rebuked both me and, less often, A.I. Savin.

By the mid-1980's, through the efforts of A.I. Savin and the collective of the Kometa Central Scientific Research Institute, V.M. Kovtunenکو, and his closest assistants



A.G. Chesnokov and A.L. Rodin, the space-based system was brought to the required level of specifications and became the most reliable and effective basis in the integrated missile attack warning system. This is of special importance in connection with the serious decrease in the combat capabilities of above-the-horizon radar equipment for detection of ballistic missiles on their flight trajectories, now located in CIS countries on several avenues of likely missile attack.

A most important element in the integrated Missile Attack Warning System is the several territorially separated, synchronously operating command posts. In the fully automatic mode, the command posts receive extensive information about the technical condition of the entire system, and warning information is also sent automatically to the command and control facilities of the Supreme High Command being warned and to the command authorities of the armed services on a special "Krokus" warning panel. I remember the three of us—chief designer of the Missile Attack Warning System V.G. Repin, Colonel-General V.K. Strelnikov<sup>12</sup>, commander of a separate special-purpose army, and I—depicted on a sheet of paper a sketch of the front panel, in our opinion, of the "Krokus" for special briefcases of the top leadership of the country and the armed forces which contained warning information.

Undoubtedly, I should talk separately about such a brilliant personality as V.K. Strelnikov. In 1967, upon graduating from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov, he was appointed Commander of a Missile Attack Warning Division being organized for the first time. He commanded it for 10 years. His name is associated with the development of the large unit and the purposeful education of military collectives aimed at unconditional accomplishment of a combat mission of national importance.

He set the tone in mastering new combat equipment.

He was the first among line commanders to become a candidate of military sciences. And quite deservedly, he was the first commander of a separate missile attack warning army.

The task of reliability and survivability of the system and its equipment was successfully accomplished. Each facility has triple redundancy of the production equipment and special technical equipment, and also several separated power supply feeds. Self-contained power sources were also created based on magneto-gas-dynamic generators. Landline and cable communications also have several lead-ins. The facilities are equipped with satellite, radio, and facsimile communications.

The following made an invaluable contribution to the creation, development, and improvement of the operation of the system: M.M. Kolomiyets, V.V. Rozhkov<sup>13</sup>, V.K. Strelnikov, I.A. Slukhay<sup>14</sup>, V. M. Smirnov<sup>15</sup>, A.V. Sokolov<sup>16</sup>, V.P. Panchenko<sup>17</sup>, N.V. Kislyakov<sup>18</sup>, A.B. Novitskas<sup>19</sup>, N.I. Rodionov, V.I. Motornyy<sup>20</sup>, G.A.

Vylegzhanin<sup>21</sup>, A.K. Mikhaylov, N.G. Zavaliy<sup>22</sup>, A.P. Blinov, V.M. Shumilin, and many others.

In the creation and particularly in the testing and operation of the ABM and missile attack warning systems, one should make note of the collective of the SNII created in the 1960's, which I have already mentioned. At that time it was headed by I.M. Penchukov<sup>23</sup> and his deputy for scientific work, N.P. Buslenko<sup>24</sup>. In subsequent years, the institute was led by Yu.G. Yerokhin<sup>25</sup> and today by G.S. Batyr<sup>26</sup>. The deputy for scientific research work is M.D. Kislik<sup>27</sup>. This institute was the scientific headquarters when commissions headed by me examined a number of preliminary projects. Favorable conditions were created for carrying out the tasks entrusted to the commissions. I talk about this with great satisfaction—after all, I was associated with this remarkable collective for many years.

More than 20 doctors and about 100 candidates of sciences labored productively at the SNII. The institute's leading scientists were: for the ABM system—G.I. Butko<sup>28</sup>; for the Missile Attack Warning System—G.V. Kononenko, B.S. Srebushevskiy, G.S. Suvorov, V.V. Ognev, and A.M. Tseytlenok. The institute was the first in the Ministry of Defense to successfully solve the problem of evaluating the combat effectiveness of complex, essentially unique, and completely automated complexes and weapons systems. The task was accomplished both according to results of full-scale testing and by mathematical modeling. Scientific method foundations of testing and commissioning these complexes and systems were developed. What is more, the institute's specialists, working constantly directly at the facilities, carefully analyzed the experience of operation and drew up the corresponding recommendations for the troops and the requirements for the designers. It is hard to overestimate the productive labor of the institute's scientists and specialists. Running ahead, I will note that the leading scientists were awarded two State Prizes and several Leninist Komsomol Prizes for the research performed and implemented in the troops.

There is something I would like to say in conclusion. A great deal of labor and maximum use of intellectual and economic potentials of the Soviet state created an integrated missile attack warning system... It was, is, and, I hope, will be a decisive deterrent factor in unleashing a nuclear missile war. For any aggressor will always receive a guaranteed, devastating, retaliatory strike.

We cannot and do not have the right to close our eyes to the fact that the great Soviet Union is no more. The Missile Attack Warning System, particularly its above-the-horizon detection and position finding equipment, has been weakened significantly by the ambitions of politicians who have received sovereignty. Urgent measures are needed for restoration of the system and its improvement under the direction and control of the government and the armed forces of Russia. After all, all components of the nuclear missile strike warning system are being improved continuously in the United States.

Footnotes

1. Yuliy Vladimirovich Polyak (1922-1993)—scientist and designer in the field of applied radio engineering. Section chief at the Radio Engineering Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1963 was chief designer of the Dniester and Dnieper radars. Doctor of technical sciences, professor, and winner of the State Prize.
2. Sergey Leonidovich Sokolov (born 1911)—Marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union. In 1964 was first deputy commander of the Moscow Military District. In 1965 was commander of the Leningrad Military District. In 1967 was first deputy minister of defense, and from December 1984 through 30 May 1987 was USSR minister of defense.
3. Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Ivantsov (born 1913)—scientist and designer in the field of radar. Hero of Socialist Labor. Deputy chief designer for the Dniester and Dnieper radars at the Radio Engineering Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1971 he was chief designer of the Daryal radar—the first with a phased-array antenna. Doctor of technical sciences and winner of the State Prize.
4. Mikhail Aleksandrovich Kartsev (1923-1983)—scientist and designer in the field of computer technology. In 1969 was director of the Scientific Research Institute of Computer Technology and chief designer of the following computers: SE-71, SE-73, SE-66, and M-13. Winner of the State Prize.
5. Vladislav Georgiyevich Repin (born 1935)—scientist and designer in the field of information systems and electronics. Hero of Socialist Labor. In 1962 was director of a scientific laboratory at the Vympel Experimental Design Bureau. In 1970 was chief designer of the missile attack warning system. Doctor of technical sciences, professor, and winner of the State Prize.
6. Anatoliy Ivanovich Savin (born 1920)—scientist and designer in the field of radio engineering systems. Hero of Socialist Labor. From 1973 was director of the Kometa Central Scientific Research Institute, general designer of space-based warning system and antiballistic-missile defense system. Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the Russian Federation. Winner of the Lenin Prize and four State Prizes.
7. Frants Aleksandrovich Kuzminskiy (1922-1991)—scientist and designer in the field of over-the-horizon radar. Chief engineer at the NIIDAR and chief designer of the over-the-horizon radar. In 1973 was director of the NIIDAR.
8. Abo Sergeyevich Sharakshane (born 1922)—major-general of aviation. In 1958 was deputy chief engineer for testing at the State Range of the National Air Defense Forces. In 1961 was directorate chief at this range. In 1962 was directorate chief at the SNII of the Ministry of Defense. Doctor of technical sciences, professor, and winner of the State Prize.
9. Fedor Fedorovich Yevstratov (born 1937)—colonel, scientist and designer in the field of radar. In 1981 was chief of scientific research department of the NIIDAR. In 1979 was chief designer of the over-the-horizon radar. Candidate of technical sciences.
10. Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Kovtunenkov (born 1921)—scientist and designer in the field of ballistics, strength, and aerodynamics of ballistic missiles. Hero of Socialist Labor. General designer of the Scientific Production Association imeni S.A. Lavochkin. Corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Active member of the International Aeronautics Academy. Winner of the Lenin Prize and State Prize.
11. Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov (born 1939)—lieutenant colonel. In 1972 was senior engineer of the office of combat algorithms and programs of the space-based warning system; from 1974 deputy chief of this office.
12. Vladimir Konstantinovich Strelnikov (born 1925)—colonel-general. In 1967 was commander of a missile attack warning division. In 1977 was commander of a separate missile attack warning army. From 1980 chief of the Air Defense Military Engineering Radiotechnical Academy. Candidate of technical sciences.
13. Vadim Vladimirovich Rozhkov (born 1928)—major-general. From 1976 chief engineer of the department for creating space defense installations. Winner of the State Prize.
14. Ivan Andreyevich Slukhay (born 1924)—major general. In 1969 was chief of the political section of an air defense corps and senior inspector of the Political Directorate of the National Air Defense Forces for antiballistic missile and space defense.
15. Viktor Mikhaylovich Smirnov (born 1939)—lieutenant-general. In 1977 was commander of a radiotechnical missile attack warning center. In 1985 was chief of an operations section—deputy chief of staff. In 1986 was first deputy commander and in 1988 commander of a separate missile attack warning army. From 1991 commander of Missile-Space Defense Forces of the National Air Defense Forces.
16. Anatoliy Vasilyevich Sokolov (born 1946)—lieutenant-general. In 1982 was commander of a radiotechnical missile attack warning center. In 1985 was commander of a division and from 1991 commander of a separate missile attack warning army.
17. Viktor Pavlovich Panchenko (born 1934)—major-general. In 1977 was deputy commander of a separate missile attack warning army; from 1977 chief of the Armament Directorate. Candidate of technical sciences.



18. Nikolay Vladimirovich Kislyakov (born 1929)—major-general. In 1965 was deputy commander for armament of a radiotechnical missile attack warning center. In 1970 was deputy division commander for armament. In 1982 was chief engineer of the armament service of the headquarters of the commander of the ABM and space defense troops of the National Air Defense Forces.
19. Albertas Boleslavo Novitskas (born 1936)—colonel. In 1958 was commander of a radar company in the Separate Turkistan Air Defense Corps. In 1972 was deputy chief of staff for battle management of a radiotechnical missile attack warning center. In 1977 was commander of a radiotechnical missile attack warning center.
20. Vsevolod Ivanovich Motornyy (born 1930)—colonel. In 1973 was chief of the office of combat algorithms and programs of a radiotechnical missile attack warning center. In 1974 was section chief of a division. In 1977 was chief of an operational and combat employment section—deputy chief of staff of a separate missile attack warning army.
21. Gennadiy Aleksandrovich Vylegzhanin (born 1927)—major-general. In 1967 was deputy division commander. In 1972 was commander of a missile attack warning division. In 1977 was first deputy commander of a separate missile attack warning army.
22. Nikolay Grigoryevich Zavaliy (born 1924)—lieutenant-general. In 1965 was chief of a combat and operational training section of a directorate for creating an ABM system. In 1971 was chief of staff of a separate ABM corps. In 1977 was chief of staff of a separate missile attack warning army.
23. Ivan Makarovich Penchukov (born 1920)—lieutenant-general. In 1957 was deputy chief of the State Range of the National Air Defense Forces. He was the first chief and creator of the Special Scientific Research Institute (SNII) of the Ministry of Defense. Doctor of technical sciences, professor, and winner of the State Prize.
24. Nikolay Panteleymonovich Buslenko (1922-1977)—colonel-engineer. In 1960 was deputy chief of the SNII for scientific work. Corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
25. Yuriy Gavrilovich Yerokhin (1934-1990)—lieutenant-general. In 1969 was deputy chief of an experimental directorate. In 1971 was chief of a scientific research unit of the State Range of the National Air Defense Forces. In 1976 was deputy chief of the SNII for scientific research work. In 1978 was chief of the SNII. Doctor of technical sciences and professor.
26. Gennadiy Sergeyevich Batyr (born 1939)—major-general. In 1971 was chief of the integrated office of research of the headquarters of the State Range of the National Air Defense Forces. In 1986 was deputy chief of the SNII for scientific research work. From 1990, chief of the SNII. Candidate of technical sciences.
27. Mikhail Dmitriyevich Kislik (born 1922)—colonel. In 1965 was deputy chief of the SNII for scientific research work. Doctor of technical sciences, professor, and winner of the Lenin Prize and two State Prizes.
28. Gelios Ivanovich Butko (1930-1990)—colonel. In 1967 was section chief at the SNII. In 1985 was chief of the Directorate for Air Defense Problems at the same institute. Doctor of technical sciences, professor, and winner of the State Prize.

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## GROUND TROOPS

### RPG-7 With PG-7VR 40/105-mm Warhead

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4 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Oleg Uspenskiy, under the rubric: "Arsenal": "RPG-7: Using a Tandem Grenade Against a Tank"]

[Text] M.T. Kalashnikov-designed assault rifles have a worldwide reputation. Much less has been written about our portable antitank grenade launchers. Meanwhile they are worthy of respect and the highest assessment in their class of weapons. The RPG-7 is in the inventory of 40 countries' armies and is being manufactured in some of them.

The RPG-7's design concept was developed at the end of the 1950's. An active-reactive ballistic design for an antitank weapon (Chief Designer V.K. Firulin) was used in this grenade launcher for the first time. In other words, the grenade "gathers momentum" using two engines—launch and sustainer—which provides a significant advantage in firing range. The RPG-7 with this projectile (PG-7V) was accepted into the inventory in 1961. This design was utilized more than a decade later in foreign grenade launchers (Sweden, Germany).

The PG-7V basic projectile reliably penetrated the armor of the main battle tanks of the 1960's. The employment of the RPG-7 in a combat situation, specifically in the Middle East, convinced us of that.

The PG-7VM and PG-7VS projectiles, which provided a greater armor penetrating capability with a smaller caliber, were accepted into the inventory at a later date.

However, the age-old battle of projectile and armor seriously intensified with the appearance of layered composite armor that was developed in England. They used it in the armor protection of the Challenger (Great Britain), M1 Abrams (United States), and Leopard-2 (Germany) tanks. It is much more difficult for armor-piercing and shaped-charge projectiles to penetrate this

type of armor. The development of the PG-7VI projectile, with a powerful warhead that guarantees an armor penetrating capability of up to 600 mm, for the RPG-7 was our designers' response. This was achieved by increasing the caliber of the grenade, the weight of the explosive and improvement of the shaped charge [kumulyativnyy uzel]. Indeed, in the process the firing range was reduced.

The appearance of dynamic protection (reactive armor) further intensified the problem of maintaining the RPG-7's effectiveness (as, by the way, of all other grenade launchers and also ATGM's [antitank guided missiles]). Reactive armor is comparatively small units that are attached to the main armor of the tank or armored infantry vehicle. Elements consisting of two plates that are separated by a layer of explosives are located in a unit. When a grenade hits, the element's explosives detonate, the strike wave and the stream of fragments disperse the shaped jet and its energy is significantly lost for penetrating the portions of the plates. Increasing the grenade's power does not provide increased effectiveness in this case.

And yet a solution to this problem has also been found. The PG-7VR projectile with a tandem warhead—with two shaped charges located one behind the other—was developed for the RPG-7 under the direction of Chief Designer I.Ye. Rogozin ("Bazalt" State Scientific Production Enterprise). They operate in succession. The first destroys the dynamic protection and the second penetrates the main armor. In this manner, our portable grenade launcher was the first in the class of grenade launcher weapons to provide the capability to combat tanks equipped with dynamic protection elements.

An RPG-7 with a PG-7VR tandem projectile penetrated an armor plate equipped with dynamic protection—a model of the latest tank armor—at the arms exhibition in Abu-Dhabi (United Arab Emirates) in the spring of 1993. This caused a sensation. Just like this projectile penetrating through a half-meter thick steel-reinforced concrete cube. We can say that the domestically-produced RPG-7 portable antitank grenade launcher that was developed several decades ago is experiencing a second birth.

#### Tactical-Technical Specifications of the RPG-7 Grenade Launcher With a PG-7VR Projectile

Caliber, mm	40/105
Weight of the grenade launcher, kg	6.9
Weight of the projectile, kg	4.5
Aimed range, m	200
<b>Effectiveness:</b>	
—Destruction of armored targets	tanks of all types, including those equipped with dynamic protection
—Steel-reinforced concrete penetrating capability, m	1.5
—Capability to penetrate wooden-earth barriers, m	2.7
Temperature range of employment, °C	+/-50

#### Grachev Praises Volga MD Troops' Combat Readiness

PM1102110794 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 11 Feb 94 p 1

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov report: "Combat Readiness of Volga Military District Troops Is High"]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Feb—According to Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, satisfaction with the troops' high state of combat readiness was what emerged from his three-day tour of five Volga Military District troop units.

Before flying back to Moscow Wednesday evening Pavel Grachev spoke positively during a conversation with your ITAR-TASS correspondent of the progress made in looking after subunits withdrawn from abroad in the region. According to the minister, housing is being built for servicemen at a tremendous pace. Pavel Grachev visited three oblasts and one republic in the course of the trip and expressed his satisfaction with the local leadership's attitude to servicemen's problems.

During the trip the minister was acquainted with the troops stationed in Ulyanovsk Oblast, visited defense enterprises, and met the oblast and city leadership. During a visit to Ulyanovsk's "Aviastar" Joint-Stock Company, the largest aviation enterprise in Europe, Pavel Grachev said that in the near future priority in defense aviation will be given to military transporters, whose task is to redeploy forces and weapons to any region. This task stems from Russia's military doctrine, which places emphasis on mobile rapid response forces.

The An-124 "Ruslan" transporter produced by the aviation industry with a load capacity of 100 tonnes can replace three or four Il-76's in military transport movements.

Viktor Mikhaylov, general director of "Aviastar," pointed out that two new-generation Tu-204's were acquired for the Russian president recently. The enterprise also received a government order to build three aircraft for the command post of the supreme commander in chief of the Russian Armed Forces—the president. In the opinion of military experts, around 100 An-124 and Il-86 military transporters are needed for the

Russian Army since the bulk of these types of aircraft remained in the former Union republics following the breakup of the USSR. However, it will be no easy matter to carry out these projects. Problems have arisen with receipt of spare parts owing to the severing of economic ties. In particular, the "Aviastar" Joint-Stock Company depends on Ukraine, Latvia, and Uzbekistan for supplies of engines and electronics. At present the Ulyanovsk aviation enterprise is manufacturing four or five An-124's a year and it will be extremely difficult to rapidly attain full capacity, even with good funding.

Pavel Grachev also inspected the Ulyanovsk Electromechanical Plant, which manufactures antiaircraft artillery systems and antiaircraft missile systems, and met with the command and personnel of the 104th Airborne Division, which was withdrawn from Azerbaijan to Ulyanovsk last year.

#### **Grachev Examines Situation in Volga MD**

*LD1102121594 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1726 GMT 10 Feb 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Feb—Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has been visiting the Volga Military District, where he thoroughly familiarized himself with the state of affairs there. This is the first tour of its kind that he has conducted this year. A large number of units withdrawn from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics are being resettled in this district. During his three-day visit, the Minister checked on the combat readiness of the forces and on the progress in building military compounds. He visited a number of defense plants and met administration heads from the region's towns and oblasts.

Over 270,000 servicemen have been brought back to Russia since 1992. A large number of them are being resettled in the Volga region. There were about 14,000 homeless officers and warrant officers in the district at the beginning of February. Two German-Turkish firms, Tekfen and Enka, are building military compounds in Chernorechye, Samara Oblast, and Chaykovskiy, Penza Oblast for units of the 2d Guards Tank Army, which is being withdrawn from Germany.

Construction work is behind schedule, however. The contract, worth 200 million German marks, stipulates that 1,910 apartments, complete with infrastructure, must be completed in Chernorechye by 1 July 1994. However, the firm will not meet this deadline. It blames inflation, the unreliability of its Russian subcontractors, and difficult weather conditions in Russia. Grachev was not convinced by these arguments. After talking to the firm's manager, he received a promise that schools and most of the officers' housing would be fully commissioned by 1 September, and the rest of the compound would be completed by the end of the year.

Construction of housing near the town of Chaykovskiy in Perm Oblast is also behind schedule. Enka has failed to meet the original deadline for commissioning of the compound—1 January 1994. The revised deadline of 1 September 1994 is also in jeopardy. Not even half the apartments are ready yet. Basically, the foreign firms proved to be not fully prepared for construction work under Russian conditions.

During his visit to the Aviastar Joint-Stock Company at Ulyanovsk, the minister noted that development of military transport aviation is a task that must be tackled in the near future because a large proportion of these planes remained outside Russia after the USSR collapsed. Military experts believe that the Russian Army needs about 100 transport planes of the Tu-124 ("Ruslan") type—manufactured by Aviastar—as well as the Il-86, for rapid deployment of mobile forces in any region.

#### **Radio Communications in Motorized-Rifle Battalion**

*94UM0177A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK in Russian No 9, Sep 1993 (signed to press 20 Aug 93) pp 47-51*

[Article by Military Communications Academy Senior Instructor, Colonel P. Kostevyat: "Radio Communications in a Motorized-Rifle Battalion"]

[Text] Tactical conditions (the type of battle, the conditions for entry into it, and the nature of the conduct of combat operations), the role and place of the subunit in the combat formation, the combat mission, organization of coordination and the command and control system, enemy capabilities to destroy it, and also the terrain, time of year and time of day affect the organization and support of radio communications in a motorized-rifle battalion. Furthermore, communications in a battalion largely depend on the condition of the equipment and the experience of the specialists.


Let's examine how today, in our view, it is most advisable to utilize radio communications to support continuous command and control of elements of the battalion's combat formation and of coordinating subunits.

Let's assume that a motorized-rifle battalion is part of a motorized-rifle brigade and that it has to transition from one type of battle to another in a short period of time during the course of combat operations. For example, in defense—to conduct an offensive against an enemy that has broken through, in an offensive—to repel an enemy counterattack or, on the march—to enter a meeting engagement. Both organic subunit radio communications systems and also radios that are in the armored vehicles of the battalion's companies and platoons will be used to support radio communications.

In certain situations (specifically, while operating as a tactical air assault force, in the mountains, on swampy terrain, etc.), the motorized-rifle battalion can accomplish the combat mission without heavy weapons and



Organization of Radio Communications in a Motorized-Rifle Battalion (Variant).



equipment. Then they have to organize radio communications using only organic portable radios.

Consequently, you need to plan radio communications beforehand so that it satisfies command and control requirements to the maximum extent possible and its diagram does not require major changes under any conditions of the combat situation. Experience shows that a radio net and a type of its operation—open telephone communications using coded topographical maps, prearranged message codes and tables of call signs of ranking officers—is the primary method of organization. One of these variants is shown in the above diagram.

Let's assume that the motorized-rifle battalion commander's (an R-14 BM or a BMP-1KSh), the chief of staff's (BTR-80K or BMP-1K), and the reconnaissance platoon commander's (BRM-1K) command-staff vehicles and two of the signals platoon's BMP-1's (BTR-80's) are deployed at the battalion command-observation post. The command-staff vehicles of the commanders of

the attached and supporting artillery, antiaircraft, tank, engineer and flame-thrower subunits can also be located here. It has not been excluded that the forward aircraft controller (FAC) will arrive here with R-853 (R-859, R-809) portable radios. Furthermore, communications personnel will set up the motorized-rifle battalion deputy commander for weapon's radios at the technical observation post which, as a rule, is located near the command-observation post.

#### Radio Communications With the Commander and Staff at the Next Higher Level

It is organized by motorized-rifle brigade headquarters communications instructions and it is best supported by brigade and battalion men and equipment.

It is desirable to support the motorized-rifle battalion commander's communications with the motorized-rifle brigade commander on two radio nets on HF and ultrashort wave-band radios in the open and encrypted modes. In the event of the loss of communications, you

need to provide for the entry of the battalion commander's HF radio into the headquarters' duty radio net through a higher echelon.

It is advisable to include an ultrashort wave radio that is in a BMP-1K on the brigade staff radio net to maintain communications with motorized-rifle brigade headquarters during battalion operations in armored vehicles. If personnel are fighting on foot, you need to carry out communications with the commander and staff at the next higher level using a portable ultra-shortwave radio.

When a motorized-rifle battalion is either the forward detachment, a tactical air assault force, or an anti-air-assault reserve, you need to organize the battalion commander's communications with the corresponding commander or staff by connecting radios of various bands into their radio net. Furthermore, if the battalion is acting as a TVD [tactical air assault force], it would also be good to have communications with the commander at the next higher level via a separate ultrashort wave or HF radio net.

We think that it is advisable for the motorized-rifle battalion reconnaissance commander to ensure he can operate on the motorized-rifle brigade reconnaissance chief's HF radio net to obtain the required information. And the commanders of the battalion's mortar battery, antitank platoon and attached artillery subunit operate in the ultrashort wave range on the brigade artillery chief's radio net. They can also receive information on the meteorological situation here. The air defense subunit commander's radio communications with the motorized-rifle brigade air defense chief should be organized on his ultrashort wave radio net.

If the commanders of the reconnaissance platoon, mortar battery and air defense platoon are located directly at the motorized-rifle battalion command-observation post, the battalion commander has the opportunity to obtain an alternate communications channel with the brigade commander through the radio net to which these subunits are connected.

Obviously the motorized-rifle battalion deputy commander for rear services and weapons needs to ensure that his radios operate on the ultra-shortwave radio nets of the appropriate higher-echelon authorities for effective resolution of issues.

And one more thing. A brigade traffic control and regulating service radio net is created on ultra-shortwave band radios for command and control of battalion subunit movements forward to occupy defense areas, at the final coordination line and also while completing a march. The motorized-rifle battalion commander's radio should be linked to that net.

#### **Radio Communications With the Commanders of Subordinate, Attached or Supporting Subunits**

It is best of all to plan command and control of battalion subunits on three radio nets on R-111, R-123, R-159 and R-158 radios.

The first radio net is a battalion commander radio net (R-111 and R-123 radios are utilized during operations in armored vehicles and R-158 and R-159 radios are used while on foot). The radios of the motorized-rifle battalion commander, chief of staff, and the commanders of the motorized-rifle companies, antitank platoon, air defense platoon and signals platoon should operate on it. Furthermore, the radios of the commanders of the mortar battery and reconnaissance platoon should be connected to it when their command and control posts are located apart from the motorized-rifle battalion command-observation post. A total of 7-10 subscribers can operate here. This composition of the radio net will permit the battalion commander to have stable command and control of all elements of the combat formation, while ensuring close coordination among themselves during the course of the battle.

We need to note that when the enemy creates jamming and when it is impossible to maintain communications with radios installed in BMP's and BTR's, you need to shift to operations on a radio net using portable radios and, of course, to shift to another frequency.

The second radio net—is also a battalion commander radio net but one that is already linked to the radios of the motorized-rifle battalion commander and chief of staff, and the commanders of motorized-rifle companies, armored vehicle groups, and fire ambushes. The following may be a part of this net: The motorized-rifle battalion deputy commander for weapons, the reconnaissance (combat reconnaissance) patrol, combat security, and detachments for the elimination of the aftereffects of enemy use of weapons of mass destruction, traffic control, removal of obstacles and other temporary formations. Here we must provide for the operations of the commanders of the attached artillery, tank, anti-aircraft, engineer and flame-thrower subunits. The total number of subscribers is high—20-22. But for the time being there is no other solution.

And finally, communications with rear services and technical support subunits is organized on a special radio net. The chief of staff radio, located in the command-observation post, is the main one. It is advisable to include on the radio net the radios of the battalion deputy commander for weapons (at the technical observation post), the commanders of the VMO [logistical support platoon], VTO [technical support platoon] and MEDV [medical platoon] and also the armored vehicles designated for evacuation of damaged vehicles. Furthermore, the motorized-rifle battalion's combat subunit radios can be enlisted to resolve the issues of evacuating the wounded from the battlefield and delivering ammunition.

The last radio net is not created during battalion operations without heavy weapons and equipment. In this case, the radios of the commanders of the logistical support platoon, technical support squad and medical platoon can be included on the motorized-rifle battalion commander's second radio net.

As we can see, the organization of the data of the three radio nets in the battalion increases the stability of communications and provides the required information



transmission capacity among all elements of its combat formation. It is also quite important that the issues of coordination can be efficiently resolved in the process.

In cases when the number of radios in the motorized-rifle battalion is limited, the battalion commander's communications with all subunits will have to be maintained on one radio net on ultrashort wave-band radios. This variant is also acceptable while completing a march.

It is also advisable to conduct the supervision of the attached tank company by including the battalion commander's and chief of staff's R-123 radios on this subunit commander's radio net.

If an artillery battalion will support the motorized-rifle battalion, their commanders will communicate either personally (when the command posts are collocated) or through the artillery battalion and tank company commanders' radio nets.

Communications with aircraft are provided through the FAC. The experience of conducting combat operations in Afghanistan showed that he usually arrived at the motorized-rifle battalion command-observation post with a portable radio and operated on aircraft and combat helicopter command and control and also target designation and guidance vectoring radio nets.

#### **Radio Communications for Coordination**

We know that precise organization of coordination is one of the main conditions for the successful execution of combat missions by the battalion. However, you won't manage to create special radio nets for its support in a motorized-rifle battalion because additional radios are needed to do that. And yet there is a solution: The exchange of information between the elements of the combat formation is carried out through reciprocal entry into the appropriate radio nets, for example, via the battalion commander's radio net but with the authorization of the main station.

Moreover, this issue is also being resolved through personal contact. This is possible when the commanders of the motorized-rifle company and artillery battery are collocated at a single command and control post, etc.

Thus, we must widely employ the method of reciprocal entry into the needed radio nets to ensure reliable coordination in the battalion and its subunits. Indeed, with one essential condition: The motorized-rifle battalion communications chief must think through this issue beforehand and disseminate the required radio operating data to the appropriate commanders.

#### **Radio Communications in Battalion Subunits**

The corresponding commanders' radio nets are organized to ensure command and control in motorized-rifle battalion companies, the mortar battery and independent platoons. The men and equipment of the signals platoon and also of the subunits are utilized here.

In each motorized-rifle company, radio communications are ensured with the commanders of platoons, armored groups and the fire ambush on the radio net using R-158 and R-123 radios. This same radio net is also used to carry out command and control of the crews of the armored personnel vehicles that will provide fire support to disembarked motorized riflemen who are on foot.

It is advisable to provide two radio nets on behalf of the mortar battery commander. The first radio net is for communications with the senior officer who is located at the fire positions and with the forward (flank) observation post. The mortar battery command and control platoon's R-159 portable radios are used here.

The second radio net is designated for command and control of the mortar platoons. It consists of the senior officer's and mortar platoon commander's R-159 radios.

From the diagram it is obvious that, when necessary, the mortar battery commander can directly command the fire platoons.

Proceeding from the assumption that observation posts will be sent out from the reconnaissance platoon in the defense and while preparing for an offensive, its commander can be located at the motorized-rifle battalion command-observation post. Then you need to organize the reconnaissance platoon commander's radio net (on R-123 and R-158 radios) on which communications can be carried out with the observation posts.

You need to provide for the creation of a special radio net for the antitank platoon commander through which he will be able to control the operations of the subordinate SPG-9 and ATGM [antitank guided missile] squads using R-123 and R-158 radios.

Destruction of airborne targets in battle is the mission of the air defense subunit; by way of illustration, the SAM [surface-to-air missile] platoon. Therefore, here we need to have a radio net on R-123, R-147 or R-147P radios, through which its commander will maintain communications with the commanders of subordinate crews and air defense gunners-SAM operators. The latter have an R-147P radio receiver. Therefore, they will also be able to receive, in a timely manner, commands for the destruction of enemy helicopters and aircraft.

The motorized-rifle battalion commander and chief of staff must have the capability to enter their radios into the appropriate radio nets in order to, for example, transmit an urgent order to some subunit or other. This task has been accomplished. However, the communications chief must prepare and issue them the needed radio operating data beforehand.

Now, on the reception of warning signals on the airborne enemy or radioactive, chemical, or biological (bacteriological) contamination. They are being transmitted out of any sequence from brigade headquarters to all of its

commander's active radio nets. You need to immediately disseminate received signals to the personnel of subordinate, attached and supporting subunits.

In conclusion, we can say that reliable command and control of all elements of the battalion's combat formation using radio communications can be ensured through not only its skillful planning but also through proper protection from enemy jamming. The motorized-rifle battalion has all of the capabilities to do that. They only need to be fully utilized.

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## AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### Russia Lags in Airborne Reconnaissance

PM1402145194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 11 Feb 94 p 2

[Colonel Aleksandr Manushkin "Observer's Notes": "Reconnaissance Aircraft: They Still Fly Along the Borders Despite the Warming of the International Climate and the End of the Cold War"]

[Excerpts] This is a routine episode from the daily work of the Air Force reconnaissance service. Admittedly, now that the cold war is far behind us and relations of trust and mutual understanding are being established between states, such an episode may seem to the uninitiated to be an anachronism. Is it still necessary to carry out reconnaissance such as this today, you might ask. Well, judge for yourself. Despite the strengthening of confidence and mutual understanding between the countries of West and East Europe, every day reconnaissance planes take off from foreign airfields and head toward the borders of Russia and the CIS countries. According to recent data in my possession, in 1993 alone NATO countries and other states carried out over 2,600 reconnaissance flights near the borders of the Russian Federation and our immediate neighbors. At the present moment the NATO countries support a whole armada—470 reconnaissance planes and base patrol aircraft—in the allied and national air forces. The main types of tactical reconnaissance planes are the RF-4C, the RF-16, the AMX, the Jaguar GR1, the Mirage F-1CR, and the Tornado FR and GR1 [as published]. The tactical and technical characteristics of these planes are given in the table below. In addition, the U.S. Air Force has over 60 strategic reconnaissance planes.

In addition to this number around another 150 reconnaissance planes and base patrol planes belonging to the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea and stationed in Asia and the Pacific also constantly monitor Russia's borders.

To be fair, it should be noted that since the end of the cold war the intensity of these flights has diminished year by year. To be precise, the 1993 figure was 12 percent down on 1992. But you will agree that 2,600

reconnaissance flights a year are still rather a lot. In short, Russia's neighbors near and far are keeping us under constant observation. Incidentally, they are doing this not just from the air but also from the ground and from space. What is there for us to do?

Despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia is still a vast state. In terms of length of border and size (the area of the Russian Federation is 17.1 million square km), it is still the largest country in the world. Russia's geostrategic position is unique because it is situated in both Europe and Asia and, consequently, it is bound to have interests in those parts of the world. In view of that fact the Russian Federation is obliged to follow the development of military-political processes both in the Asia and Pacific region and in Europe and, indeed, in the Near and Middle East, which are just 1-2 hours' flying time from our territory. In short, Russia needs constant, objective information on the states surrounding us. This information comes not just from the words and assurances of the politicians. Airborne reconnaissance is one objective source of that information, too. [passage omitted]

The Army and its most important component—the Air Force—like the whole country, are not having the best of times at the moment. Owing to the crisis in the economy and the disastrous lack of funds, the command of the Air Force is having to tackle tasks that contain many unknown quantities when it comes to the allocation of budget money: What is it to be spent on—wages, housing, spare parts, or procurement of new hardware?

"Owing to the shortage of fuel, spare parts, and other expendable materials," Lieutenant General of Aviation Nikolay Rastorguyev, directorate head and deputy chief of the Air Force Main Staff, said, "we have cut flights to a minimum beyond which we can go no further. Pilots are simply losing their skills."

I cannot fail to mention the fact that, as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the division of the Army, the Air Force reconnaissance service has suffered palpable losses. Some air regiments have been disbanded, some "privatized" by the former Union republics. For instance, there is one regiment of front-line reconnaissance aircraft left in Belarus and three regiments apiece in Ukraine and Central Asia.

Despite these losses, a Russian front-line reconnaissance aviation grouping has in the main been formed today. Units redeployed from distant and nearby foreign countries are settling down in their new bases and have embarked on combat training. And the claims by some mass media that the Air Force has curtailed combat training do not, to put it mildly, accord with reality. The example I cited at the beginning of these notes and a host of other facts attest that the Air Force reconnaissance service is always ready to perform and is performing its designated tasks.

Of course, they are having a hard time now. Everything is in short supply. Things are further aggravated by the

fact that over the last few years (owing to lack of proper funding) the Air Force has drastically cut procurement of new aviation hardware. That has also taken its toll on reconnaissance aviation. The stock of Su-17M4R, Mig-25RB, and Su-24MR planes is becoming outdated and worn-out, their service life is coming to an end, but there are no reinforcements or replacements. The program for commissioning the Sukhoi firm's new reconnaissance plane has been disrupted owing to lack of funding again, and will the Air Force even have the money to buy it? In short, if the current situation lasts another few years, in around 10 years the Air Force may be left without a reconnaissance service.

But what are we worrying about? The world situation is changing. And it seems to be changing for the better. Perhaps in 10 years or so Russia will not have any enemies or adversaries? God grant that that be true! But can we close our eyes to the fact that neither the United States nor the other NATO countries are giving up any of

their reconnaissance programs. In particular, reports have appeared in the Western press that the United States is developing the "Aurora" top-secret supersonic reconnaissance plane. With a range of 15,000-17,000 km and a speed of Mach 5-6 at altitudes of around 36,000 meters this aircraft with its two-man crew is capable of getting virtually anywhere in the world fast.

AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY also reports that the U.S. Air Force has allegedly taken delivery of the new "Black Manta" TR-3A operational-tactical reconnaissance aircraft. In short, despite the fact that international tension is obviously easing and relapses into "cold war" are a thing of the past, the leadership of the world's leading countries has not slackened its efforts to develop airborne reconnaissance systems, but is, on the contrary, trying to perfect them.

Come what may, Russia is historically destined to be a leading world power. And it cannot do without reconnaissance (airborne reconnaissance included).

**Basic Tactical/Technical Specifications of Russian Federation Air Force Front-Line Aviation Reconnaissance Aircraft**

Aircraft	Speed, kph	Flight Altitude, m	Tactical Operating Radius, km	Maximum Range, km
Su-17M4R	1,600	14,000	650	1,800
Mig-25RB	3,000	23,000	1,050	2,400
Su-24MR	1,500	17,000	900	2,500

**Basic Tactical-Technical Specifications of NATO Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft**

RF-4C	1,400	18,000	1,900	3,800
RF-16	1,300	18,000	1,500	3,300
AMX	1,060	13,000	890	2,400
Jaguar GR1	1,100	15,000	1,100	2,800
Mirage F-1CR	1,400	15,500	1,200	3,200
Tornado FR	1,350	15,000	1,330	3,200

**MiG-29's Stationed in Transbaykal Military District**

*PM1102172394 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0600 GMT 11 Feb 94*

[From the "Novosti" newscast: Video report from Chita Oblast by Aron Bardo and Nikolay Osipov, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Text] [0613.45] [Bardo over video of MiG's on military airfield, captioned "Chita Oblast"] Apart from the famous air shows in Le Bourget and Bangkok, these latest MiG-29 fighters have probably never enjoyed closer attention from journalists. The Transbaykal Military District Press Center organized a meeting between the Air Force unit's flight staff and representatives of the press, radio, and television.

Some 30 combat aircraft have been added to the arsenal of the Transbaykal District. The MiG-29 fighters, to which the Russian Air Force is switching, represent fundamentally new combat hardware, currently rated as the best in world military aircraft construction. It appears that we are still capable of producing something to amaze the planet. And while military analysts are trying to define the potential enemy and to determine the army's need for specific types of weapons, the Transbaykal pilots are carrying out their normal duties and rehearsing air combat techniques for repelling massive attacks by enemy aircraft.

Incidentally, REUTER recently confirmed the excellent reputation of this aircraft. It reported that Slovakia received a shipment of MiG-29's from Moscow in repayment of a Russian debt. [0614.50] [video shows MiG's on tarmac, missiles on trolley, aircraft taking off and landing, glimpse of officers in front of radar screen]



## NAVAL FORCES

### Adm Gromov Summarizes 1993 Training Year

94UM0196C Sevastopol FLAG RODINY in Russian  
12 Jan 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Admiral F. Gromov, Russian Federation Navy Commander-in-Chief; this article is published in its entirety in the first issue of MORSKOY SBORNIK for 1994: "Summarizing the Results of the Past Year and Looking at Next Year"]

[Text] Owing to fundamental changes in the domestic and foreign policy of the world's leading countries and expansion of their political and economic cooperation, the modern military-political situation is characterized by a decrease in the probability of nuclear missile war, as well as of a major armed collision involving conventional weapons. At the same time the danger of military conflicts remains in certain regions of the world and on Russia's southern borders, including in territories of former Soviet republics. This danger has economic, social, political and religious roots.

With regard for the present trends in the development of the military-political situation, the leading states of the West and the East are reexamining their foreign policy goals, their international obligations and their military doctrine and strategy. Emphasis is being laid in this case mainly on providing for regional security and preventing crises in different regions, with a special role being reserved for naval forces and deep reexamination of the concepts of their development and use.

The Russian Navy is fully involved in this process as well. The missions of the fleets in peace and in war have been refined, the effective combat strength and numerical strength of the Navy are being decreased, new forms of manning the fleets with highly professional personnel are being developed, and a complex of measures to improve the organizational structure of large strategic formations and combined units and to create new elements of their basing in the country's territory are being implemented. Much work has been done to substantiate the future development of both the Navy as a whole and its component services. Views on operational use and training of the fleets have changed significantly. The extent of the measures, their succession and their deadlines have been updated. Their actual implementation will depend to a significant degree on stabilization of the economy and of budget appropriations for development of the Navy.

Measures of trust between the navies of Russia and other countries continue to strengthen. Evidence of this can be found in reciprocal visits and joint exercises at sea. Last year detachments of our ships visited ports in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, China, France, Norway, Germany, Denmark, Turkey and South Korea. Joint tactical exercises, some involving combat drills employing practice weapons, were conducted with the navies of Canada, the United States and Great Britain.

Not only did these cruises have political significance, but they also promoted further improvement of the naval skills of the crews of our ships.

The tasks assigned to the Navy for 1993 have generally been completed. In the complex conditions of the Navy's reorganization and limited financing, we were able to preserve the existing combat readiness of the principal large strategic formations and combined units of the fleets, and their capability for promptly switching from a peacetime to a wartime footing in organized fashion, and carrying out their main operational missions within set time.

Despite the difficulties associated with manning the crews and maintaining the technical readiness of the ships, the intensity and effectiveness of their combat service and alert duty have risen somewhat. Strategic missile submarines patrolled their designated areas and maintained alert duty at their bases, ready to carry out their missions. General-purpose forces supported their ability to stand up in combat and monitored the reconnaissance activities of foreign navies. Ships of the Pacific Fleet successfully carried out their missions in coordination with multinational forces in the Persian Gulf, demonstrating Russia's support to United Nations sanctions against Iraq, while part of the Black Sea Fleet forces provided assistance to Georgia in stabilizing the situation in Poti.

Measures of operational, mobilizational and combat training were conducted more intensively last year. In them, the practical skills of the command and staffs in controlling the forces, and the means of operational use of forces in combined-arms and strategic operations to repel an aerospace invasion by an adversary were honed.

Command-and-staff exercises on maps, and joint command-and-staff and staff training exercises conducted without the participation of designated forces were the principal forms of operational and mobilizational training. This made it possible to maintain and improve the practical skills of commanders and staffs at the operational level to control the forces, but at the same time it reduced the number of sea cruises by ships and flights by aviation, which had a negative effect on the proficiency of naval and air units.

Combat training in the naval forces went generally according to plan in 1993—intensively and rhythmically. The best results were attained by the Northern Fleet, the large strategic formations and combined units under the command of captains 1st Rank S. Simenenko, V. Shchegolev, V. Krikunov and N. Temerev, and submarines under the command of captains 1st Rank V. Zakharov and A. Yefanov and Captain 2d Rank V. Kvasov.

At the same time we were unable to achieve noticeable improvement in combat training. Training and exercises were conducted in certain combined units and units at a low organizational and methodological level, and they failed to provide for full, high-quality work on specific

functional responsibilities of maintaining the high combat readiness of subordinated forces and their effective execution of combat training missions. Little attention was devoted to finding and mastering new tactics for the forces. Training was often dominated by passive forms, without the use of shore-based trainers and classrooms. The necessary measures to intensify combat training by improving the procedures of exercises, drills and training were not implemented.

Given the acute shortage of fuel and reduction of allocated engine life, stiffer requirements should have been imposed on the planning of tasks carried out by ships at sea. Every ship cruise should have been utilized with maximum effectiveness, with mutual support among different component services in practicing the missions for which they are intended, and with integrated use of weapons. But these requirements have not yet become a mandatory norm in all fleets.

Naval Aviation successfully embarked upon mastering the Su-27k deck-landing fighter in 1993, completing its tasks of combat service with high indicators. Air Force units of the Northern Fleet commanded by colonels I. Bokhonko and N. Levchenko may be mentioned as having done well. Reasonable results were attained by ASW [antisubmarine warfare] personnel of the Air Forces of the Pacific Fleet headed by colonels V. Udarov and A. Akhmeddyanov, and of the Baltic Fleet Air Forces commanded by Colonel N. Somov.

The Navy's shore-based forces successfully mastered new means of combat and prepared themselves for actions as elements of a combined air and sea attack echelon of an assault force, and for defense of important naval objectives and of portions of the seacoast accessible to assault forces, in coordination with other naval forces and combined ground troop units.

Despite objective difficulties associated with having the troops carry out missions atypical of them and the great shortage of personnel, the combat training plans were basically fulfilled in all combined units and units. Combat training proceeded intensively and at a high level of quality in the combined naval infantry unit under the command of Colonel A. Smolyak. Good results were attained by gunners under the leadership of Colonel M. Kumshatskiy and by naval infantry under the command of Major V. Novikov. Missilemen under the leadership of colonels A. Zabavin and S. Kazachukhin successfully completed all combat exercises. Combat training was poorer in the combined unit under the command of Colonel Ye. Kocheshkov, in which mistakes in organizational work by officers were the cause of insufficient preparedness of command and control elements and of poor fire skills of the personnel.

On the whole, last year the objectives of operational, mobilizational and combat training were reached with better quality in the Northern Fleet.

Unsolved problems in ship repair, in the repair of utilities and communication networks, and in supporting bases with technical resources, some of which are beyond their useful life, obsolete and worn out, also had a negative effect on fleet training progress.

Equipment failure still remains high aboard ships and vessels of the fleet. In this case around 60 percent of the total failures are technical ones having the following as their principal causes: poor work organization, weak special training of personnel, and failure to fulfill requirements of the leadership and operating instructions. The quality of technical maintenance and preparation of ships for sea cruises remains low, personnel continue to violate fire and explosion safety requirements during potentially dangerous work, and inspections of ship hulls, fittings and systems by permanent ship commissions are poor in certain combined units.

The role of staff specialists in providing for and maintaining the technical readiness of ships has been diminished in the fleets. Requirements on them in carrying out routine scheduled inspections are relaxed, and measures to eliminate faults and raise the level of repair training of the personnel are not being implemented promptly. The internal resources of combined units and ships for carrying out high quality planned preventive repairs and inspections are not being utilized fully.

The Pacific Fleet combined unit under the command of Rear Admiral A. Klimenok was the most unfavorable last year in terms of equipment failure. The rate of equipment failures associated with ship control did not decrease. In this case half of the incidents of this sort occurred in the Black Sea Fleet.

The morale of naval personnel is evaluated as stable. While the situation aboard ships and in the units is being monitored and is under control, it remains complex. Despite unfavorable trends, most military collectives are distinguished by proper observance of regulations, good organization, and healthy cohesiveness of all categories of servicemen, which is generally making it possible to successfully carry out missions and maintain the fighting capability of fleet forces. This was promoted in many ways by the personal example set by the absolute majority of commanders and chiefs in fulfillment of their official and military duty, by certification of officer personnel, and by initiation of the transition to contract service.

A lack of concreteness in efforts to implement measures of social and legal protection of servicemen is a serious shortcoming in the organizational and educational activities of commanders, staffs and elements in work with personnel. This is having a negative effect on the morale, mood and behavior of officers, shore-based and seagoing warrant officers, petty officers and seamen. As a result considerable tension, conflicts and negative trends that undermine the foundation of military service—proper organization and maintenance of law and order—persist



in the military collectives, having a deleterious effect on the overall level of military discipline.

Last year the Navy was unable to create an integrated system of training and indoctrination of subordinates in which all elements of military command and control and educational elements would participate actively. Contacts with local authorities, veteran and youth organizations, creative unions and cultural institutions are being restored too slowly. Training of commanders and chiefs of all levels and of staff and service specialists in educational work is sporadic, and it is insufficiently focused on solving particular problems of combat training and tightening military discipline.

A number of priority measures were planned in order to provide for social protection in the Navy. Thus, given a total of around 30,000 persons without housing, 6,945 apartments were to be built and 344 spaces were to be obtained in dormitories with assets appropriated for capital construction. In addition 1,254 apartments were to be obtained from local agencies on the basis of proportionate participation, and 490 apartments ready for occupancy were to be purchased. We also planned to open a school with a capacity of 534 pupils, two children's nurseries with a capacity of 1,300 children, four dining halls with a capacity of 955 persons, seven boiler plants, three treatment plants and a number of other facilities. However, insufficient and irregular financing permitted us to fulfill our plan by only 72 percent. Consequently the Navy has approved the target of obtaining around 11,500 apartments in 1994 by means of its own construction efforts and through proportionate participation.

Summarizing the results of the past year, it should be noted that despite objective and subjective economic, social and legal causes, the Navy was generally able to successfully reach the main goal—maintaining the attained level of combat and mobilizational readiness.

The Russian Navy faces complex and important goals in 1994.

Regarding combat readiness: The main efforts must be concentrated on maintaining the composition and condition of naval strategic nuclear forces at a level ensuring guaranteed fulfillment of assigned missions in any situation. General-purpose forces need to be kept in a state of readiness permitting them to repel aggression of local or regional scale from the oceans and seas.

As before, combat service and alert duty having the purpose of promptly revealing preparations for an armed invasion or development of a threatening situation and taking the necessary steps to raise the combat readiness of the fleets remain the principle forms of maintaining high combat readiness of the forces.

All organizational and technical measures must be implemented to preclude a surprise attack, and to ensure effective reconnaissance, prompt augmentation of the

readiness of forces and their deployment, and the capability for cutting off aggression quickly.

Comprehensive rehearsal in organizing transfer of the fleets from a peacetime to a wartime footing with regard for different scenarios should be considered to be the most important direction of improving combat readiness. In carrying out this task, we need to attain efficient organization of the work of command and control elements and coordinated fulfillment of planned measures at all levels in order to raise the forces to the highest degree of combat readiness, and we need to correct the shortcomings revealed on the basis of the results for 1993. Considering intensive implementation of organizational and staffing measures and reduction of the numerical and effective combat strength of the fleets, we need to constantly account for these changes, and promptly take the appropriate steps to provide for and maintain the prescribed level of combat readiness.

Implementing the law of the Russian Federation "On the State Border of the Russian Federation," the Navy needs to work on a system for defending Russia's state borders in the underwater environment with naval forces and resources, and begin its practical check-out.

We have to carry out a complex of tasks to qualitatively renew ships, armament and military equipment, reduce their assortment and improve ship basing conditions and all other forms of support. The work of accommodating forces of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets and the Caspian Flotilla at new bases in the Russian Federation, and efforts to withdraw armament, ammunition, materials and equipment from Latvia, Estonia and Belarus will be continued.

Quick mastery of new ships, airplanes, helicopters and modern types of armament and military equipment entering the forces is an important task for the fleets. In order to reach the objectives of operational training, the basic efforts must be concentrated on high quality fulfillment of planned measures and on supporting the readiness of commanders and staffs to control the forces during preparation and conduct of operations and combat activities. Special attention should be devoted to rehearsing organization of coordination of fleet forces with combined units and large strategic formations of other armed services, and to studying and analyzing the problems of operational use of fleet forces in armed conflicts, local wars and emergencies.

The methods of operational training need to be improved on the basis of wide introduction and intensive use of computers and of systems and resources for automation of the command and control of forces, troops and weapons. We need to actively develop and introduce computer games into the training of command and control elements, upgrade the quality with which exercises, training and lessons are prepared and carried out, and strive to achieve an integrated approach in conducted all training measures. Operational-tactical and command-and-staff exercises need to be conducted

simultaneously with several large strategic formations which would pursue joint missions in accordance with their operational purpose and which would operate in a single zone (region). In this case in planning the measures of operational and combat training we need to account for the economic and financial aspects of their implementation, analyze the results, and when necessary, adjust the plans and guidelines according to established procedure.

In carrying out the tasks of combat training, we need to continue improving preparation of combined units and units for combat activities within the composition of groupings of heterogeneous forces, and we need to seek and master new, effective tactics of their use. We need to rehearse formation and deployment of groupings, organization of support to their combat stability, all forms of defense, and the tactics of naval combat with the enemy's ship groupings with the support of air forces, fleet shore-based missile and artillery forces and fighter aviation of combined air defense units.

Preparation of heterogeneous ASW forces should be oriented on improving the means of seeking, tracking and destroying submarines, and on integrated use of all forms of ASW weapons utilizing acoustic and non-acoustic search equipment.

In tactical exercises we need to continually practice the actions of ship and aviation reconnaissance and strike groups in conducting reconnaissance and providing targeting information to strike forces, and rehearse integrated use of electronic countermeasures, concealment and other forms of support.

Integrated training at sea must become the principal method of combat training. It must be supported by a clearly developed, fully equipped and tightly controlled training base. It should be organized in such a way as to impose a full training load on shore-based trainers, practice ranges and classrooms, and to make maximum possible use of command and control systems and ship weapon and equipment systems in the practical training of the crews. The organization of basic exercises conducted by large strategic formations needs to be improved.

All of these measures need to pursue a single goal—keeping the naval field and flying skills of the personnel from deteriorating.

Maintaining ships, airplanes, armament and equipment in constant readiness and mobilizing all personnel to maintain equipment entrusted to them in serviceable and combat ready condition must become a constant concern of commanders and staffs in the course of combat training.

In organizing government and social training, we need to concentrate our main efforts on shaping and improving the professional knowledge of the personnel, moral and psychological qualities, the readiness to defend the fatherland, faithfulness to military duty, discipline, and

pride in and responsibility for membership in the Russian Navy, with its 300-year heroic history.

Fuller use needs to be made of this form of training in order to develop psychological, educational and legal knowledge and skills in regular military personnel. Forms of training that are most active, democratic and demonstrative, and which have the greatest emotional impact, should be constantly introduced into the training process.

Educational work should be oriented in the new training year on supporting the moral and psychological stability and discipline of all categories of personnel, on preserving the cohesiveness of military collectives and on reinforcing an aggressive attitude in the servicemen in carrying out their missions. In this case all personnel involved in education must be required to exhibit maximum sensitivity and efficiency in their reactions to fluctuations in the mood of servicemen, and flexibility in their choice of the methods and resources of influencing them, and they must consider the unique features of each category of personnel, of every group and of each separate individual.

The primary military collectives—the ship, the company, the battery—must be the focus of application of educational efforts.

Ideology oriented chiefly on patriotism and professionalism, faithfulness to constitutional duty, responsibility for assigned work, and the merit and honor of a soldier and citizen must be introduced more boldly into the educational process.

All forms of organizational and educational work must be used to attain the highest possible increase in the responsibility of each official for the state of military discipline, for the state of affairs aboard ships and in military units and subunits, and for the effectiveness of measures to prevent incidents, crimes and losses of human life.

Eradication of jeering and humiliation, of crimes against chain of command, of evasion of military service, of outrages against the local population, and of misappropriation of state and military property, especially small arms, should be considered to be a priority task, as should preventing death and injury of servicemen, accidents, and disasters involving military equipment and armament.

One of the main directions in the activity of the commanders of staffs and personnel departments, and of all officers, must be daily concern for the material and personal needs of the personnel, medical services, cultured leisure time for servicemen and their families, analysis of urgent problems and the of the needs and requests of subordinates, and their timely resolution.

Officers should be selected and placed with regard for certification results. Personnel issues must be resolved quickly at all levels, in such a way as to ensure that

executive positions are filled by trained, promising officers, admirals and generals, and to maintain continuity of leadership. Work with young officers needs to be improved. Steps must be taken to eliminate causes and conditions compelling young officers to submit applications for discharge from active military duty.

This article describes only the most important results of work in 1993 and the objectives of the new training year.

I am certain that fleet personnel will carry out their tasks with honor and merit. For this, they will need to work with full effort, study hard, and attain high end results in their work in their assigned areas of activity.

#### **Adm Kalinin: Navy and New Russian Military Doctrine**

94UM0197B Sevastopol FLAG RODINY in Russian  
4 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Admiral (Res) A. Kalinin and Cand Naval Science G. Morozov: "The Black Sea Fleet and the New Russian Military Doctrine"]

[Text] The present stage of transformations in the Armed Forces and the Navy requires a new approach to evaluating the role and place of the Black Sea Fleet in the life of Russia and other CIS states.

Historical experience shows that the Navy played far from the last role in determining Russia's fate. The fleet's significance rose especially under Peter I, when his forces attained the Baltic and Azov seas. It was then that Russia became a naval power.

Today, despite easing of the world situation and the agreements with the United States and countries of the European community on armed forces reductions, it is obviously premature to totally exclude the possibility of military actions directed against the Commonwealth of Independent States as a whole and against any of its members in particular. Centers of tension still exist in the world—in the Near and Middle East, in Central America [sic; Asia?]. Some regions in Africa, in the Balkans and in other areas are restless. And in general, for that matter, there's a sense of anxiety in the world community. States are regrouping, policies of certain states are being reoriented, and formation of new blocs, commonwealths and so on can be discerned. All of this is generating instability in the world situation, and harbors explosions and conflicts.

It is difficult to overstate the place and role of the Azov and Black seas in Russia's life on the modern road of historical development. We are astonished in this connection with the position taken by the leadership of the Russian Federation and Ukraine in relation to the fate of the Black Sea Fleet—a position that is leading to its disintegration and gradual liquidation. The lines of communication in the Black Sea that must be defended are something Russia and the CIS need in order to enter the

world economy, and to develop multilateral ties with the world community in the southern sector.

Having lost over 20 major ports owing to the collapse of the USSR, Russia is now experiencing difficulties in marine shipping in this region. The objective necessity for increasing marine cargo traffic will force its government to expand existing port facilities and build new major ports and terminals in the vicinity of the Kiziltashskiy Estuary and rayons adjacent to it. In addition the coastline from Taganrog to Adler is around 1,000 km long. It would be impossible to defend all of this from invasion, seizure and attacks from the sea without a modern fleet. And as reality shows, now that the fighting capability of the armed forces has decreased somewhat due to ill-conceived reform, Russia's neighbors have immediately started making territorial claims upon it, covertly in some instances and openly in others, while in certain of its marine economic zones resources are literally being plundered without any countermeasures.

The situation in the Black Sea is changing as well. A certain decrease in the potential of the Black Sea Fleet is making it possible for Turkey to become the real boss of the Black Sea, upon which it is making claims at various forums being conducted in this region. A certain "interest" in the Black Sea has also arisen on the part of the command of the U.S. Navy and NATO. Despite assurances that the United States and Russia are not adversaries, the Pentagon is nonetheless finishing its work of drafting political agreements on stationing ship formations (groups) in Bulgaria and Romania. Given the existing range of Tomahawk cruise missiles from ships against naval targets—500 km, and against objectives on land—2,000 km, U.S. and NATO ships will be able to hit targets in Ukraine, Moldova, the Transcaucasus, in the south of Russia and Belarus from the vicinity of Burgas and Constanta. Consequently one need not be a great strategist to understand the damage caused by loss of the Black Sea Fleet to Russia and other CIS states.

On acquainting ourselves with the basic provisions of the Russian Federation's military doctrine, we are confronted by many puzzling questions regarding discrepancies between the doctrine's provisions and reality. Thus, "build-up of troop groupings (forces) by the borders of the Russian Federation to levels disturbing the existing correlation of forces" is named among the factors promoting escalation of the military danger into a direct military threat to the Russian Federation. However, for practical purposes the collapse of the Black Sea Fleet has already altered the correlation of forces with the Turkish Navy that had existed on the Black Sea prior to 1991 from 2:1 in favor of Russia to 1:1 in late 1993. And this correlation continues to change in Turkey's favor.

The doctrine goes on to say that in order to deter a potential aggressor "the combat potential of peacetime general-purpose troop (force) groupings is being maintained at a level ensuring repulsion of aggression of a local (regional) scale." Juxtaposing this postulate with



reality, we can say once again that what is being done in relation to the Black Sea Fleet is hardly supported by the basic provisions of the doctrine.

It is written in the doctrine that the armed forces accept the responsibility "for providing for action by the UN Security Council and other international organizations to support or restore international peace and security at the earliest possible stage of development of a threatening situation or conflict." But for practical purposes no real measures are being undertaken to preserve the potential of the Black Sea Fleet. On the contrary this potential is gradually decreasing. What kind of forces would be needed to carry out the missions foreseen by the doctrine in the most explosive contiguous regions of the Near East, North Africa and the Balkans? We've forgotten the wise counsel of our predecessors regarding the need for maintaining a strong fleet in the Black Sea. Experience shows that in these uncertain times the Black Sea Fleet has already carried out peacekeeping missions in Abkhazia and in the vicinity of Poti. The Black Sea Fleet is a necessity not only to Russia but also to all CIS states.

"The main goal of developing the armed forces written in the doctrine is to create and develop troops (forces) capable of providing for the defense of the country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the safety of citizens and other vitally important interests of society and the state, corresponding to the military, political and strategic situation in the world...with regard for the country's geopolitical and geostrategic position." We need to dwell on this premise in greater detail.

The collapse of the former Union gives Turkey a chance to resurrect its past might, which is obviously something its government is striving to do. Its political actions and demarche in Azerbaijan, Nakhichevan and the Central Asian republics and rearmament of its army and navy can be examples of this. Statements are being made that the Caspian Sea is a Muslim sea. And certain historians are even prophesying domination by Turkic-language nations in the next century. Exercises of Turkey's 3d Field Army by the southern borders of the CIS and an increase in frequency of visits to the Black Sea by NATO ships also raise red flags.

Having become independent, our former union republics are now gravitating more and more toward rapprochement with Russia. Thus, Azerbaijan and Georgia recently joined the Commonwealth. Steps are being taken toward integrating measures to ensure collective security. We are coming to understand the indisputable fact that on its own, not one of the former republics of the Union is able to maintain armed forces corresponding to the proclaimed principle of reasonable sufficiency of forces for defense. And this pertains first of all to ship building. Modern ship building, development of the infrastructure and maintenance of the fleet require superlarge economic expenditures,

which not a single CIS state will be able to make on its own under current conditions.

The optimum solution is for the CIS to have a unified fleet in the Black Sea, which up until this time has been a guarantee of stability in this region. The Black Sea Fleet will carry out missions in the interests of all states of the Commonwealth: protecting their shores from invasion and attacks from the sea, covering administrative and industrial centers and troops in coastal regions, providing for the freedom and safety of navigation and the productive activity of vessels of civilian departments in the southern sector and fishing grounds, and participating in peacekeeping missions in the Black and Mediterranean seas, and in the Near and Middle East.

Considering the missions and the defensive orientation of military doctrine, the Black Sea Fleet must be founded upon highly maneuverable forces, shore-based missile systems, and naval attack aviation capable of decisively parrying the blows of an adversary. In order to defend shipping interests in the Mediterranean Sea and in fishing grounds, the fleet must contain formations of large and midsize surface ships capable of fulfilling their mission.

But if Russia is serious about participating in United Nations peacekeeping missions, as the doctrine says, then the fleet must contain amphibious forces consisting of fast amphibious warfare ships and marine infantry.

Threatening no one, and existing under Russian jurisdiction, the Black Sea Fleet will have to maintain parity on the southern flank of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and provide protection to the considerable economic traffic linking them to all continents.

The majority of politicians in Russia and other CIS states are now beginning to understand the obvious truth that neither the West nor states of the NATO bloc need a strong Russia, or any of the individual states of the Commonwealth. This is why all of the West's promises of aid and assurances of friendship give way to practical actions sharply contrasting with its prior mealy-mouthed assurances. And it would be naive to expect that the United States and its allies, who have the power, will concede their interests in Grenada or Panama, in the Persian Gulf or the Baltic, in the Black Sea or in the Near East, or in the World Ocean as a whole.

If Russia and the CIS generally want to be a power to reckon with, they cannot allow sharp reduction of the fighting capability of the armed forces as a whole and of the Black Sea Fleet in particular, which are a powerful tool in resolving political issues in the southern sector. If we fail to preserve and improve the Black Sea Fleet and its infrastructure through combined effort today, in the future we will have to overstress the economy and impose a severe burden upon the peoples of the Commonwealth to restore the former might of the fleet, and a breach will appear in the collective defensive system of

the CIS in the southern sector, into which interested western and southern neighbors will immediately try to drive a wedge.

#### **Fire on Northern Fleet Nuclear Sub At Murmansk Ship Repair Yard**

94UM0219B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 1 Feb 94 p 1

[ITAR-TASS Article: "Fire on a Northern Fleet Nuclear Submarine"]

[Text] A fire occurred on a Northern Fleet nuclear submarine during the evening last Tuesday on the territory of a military ship repair plant in Murmansk Oblast.

An ITAR-TASS correspondent has learned that the fire broke out during welding work on the nuclear submarine that was being prepared to be written off as obsolete. The fire was extinguished, there were no injuries, and the radiation situation was not violated.

### **BLACK SEA FLEET**

#### **V-Adm Svyatashov on Future of Fleet**

94UM0195D Sevastopol FLAG RODINY in Russian  
18 Jan 94 p 2

[Interview with Black Sea Fleet Chief of Staff Vice-Admiral Petr Grigoryevich Svyatashov by special correspondent Dmitriy Chumak; place and date of interview not given: "It Is Our Hope That the Fate of the Black Sea Fleet Will Finally Be Resolved"]

[Text] The Red Banner Black Sea Fleet... There is so much behind these words! The fleet has rich traditions, and a heroic past. The whole world knows of the heroism of Black Sea Fleet seamen in the difficult war years.

But today the fleet is going through difficult times. The ships are growing old, and there are no new ones to replace them. The seamen take fewer long cruises. The hopes and dreams of those who decided long ago, in childhood, to tie their life to the sea are vanishing. Many officers who see no future in the service are retiring into the reserves. Often with heavy hearts, in anger. The delays in dividing up the fleet and the political squabbles around it have had a negative effect on the skills of Black Sea Fleet seamen.

What are Black Sea Fleet seamen doing in this complex situation? It's not an idle question—many are asking it. Getting ahead of ourselves a little, we should note that in the last training year the Black Sea Fleet seamen successfully endured some difficult trials. They have something to be proud about. They have created a good foundation in their training. When compared with the Northern, Pacific and Baltic fleets, the Black Sea Fleet is among the best in terms of the results of its combat training. Black Sea Fleet seamen have won six prizes in contests of naval championship.

[Chumak] Petr Grigoryevich, does this mean that there are grounds for optimism? Judging from last year's training results and from the way the new stage in the combat training system has begun, it might be said that personnel of the fleet's ships and units are ready to carry out the most complex missions. I would like to know your opinion in this regard.

[Svyatashov] I'm pleased that winter training basically began in organized fashion in the fleet. Commanders, staffs, staff and division specialists, and instructors gave some thought to their work ahead of time, and creatively planned the training. They took account of the situation and the general training level of their students. Instructors thoughtfully utilized experience accumulated last year in their practical training. Trainers and mockups are being used to teach the seamen. Lessons are also conducted at duty stations. Rather than playing the role of testers, officers who attend the lessons provide practical assistance to the young instructors. Training in classrooms and offices has become more active. This is an indication that many students are striving to become rated specialists. There has been a noticeable improvement in the training of young seamen as well. They are striving to make it to sea aboard warships faster. This fast start in winter training will doubtlessly have an effect on the skills of all specialists. Our hope is that this year ships will go to sea more often, and carry out planned missions.

But for now let's return to the training results for the past training year. The fleet took second place in the navy. The tasks imposed on the ship crews and unit personnel were completed in full. Practice missile, artillery and torpedo firings at sea were successful. Commanders sought the initiative and avoided stereotypy in fluid, dynamic combat. The main goal was to make the people proficient, to prepare for them for action in novel situations.

In this regard I would like to make special mention of the crews of the BPK [large ASW ship] "Kerch", the SKR [guided missile cruiser] "Razitelnyy" and the SKR "Ladnyy", which participated in an exercise in the Mediterranean Sea in a KPUG [ship hunter-killer group]. ASW seamen displayed a high class of work in their hunt.

Black Sea Fleet seamen worked quite competently in their hunting efforts during a joint exercise with an American ship as well. They obtained good combat experience in the Mediterranean Sea, and gained confidence.

Mention should be made of the crews of other warships, as well as of vessels of the auxiliary fleet, which carried out their tasks.

[Chumak] In addition to planned training measures, the fleet also carried out special missions. For example, evacuation of refugees from the Caucasus. On some occasions the Black Sea Fleet seamen risked their own lives to rescue children, casualties and the families of

servicemen. Setting off aboard their ships to the Georgian coast, to Poti, the seamen knew that anything could happen. Were there any who displayed cowardice, who refused to go to sea?

[Svyatashov] No. The seamen knew that many people in the Caucasus were in difficulty, and they went to the region of misfortune to help them. The crews of BDK-69, the BDK [large amphibious warfare ship] "Konstantin Olshanskiy", and of other warships and auxiliary vessels in the fleet displayed real heroism and courage in rescuing the peaceful inhabitants.

During these operations the forces were competently led by Rear-Admiral N. Mikhalechenko, Captain 1st Rank V. Maksimov and other experienced commanders. The fleet's assault forces accumulated rich experience in "hot spots." This experience is being analyzed and generalized. It would be nice if this kind of thing didn't happen again. But if difficulties once again arise in some region, Black Sea Fleet seamen will always be ready to render peaceful assistance.

[Chumak] Comrade Vice-Admiral, which military collectives especially pleased the fleet command with high indicators in combat training despite the complexities of last year?

[Svyatashov] There are many such combined units, units and ships. Our submariners distinguished themselves: Participating in the naval championships, a KPUG consisting of the BPK "Kerch", the SKR "Ladnyy" and the SKR "Skoryy" won a prize in missile launching.

We were also pleased with submariners under combined unit commander Rear-Admiral F. Pogorelov. They had it rough in their training and their cruises. Captain 2d Rank K. Vasil'tsev's crew distinguished itself. The submariners won the navy's perpetual prize for the second time in succession.

As always, the offshore defense unit performed at its best. Crews of minesweepers, particularly of the MTShch "Signalshik", the MTShch "Zenitchik" and the MTShch "Dizelist", confirmed their high class rating in their qualifying exercises. And an honorary prize was deservedly presented to the best ships in the beginning of the new training year. Captain 2d Rank M. Spalek and captains 3d rank O. Vatin and S. Pyatnichuk competently organized the training process, and displayed creativity and initiative in exercises. They earned their training results.

The collectives in which rear-admirals A. Tsubin, A. Aladkin and A. Grinko, captains 1st rank N. Martynov, Yu. Kostyrko, N. Mikheyev, S. Umnov and V. Krikunov, Captain 2d Rank V. Belenko and Lieutenant Colonel A. Smolyak serve faced very important missions. Despite everything, these leaders competently organized the people in complex conditions to carry out their assigned missions. Good organization of service, exactingness, and control over execution promoted this success. By the way, submariners, ASW specialists,

boatmen, signalmen and other fleet specialists have also begun the winter training period aggressively.

[Chumak] How did the fleet's Rear Services do last year?

[Svyatashov] Rear-Admiral Bogdanov and his aides approached their work competently and creatively. Potatoes and vegetables were procured and delivered to fleet storage depots in time. Suppliers had to work a great deal in fall in order to procure everything planned for the seamen. The storage depots contain more than enough, and that's gratifying. This is the result of the fact that the fleet's rear services oriented themselves promptly in the complex situation, and correctly organized their work. Seamen have high quality food, and warrant officers and officers will receive their food rations, which is important these days.

[Chumak] Petr Grigoryevich, many difficulties arose in the course of training and during work on planned missions, constraining the people's initiative and sometimes slowing progress down. What troubled Black Sea Fleet seamen the most?

[Svyatashov] First of all, the uncertainty. People were perpetually keyed up, in anticipation of changes. But politicians are in no hurry. As for what awaits Black Sea Fleet seamen tomorrow, no one can clearly say. However, we firmly believe that the fleet problem will be resolved reasonably.

Last year there were cases in which training measures had to be postponed at the fault of certain executives. And there was stereotypy in some practice firings as well. Another troubling thing is that certain subunit commanders, especially junior officers, have lost interest in service, and consequently they've left seaman training to its own devices. As a result the number of highly qualified specialists decreased aboard a number of ships. Poor training of seamen and petty officers led in turn to breakdown of equipment and weapons. The shortcomings were especially great in this regard in the combined unit under Read Admiral O. Sviridov.

Nor can we condone cases of poor organization of alert duty and watches, or the absence of proper order. Things like this led to disciplinary violations, and to improper mutual relations, with serious consequences.

This training year, like the last, will not be easy for Black Sea Fleet seamen. Many unsolved problems are getting worse. But we always need to remember that we are military people. And our most important objective is to become masters of our work, to be prepared, if necessary, to carry out any mission. Therefore we need to improve the quality of special training. And this quality will depend in many ways on the training provided to instructors. However, as the first inspections showed, there are many passive officers among them, who have stopped improving themselves. What could they teach subordinates? Nothing.



Staff workers need to keep questions of this kind under special scrutiny. Their demandingness and their interested assistance will help to upgrade the quality of training in the Black Sea Fleet. We can't allow seamen to be taken away from their training, or to waste their time.

Much in the course of planned measures depends on commanders. Where they continually raise the level of technical training, display aggressiveness and strive for novelty and initiative, order will necessarily be better and organization and performance will be higher. But these are precisely the qualities that some executives lack. They promise many things, but their results are meager. This is why, as an example, repair training of specialists has declined.

Commanders and staff officers need to keep a constant eye on issues like accident-free ship navigation, damage control, injuries, fire and explosion safety, the physical fitness of seamen and other problems in the course of winter training.

I would like to make special mention of deputy commanders for personnel. They unite the collectives, and do much to help young seamen mature and to maintain glorious fleet traditions. Many fabulous educators who enjoy respect among the people serve aboard ships. They are the ones who are sought out for help and advice. Discipline has risen and order has become firmer aboard ships owing to many of them. The crews are living in friendship. The seamen are happy to serve.

However, it would be wrong to assert that things are like this everywhere. Some educators were put in their important positions by accident. They don't know how to work with people, and they don't understand their needs. Such educators can only do harm to the collectives. Educational work is especially poorly organized in the combined unit in which Captain 1st Rank G. Chernokhlebov serves, and aboard the PSK "Apsheon".

[Chumak] There have been complaints that some officers, warrant officers and civilian employees of the fleet have not received their pay and wages for November, December and January. How are these people to live? And why did this happen?

[Svyatashov] I know that the Russian Ministry of Defense has transferred funds to the fleet. But the fact is that not all Ukrainian banks are working efficiently. That's where the holdup in pay is. But I think that his matter will soon be resolved.

[Chumak] Petr Grigoryevich, what would you wish Black Sea Fleet seamen in conclusion?

[Svyatashov] That they gather up their endurance, and do their work honorably. It is the hope of all of us that this year the fate of the Black Sea Fleet will finally be resolved. And then all of us would see that we have a future. Officers, warrant officers and seamen will be able to serve in peace.

And one other thing—we all need to live in peace and friendship. There are some people who are trying to start fights between our Slavic peoples. But this cannot be. Black Sea Fleet seamen have stood, and will continue to stand guard over the southern borders of CIS countries.

[Chumak] Thank you for the interview.

### **Russia Willing to 'Compensate' Ukraine for Fleet, Infrastructure**

94UM0223D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 1

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vladimir Maryukh under the rubric "News": "Russia Is Prepared to Compensate Ukraine For Its Share of Black Sea Fleet"]

[Text]

### **From Sevastopol**

In response to an appeal from Viktor Semenov, chairman of the Sevastopol City Soviet, to the President of Russia, Sergey Lavrov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, has telegraphed that the Russian delegation is prepared to settle the problems of the Black Sea Fleet as rapidly as possible.

The Press Center of the Black Sea Fleet reports that the telegram indicates, among other things, a willingness rapidly to conclude an agreement whereby the Black Sea Fleet and its entire infrastructure in the Crimea would be used by Russia and flying its flags. The Russian side would make the appropriate settlements with Ukraine for that portion of the fleet which previous agreements ceded to Ukraine.

### **Rear Services: Flight Ration Shortages**

94UM0195C Sevastopol FLAG RODINY in Russian  
19 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by Major A. Kazakov: "You Can't Substitute Oats for Meat"]

[Text] There are strict scientific substantiations to the nutritional norm for aviators. It replenishes the body with what it needs, with what aviators expend while performing their assignments in the sky and servicing equipment, and ensures flight safety and a long flying career. This is why much attention is devoted in all countries of the world to maintaining the health and raising the combat readiness of aviators. In the times before perestroika this matter was never neglected in the fleet's air units. But recently aviators have started experiencing discomfort in their diet as well. Because economic ties that had existed in the former Union have been disturbed, the thread of fleet food supply has broken. It is becoming increasingly more difficult for rear services of the fleet air forces to ensure the minimum ration necessary for sensible, high quality nutrition for flight crews, engineers and technicians. It's now

a long-established practice to substitute one food product for another of far from equal nutritional value when a shortage occurs in a certain assortment of foods. Experience shows that such "transformations" are far from harmless.

A certain food service worker joked to me that if you wanted to, you could "translate" the calorie count of even meat into oats, and serve them as food. It might of course go this far if the economy's disintegration continues at the current rate. But I think everyone realizes what the result of all of this could be.

"We manage as best we can," said Lieutenant Colonel V. Molchanov, deputy commander of the aviation technical base of the Kacha garrison. "We get the needed food products either on the basis of our enthusiasm and personal time, or through acquaintances and good relations with various executives. We get them from kolkhozes and sovkhoses on credit, on the basis of our word. Only the food specialists know what we've had to do to manage thus far."

Well, I'm not about to reveal the secrets of the suppliers. And here is why. A certain article in our newspaper said that because electric power had been shut off from the Kacha garrison, the command found a way to use local electric power sources for the time of the shut-down to keep the dining halls, boiler plants and offices running. On learning this, workers of the rayon electric power network switched off the electric power for 2 days before New Years. The reason they gave was that the garrison had its own electric power sources.

Consequently food suppliers wisely refuse to say anything more about how they manage to supply the needed food products to the aviators' dining hall. The whole thing might backfire, you see. The main thing is that the suppliers, who take the experience of the perestroika years into account, no longer wait for central deliveries, and instead establish direct ties with the producers. This allows them to provide at least the minimum ration to the personnel.

But something does need to be said about the numerous instances of disorganization that rear service workers have to deal with in obtaining food for military units. Here are just a few of them, as related by Colonel V. Yankovskiy, commander of the aviation technical base of the Kacha garrison.

"We can get meat from Simferopol. But they demand prepayment, and we have no money in the unit.

"It's no secret that we've recently been receiving food from Russia. The rail cars travel thousands of kilometers to us. You'd think that it would be simple—just meet the cars, unload them, and truck the supplies to the unit. But it isn't. Customs officials are always on the watch. If you don't draw up a customs declaration within 3 days, which isn't always possible, they take a large percentage for the idle time of the car. And not from just anyone, but from the military units, which don't even have

enough money to cover the pay of the servicemen. There are many such discrepancies."

However, despite all of these difficulties, which are sometimes created deliberately, rear service workers are fulfilling their tasks successfully. And the persistence of commanders has a lot to do with it. This is evident at least from the following case.

Bread for military units of the Kacha garrison comes from far away. Every trip means many liters of precious gasoline. The command of the aviation technical base suggested many times that 2 days' worth of bread should be delivered on Saturday. Then the Sunday trip could be dropped. But its efforts were in vain. It was then that Lieutenant Colonel Molchanov went to the bakery himself. He substantiated all of the pros and cons, and demonstrated that this would be more advantageous both to the supplier and to the consumer. And so the issue was finally resolved.

Then things like this happen. Today there are food products in the storage depots, but tomorrow there might not be any. You'd think that there would be nothing simpler than to pick up enough to last a while, and the problem would be solved. But that's not the case. Having become accustomed to centralized, regular and constant deliveries in the "period of stagnation," units didn't create large storage capacities. And now the housekeepers are finding that these capacities are extremely small, and can't satisfy anyone. And so, now they have to run around each day, scrounging food and making deals with the "right" people, so that they could somehow "requisition" some of what the aviators are supposed to get.

And there's no end to this. The people are weary of it. They're becoming nervous, and unsure about tomorrow. This is having an effect on mutual relations in the collectives, and it is influencing combat readiness. But we can't go on trying the patience of men in uniform forever.

Wouldn't it be simpler to put aside the ethnic strife, to heal the fracture that occurred between Slavic peoples out of someone's stupidity, and restore the economic and social ties that were broken by the ambitious political activity of today's politicians? Divided we fall.

#### **Chief of Engineer Services on Ukrainian Subordination**

94UM0195B Sevastopol FLAG RODINY in Russian  
20 Jan 94 p 1

[Interview with Lt-Col Vyacheslav Ilich Kim, chief of Naval Engineer Services, by correspondent G. Lyubayev; place and date of interview not given: "Postscript to a Seizure"]

[Text] Administrative structures of the Ukrainian Navy are continuing their attempts to unilaterally resubordinate units of the Black Sea Fleet's Naval

Engineer Services (MIS). The Ukrainian side is using the most diverse assortment of uncivilized methods of influence to this end—persuasion and promises, blackmail and threats, and even demonstrations of force. Recently for example, premises of the Odessa and Nikolayev MIS [Naval Engineer Services] departments were taken under the control of armed representatives of the Ukrainian Navy.

How could this have happened before a political solution was found for the Black Sea Fleet? Who specifically made it possible for the provocative acts of seizing MIS subunits in Odessa and Nikolayev to occur? What conclusions follow from an analysis of these events? The editor's office is receiving many such questions today. In order to answer them, our correspondent met with Colonel Vyacheslav Kim, chief of the Naval Engineer Services, and interviewed him.

[Lyubayev] Vyacheslav Ilich, when and how did you learn that, for example, the Odessa branch of the OMIS [Department of Naval Engineer Services] snapped and is hanging by thread, if I may put it that way?

[Kim] I got a phone call in the evening. It was from Captain A. Sharapov, deputy chief of the OMIS. "What should I do?" was the first question he anxiously asked. The situation was clearly out of the ordinary. As it turns out, OMIS chief Major N. Klyushnikov had quietly transferred his allegiance to Ukraine and then acted unpredictably.

I couldn't see the details from by distant vantage point. Therefore I gave Sharapov the textbook instructions. If Klyushnikov did in fact decide to change his place of service, then let him leave for the Ukrainian Navy. And he, Captain Sharapov, should naturally take over his duties until a decision was made by the commander. It didn't seem like there should be any special difficulties. But it became clear from further discussion that everything was much more complex than I thought. The OMIS building was taken under guard by Ukrainian servicemen, and this raiding party (15 well-instructed youths) would not allow Captain Sharapov into his office, and was generally behaving provocatively.

Does this mean that someone in Kiev decided to once again test the patience of Black Sea Fleet seamen? The plan, I think, is simple. If the command of the Black Sea Fleet and the Russian side were to confine themselves to restrained condemnation of the predatory act, then the violators of the Massandra agreements could boldly move further in their forcible transfer of the entire infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet to Ukrainian jurisdiction. Let them carry on with their presidential meetings at the top according to plan, let them seek political solutions to the difficult problems, while we at the level of the Ukrainian Navy will start another process here—that of confiscating another's property and changing the allegiance of the personnel, and the spirit of adventuristic attack and a freebooter's luck

will aid us in these efforts. But can a "state" navy be created on such shaky ground?

[Lyubayev] The answer to that, Vyacheslav Ilich, is evident in your question. How did events develop in the Nikolayev MIS department?

[Kim] Basically along the same mystery-novel line. Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Krichevskiy, chief of the MIS department, renounced his first oath in secret and then took another—the Ukrainian oath—together with his deputy, Captain G. Kotelenets. After that, the story follows the familiar rut. These newly made "officials of the Nikolayev OMIS of the Ukrainian Navy" began summoning the department's civilian associates and demanding their unquestioning obedience to the new department.

I don't have anything against those officers and shore-based and seagoing warrant officers who transfer to the Ukrainian Navy in a civilized way. That's the right of each person—to serve wherever he sees fit. But I can't at all understand people who say one thing today and then do quite the opposite tomorrow.

After all, no one forced that Major N. Klyushnikov to portray himself as being faithful to his oath forever. When I met him at a conference of MIS department and unit executives I asked him what he would do if Ukrainian "emissaries" asked him to stand beneath the yellow and blue banner. Nikolay Vasilyevich protested with righteous indignation. How could you ask me such a thing, Comrade Commander, I never would, for anything! But then just a few days later he goes and quietly transfers his allegiance and allows the Ukrainian side to seize the OMIS by force.

The same hypocritical situation (I simply can't find any other words) essentially repeated itself in a conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Krichevskiy. He sent his deputy to the conference I mentioned above in his stead, and so I had to telephone Yevgeniy Ruvimovich, who "fell ill" unexpectedly, and ask him point-blank—had he already taken another oath? His answer was no. Krichevskiy was not about to soil his honor as an officer, he was faithful to the Black Sea Fleet, and so on in the same spirit. And then I learned that Yevgeniy Ruvimovich had been toying with me. With the first psychological attack by Ukrainian recruiters, he agreed to carry out a "revolution" in the department.

[Lyubayev] The impression is created that the Ukrainian naval department is "snipping away" at the Black Sea Fleet's infrastructure by just one means—from above. They persuade or frighten a subunit chief and force him to change his allegiance, and then it is assumed that all of the administration under his control would transfer to the Ukrainian Navy.

[Kim] This is precisely how the Ukrainian side proceeded in "disconnecting" the Odessa and Nikolayev MIS departments from the Black Sea Fleet. You needn't



even ask whether such an act is legal. Armed seizure of two of our OMIS sections is a concrete expression of legal tyranny which some local representatives of the Ukrainian Navy are so eager to legalize. But this naturally sounds an alarm: Who is going to answer, and to whom, if material valuables in unilaterally Ukrainianized MIS subunits are squandered? Officially, after all, Major Klyushnikov, Lieutenant Colonel Krichevskiy and his deputy, Captain Kotelenets, have been dismissed from their positions and discharged into the reserves. But in reality they continue to portray themselves as full-fledged chiefs, and no one knows how this will end.

[Lyubayev] It is but one step from such confrontation to dangerous conflict. In response to the forcible act by Ukrainian servicemen, Black Sea Fleet seamen might respond with adequate actions, and then the stage would be set for scuttling of the soon to be held Russian-Ukrainian talks on the Black Sea Fleet. But could this be something someone in Kiev actually wants? And is patience on the part of the command of the Black Sea Fleet the only reasonable response today to the provocations from the other side?

[Kim] Judging from everything, it isn't because things are going so well for it that the Ukrainian Navy is taking such actions against our fleet. When you get right down to it, the organizers of such actions can hardly take joy in their successes in recruiting certain Black Sea Fleet officials to serve in behalf of the idea of Ukrainian self-rule. It wouldn't of course be all that hard to gather together a certain number of managers like Klyushnikov, Krichevskiy and Kotelenets. Except, will this "nucleus of executive personnel" be sufficiently dependable and professionally mature? I hardly think so. Anyone who once transfers his allegiance isn't going to distinguish himself with an exemplary attitude toward his work. Personal interests and unfulfilled ambitions are almost always foremost in the minds of such a person.

[Lyubayev] What type of personnel are the glue, in your opinion, holding together the unity of the Black Sea Fleet today?

[Kim] It would be the officers and shore-based and seagoing warrant officers who are in no hurry to run from one army to another, to change their convictions and emblems, and their life's reference points. Such people include, for example, Captain Aleksandr Sharapov from the Odessa OMIS, who remained faithful to his oath, and Colonel Sergey Dybovskiy, chief of the Nikolayev UNR, who categorically refused to assist in the resubordination of his collective to Ukrainian will. Nor did Captain 2d Rank Aleksandr Tkach, chief of the Izmail MIS department, give in to blackmail and threats. In order to frighten him, they told this officer that if he did not transfer his allegiance, he would never find a place to

live in Izmail, and he shouldn't expect anything good to happen in his future. But no matter how hard those wretched recruiters try to win over the real patriots of the fatherland by their ridiculous scare tactics, they can't bring down the unified Black Sea Fleet.

It is on this optimistic note that I would like to end our discussion.

[Lyubayev] Thank you for the interview.

#### **Press Center Statement on Reinstatement of Colonel Yermakov**

*94UM0195A Sevastopol FLAG RODINY in Russian  
21 Jan 94 p 1*

[Article: "Statement From the Black Sea Fleet Press Center"]

[Text] As we know, Ivan Yermakov, the head of the state administration of the city of Sevastopol, was dismissed from his position by an edict of the Ukrainian President dated 19 January of this year. On 28 February 1991 Colonel I. Yermakov, chief of an aviation repair plant of the USSR Naval Aviation, was released from his position in accordance with Decree No 1010 of the USSR Council of Ministers for his term of office as a deputy, during which he was to remain on active duty on the Black Sea Fleet personnel roster. Since the moment of release from his position, Colonel I. Yermakov has been considered to be a member of the RF Navy, he did not take the Ukrainian oath, and he has not expressed a desire to serve in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On the basis of the above, on 20 January of this year Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, signed an order placing Colonel I. Yermakov at his disposal. The chief of the personnel department of the Black Sea Fleet was instructed to find a position for RF Navy Aviation Colonel I. Yermakov in accordance with his wishes and his military specialty.

The command of the Black Sea Fleet and the Russian Ministry of Defense intend to display concern for the fate of each officer in the future as well.

A corresponding telegram to the Russian Federation Minister of Defense was drafted.

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Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Edward Baltin received a telegram from Georgian Republic Security Minister I. Georgadze. It read: "Georgia will always be grateful to you for your humanity and for the assistance you provided to my motherland. My warriors and I treasure your friendship. Warmest regards to your command."

**Press Center on Ukrainian Subornation of Engineer Units***94UM0196A Sevastopol FLAG RODINY in Russian  
12 Jan 94 p 1*

[Article: "Statement From the Black Sea Fleet Press Center"]

[Text] Over the last 2 months the command of the Ukrainian Navy has been attempting to unilaterally subordinate units of the Black Sea Fleet's Naval Engineering Service located in the fleet's remote garrisons.

After the recent unlawful actions in relation to the Odessa and Nikolayevka departments of the Black Sea Fleet Naval Engineering Service, another action was taken to encourage personnel of the Naval Engineering Service in the Izmail garrison to take the Ukrainian oath. This is already the fourth provocation against Black Sea Fleet seamen serving in this region in the last 2 weeks. The Black Sea Fleet unit stationed there essentially found itself under economic blockade. With the support of city authorities the Military Commissar of Izmail and the Chief of the Officer Training School of the Ukrainian Navy continue to exert pressure upon Black Sea seamen, resorting to a practice of blackmail and threats.

In order to normalize the situation and preclude negative development of events in Izmail, the command of the Black Sea Fleet is once again asking the leadership of the Ukrainian Navy and the city authorities to be reasonable, it feels it necessary to await civilized solution of the Black Sea Fleet problem by the presidents of Russia and Ukraine, and it is adhering to agreements on the fleet reached at the highest level. The fleet command has sent the corresponding documents on the situation in Izmail to the Russian and Ukrainian defense ministers.

**Ship Repair Workers Appeal to Fleet on Financing***94UM0196B Sevastopol FLAG RODINY in Russian  
12 Jan 94 p 1*

[Article: "We Await Decisive Actions"]

[Text] On the instructions of the collective of a fleet ship repair enterprise A. Balyura, chairman of its Trade Union Committee, made an appeal to the editor's office of FLAG RODINY. The text of a document containing an appeal by the plant's blue and white collar workers to the Black Sea Fleet Military Council was forwarded by him for publication. It states in particular:

It is with pain in our hearts that we appeal to you, as the element of collective leadership of the Black Sea Fleet, to help one of the oldest labor collectives of the Black Sea Fleet to survive and to preserve this unique plant carrying out comprehensive repairs on warships and vessels.

An extremely serious, critical situation has evolved at the plant; specialists are being forced to work in an atmosphere of constant political and financial pressure.

One of the main causes of the present situation is the absence of any progress in the 2-year negotiations on problems of the Black Sea Fleet, including on the status of ship repair plants. All of this has of course affected our productive and economic life.

The plant's work has not been financed since 1993. The amount the fleet owes for work done now exceeds 5 billion karbovantsy. Promises of the command to pay its debts, and equally so the promises of the financial services of the Russian Navy regarding replenishment of the plant's working capital are not being kept. The enterprise's administration is unable to pay wages to the labor collective. Blue and white collar workers are no longer able to feed their families, while some are simply starving.

Being a cost-accounting enterprise, the plant is forced to provide for its productive activity and for social protection of the collective at the expense of wages, and in order to survive, it is forced to accept vessels for repair from all organizations, from commercial to private, which are doing everything they can to get the plant to work for them. Moreover they have everything—licenses, financing, materials, deliveries.

It should be kept in mind here that if this tendency continues to increase, this naval plant will lose its identity and its qualifications.

The impression is created that it is to someone's advantage to destroy the plant, to destroy the structure of the fleet, and consequently its fighting capability. Everyone knows, after all, that respecializing the plant would mean losing a unique ship repair base, and losing qualified personnel that it has taken years to accumulate in ship repair.

The critical financial situation also requires immediate adoption of a decision by the Military Council to pay the debt to the plant in full and to determine a procedure for financing ship repair. We see one solution here—providing financing through central financial bodies of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

In behalf of our Black Sea Fleet we appeal to the Military Council to take all steps to save this oldest ship building enterprise, to immediately restore financing to programs in place, and to solve the problems of material and technical support.

The plant collective awaits decisive actions that meet the requirements of the current situation.

**Fleet Problems With AWOLs***94UM0197A Sevastopol FLAG RODINY in Russian  
4 Jan 92 p 2*

[Article by Capt Lt A. Chebotarev: "Running on the Razor's Edge"]

[Text] They stood surrounded by shore patrol and police. The young AWOL seamen looked at them fearfully. This time their attempt was unsuccessful. But is there a guarantee that there won't be another?

Mass flight of young seamen from units and from ships began around the Spring of 1990. It was then that talk went on about the insolvency of the ruling party's military policy, and about the inability of the leadership of those days to solve the country's concrete problems. But the CPSU ceased to exist, and the Soviet Union followed it into history. However, the problem of desertion grew even more acute. Now not only young seamen but also ones with a year or two of service were fleeing. The reasons were the most diverse—from a sick mother to jeering and humiliation. But the main causes were disorganization and impunity.

I'm not about to analyze the state of affairs in this area, but I would like to describe the things I've witnessed, and my experiences on a few occasions when I took part in court examinations as an inquisitor.

It is said that a few years' work in court was enough for Balzac to write for decades about the human passions he had witnessed. This came to mind as I looked at a familiar young lad standing under escort. I was to process several detainees through the military medical board. One of them, unwashed and suffering scabies, evoked pure human pity in me. It was not until the following day, when he called out my name, that I remembered who he was—he had changed that much. The story is tragically simple. Before joining the army he got in with some criminals. They stole everything they could get their hands on, along the entire southern Crimean shore. Then he was drafted. Upon graduating from his training subunit he received the rank of junior sergeant.

He didn't have much longer to serve. Even so, he ran away. Back in with his criminal friends. More stealing. It all ended with a high-security prison colony. Moreover the trial was held at the time when he would have been returning home from service. He had a choice, and he made it.

Last summer a seaman went AWOL off a neighboring ship. An officer rode out after him, found him, but too late to bring the runaway back to the unit. Perhaps out of the joy of having liberated himself from service, the former seaman got drunk and then went to the river for a swim. Whether he jumped in or dove in, I don't know, but he broke his back. His mother weeps, naturally, the grief is so great. She blames herself for not making him stay in, it would have been better if he had finished his tour.

The most widespread means of flight is with the participation of parents. I'm certain that had it not been for relatives, many wouldn't even have thought of going AWOL. As far as I know, the passports belonging to civilian Smirnova and Mr. and Mrs. Poalelunzh, held as a pledge against their son, are still lying in the safe in the commander's office.

After working 5 years with the personnel I became convinced that the runaways often develop a reluctance to serve because they were not prepared for service. The young person leaves the safety and warmth of his home for a life of hardship. Sweepdowns, physical loads, and

then rough handling by others make their impact as well. Experiencing discomfort from the disturbance of the accustomed rhythm of life, the seaman seeks solutions, of which there are two. The first is to get a hold of one's self and serve out one's tour normally. The second is to go back, back home, where one's parents are always waiting. Upon returning home, as a rule the AWOL seamen go to the military commissariats and procuracies. There statements are always the same—they were belittled, they were humiliated. Then, after the runaways are reassigned to their respective military units, their complaints disappear. Such was the case in my experience with seamen Smirnov, Yesipov and Makhanov.

I've always wondered about one thing: Why, after so many years of existence of the runaway problem, hasn't a system of effective measures to prevent such violations and avert their consequences not been developed?

There are many questions, but no one is offering any answers. As always, officers and warrant officers end up having to carry additional loads. But isn't this out of their line?

## REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

### Political Side of Housing Problem

94UM0211A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
26 Jan 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Yuriy Gladkevich: "The Housing Problem in the Armed Forces—a Political Problem"]

[Text] "It is one step from hope to despair. And it has already been taken...." Unfortunately, this is precisely the tone of most of the letters coming to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA from servicemen, officers in the reserves, and retired officers without apartments. The hopes raised by the edicts of the president of the Russian Federation "On Measures To Strengthen the Social Protection of Service Members and Persons Discharged From Military Service" (February 1992) and "On Additional Measures for the Financing and Acquisition of Housing for Service Members" (July 1992) and by the law of the Russian Federation "On the Status of Service Members" (January 1993) were first replaced, in their words, by depression caused by the obvious unwillingness of local authorities to pay back to military people their debts for housing and the decline in the rate and volume of construction and then by despair.

"For many years, our families have not had roofs over their heads," lieutenant colonels Brestel and Teselkin, captains Popov and Khramtsov, Senior Warrant Officer Kryuchkov, and others (altogether 36 signatures) from Kaliningrad Oblast write to the editor's office. They counted on the law on status but in July of last year Colonel General Valeriy Mironov, deputy minister of defense, signed a directive that permits the dismissal of officers without housing from the ranks of the armed forces. And this is despite the fact that the law prohibits the dismissal of service members who have served 10



years or longer without providing housing for them and the members of their families.

In a similar situation were Lieutenant Colonel of the Reserves Valeriy Semushkin (Gvardeysk in Kaliningrad Oblast), who was discharged to the reserves in violation of the law without being provided with an apartment, and majors Belichko and Ivanov (Kemerovo), who were discharged to the reserves under the same circumstances.

Alas, here it is not a matter of the "ill will" of the military department. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation was itself a hostage of our imperfect legislation and lack of a normal practice for the execution of the laws. Let us turn to the content of the law "On the Status of Service Members." Article 22 of the law does indeed prohibit the discharge of service members to the reserves and retirement without the provision of housing. But this same law states (Article 15) that "citizens discharged from military service...are provided with living premises by the agencies of local self-administration in accordance with the established norms within three months at the latest...." Does not the presence of this article in the law infer that...officers and warrant officers without housing will nevertheless be discharged from service?

The readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA noticed this total discrepancy a long time ago. In their letters, they justifiably note that even today, a year after the passage of the law "On the Status of Service Members," the articles that constitute the so-called housing block do not actually work. And Lt. Col. of the Reserves Andrey Molostov from Orel has good reason to think: "If tomorrow the editor's office receives a report that even one officer or warrant officer discharged from military service received an apartment within three months, then I am certain that it will be published in the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA under the heading 'Sensation'...."

As for the directive signed by the deputy minister of defense, it does indeed contradict the law. And this was confirmed in the Main Directorate of the General Procurator's Office of the Russian Federation in its supervision of the execution of the laws in the military forces of the Russian Federation, officially protesting it on 8 December of last year. On 30 December, the minister of defense of the Russian Federation revoked it.

Overall, of course, the problem of eliminating the lack of housing in the army is a matter of distribution. If only there were something to distribute.

Here are some figures. In 1993, it was planned to construct and acquire 82,000 apartments for military people through all sources of financing. And of course the plan for 1993 and the state program for 1993-1995 for the provision of service members and persons discharged from military service and their family members with housing did not completely resolve the problem, although they did at least make it possible to stop the dramatic worsening of the housing situation in the army and to reduce the number of officers on the waiting list to

a little more than 100,000 by the end of 1995. The only condition that they were required to observe was the performance of obligations by all sides. But practically from the very beginning of the realization of the state program, the Ministry of Finance put it on strict rations with respect to financing. In the first seven months of 1993, for example, the Ministry of Finance was supposed to finance capital construction amounting to almost 500 billion rubles [R] under the program. But actually only R298 billion were allocated for these purposes. The credits to the Ministry of Defense for housing construction were allocated without the appropriate indexing, which essentially paralyzed the work of the building organizations.

And most often the explanation was extremely simple: they said that the state did not have enough money for everything and that it was necessary to be patient.... "But how long can one wait?" write the wives of servicemen of an aviation squadron withdrawn from the territory of Latvia to Saransk (Mordovia) in 1992. "How long can our families stay in hotels and children's sanitary camps? We live in extremely crowded conditions, in housing not suitable for family life and without basic amenities. At the time when the unit was being pulled out of Latvia, we were promised that housing would be built quickly at the new station. In May of last year, the air force command for Moscow District issued specific information, saying that those on the waiting list would receive the first few dozen apartments by May 1993. Alas, we did not receive anything and essentially there is no construction under way—there are no funds. But to live in a hotel they demand the timely payment of several tens of thousands of rubles. Where can we get this money, if our husbands are not paid on time? And there is nothing with which to feed our children...."

But this is not all. Many local administrations essentially did not pay their debts to service personnel for housing and were openly scornful of the directives of the president of Russia. And this is despite the fact that in Moscow, Tver, Murmansk, and several other oblasts they were able, despite difficulties, to settle accounts with military people.... Last year the military people failed to receive more than 10,000 square meters of housing space that was supposed to be built with funds from the federal budget.

And the prospects are by no means favorable for 1994 either. A decision by the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation specified that this year the construction of housing for military people will be financed at the level of last year. In the context of the state program with a planned increase of 11,000 square meters for 1994, this sounds either like an admission of the unsoundness of the control figures incorporated in it or as disdain for them. In both cases, we are actually dealing with the failure of the program.

In the opinion of readers, the problem of the provision of housing to persons discharged from military service has gone over to a second or possibly even lower category.

No one is carrying out the enforceable acts providing for the allocation of housing for the resettlement from military posts of persons who have lost their ties with the armed forces. In the military districts and fleets, they are more concerned about improving the living conditions of regular service personnel. "And this is very painful and insulting," reserve officers and warrant officers from the town of Gremikha (Northern Fleet) write to the editor's office, "we served on ships and in units of the fleet for many years and some of us lived all of our lives here, in this town with difficult climatic conditions. And now, when our health resources are just about exhausted, it turns out that there is no place for us in regions with a more favorable climate and with medical facilities more oriented toward people of our age.... Out of 35 reserve officers and warrant officers, only 5 people received the expected housing last year. It may be that they will allocate abundant housing to the fleet but will it reach us here in Gremikha?"

Whether or not Gremikha gets housing, this is a question for the command of the Northern Fleet. But of course there is no abundance either in the Northern Fleet or in other fleets and districts. Everywhere they are on starvation rations with respect to housing....

Judging by the mail to the editor's office, those without apartments have long since quit believing that there is no money for the construction of housing. "They can come up with hundreds of millions of dollars for the building of a parliamentary center, but is this the most acute problem in Russia?" asks Stepan Ugolnikov from Saratov. And he draws this conclusion: there is money but there is no order, there are laws but there is no respect for them, and there are responsible persons but they are not taking their responsibility very seriously. And one can find solutions but one must make a genuine search for them.

By the way, the editor's office of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has received many proposals on this in its mail. The most constructive of them essentially amount to the following: if there is a particular legislative base, there needs to be a mechanism for the realization of the laws, a mechanism based on the strictest responsibility of officials, administrative heads, managers of ministries and departments, and members of the cabinet of ministers for the execution of the laws. The tasks defined by the programs that constitute state policy with respect to the armed forces must be resolved whatever the difficulties may be....

To a certain extent, the constructiveness of these proposals is relative. This, in a manner of speaking, is the constructiveness of the object of state policy, the human being who does not bring about a solution but expects one. Nevertheless.... Some readers are proposing the allocation of long-term loans at a favorable rate of interest (and possibly no interest at all) to military personnel without housing and to those who have been discharged from military service for the construction of housing, the transfer of all the funds from various sources

of financing to a single customer for housing (the Ministry of Defense), and so on. But Vladimir Sergeyevich Katin, to whom, as he writes, it is painful to see the disorder of Russian military personnel, is proposing to the government and Ministry of Defense that they pay closer attention to the so-called unfinished construction: "At the central farmstead of the joint stock company "Velikopolye" (Smolensk Oblast), there are 10 unfinished two-apartment cottages, which the sovkhos began to build for its workers in 1989-1990 but did not complete. They should have finished building them on a shared basis with "Velikopolye" and you would have seen that several families of military people would have had a roof over their heads...." But whatever might have been heard, it appears that all of this is nothing new for those who are obligated by their official position to solve the problem of overcoming the lack of housing in the army. They know all of this or at least should know it....

Today it is already obvious that the resolution of the housing problem in the armed forces is not so much a social and economic task as it is a political one. Russia is a state in the process of reform and this process has just begun to get under way seriously. In such a situation, sensible politicians are doing everything they can to strengthen the institutions of power (and the armed forces are one of them). To allow the army or in any case a large detachment of people who comprise it to continue along the path of disappointment in the current authority, along the path leading from hope to despair, is at least imprudent. After all, the palette of human moods is not limited to despair....

#### **Transport Network Problems in Terms of New Military Doctrine**

94UM0224B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 8 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Yuriy Kirsanov: "The Routes Are New, the Problems Old"]

[Text] The adoption of the military doctrine of Russia, which has a clearly pronounced defensive tendency, compels us to rethink many problems not only of the country's military development, but also of its economic development. Improvement of the transportation system is one such problem.

Transportation has always had enormous military importance at all times and in all countries. In the history of war there are many examples of failures of strategic operations, when military campaigns and whole wars were lost because of the disruption of operations or poor development of lines of communications. And in Russia, with its great expanses, transportation lines and railroads in particular have always played a special role.

Now, under new conditions, the Russian Armed Forces are confronted by new tasks: To improve the methods of building up forces in specific strategic and operational sectors with limited manpower; to have mobile forces ready to go to any point in the country on short notice; to

assimilate methods of strategic and operational deployment and regrouping which are adequate to present-day conditions. It is impossible to assure accomplishment of these tasks without full allowance for the transportation factor. This must also be taken into account when creating troop groupings in strategic sectors, in supporting their communications both with military district materiel-suppliers and with one another. There is a broad spectrum of questions here: accomplishment of military transport movements, freight delivery, technical support and restoration of lines of communications. And all of this under the real and difficult conditions of transition to the market.

For now, I believe, these problems are not being given due attention. The reason? It is because military strategy and the concepts of types of transportation have been developing recently as if independent of one another. But not a single operational plan is conceivable without allowance for the transportation factor; in every strategic sector the transportation system has its own parameters and at times they are very limited ones.

Also, one cannot ignore the fact that in the last few years the military sphere has been quite "dynamic," while transportation systems have been rather inert in their development. The service lives of the basic structures, roads, landing strips, ports, and canals reach 70 to 100 years, those of pipelines 25 to 30 years or more, and for locomotives, rail cars and ships, 15 to 30 years. For this reason, the development of the transportation system must be laid out for the future with allowance both for economic indices and for defense requirements.

For a start, let us try to compare the extent to which the actual state of affairs in transportation corresponds to the current requirements of the Armed Forces. In brief, there are few grounds for optimism here. The Russian lag in terms of roads has already become notorious. For example, in the U.S. the length of the transportation net is six times longer and its density 14 times greater than it is in Russia. This makes it possible to have a 3- to 4-fold margin of through-put capacity of transportation lines for creation of the necessary reserves and conduct of planned repair tasks without disrupting the rhythm of shipments. It is also possible to rationally distribute the volume of shipments among the types of transportation. Even when we had a more stable economy, this was something we could only dream of, all the more so now in the reform period.

Railroad lines and highways are in unsatisfactory technical condition over significant stretches, and require reconstruction. Volumes of road work have decreased recently by 20 to 25 percent. Wear of the basic stock in transportation is approaching 40 percent. In the last twenty years there have been reductions in the volume of deliveries of freight cars for railroad transport, and this has led to intense aging of the rail-car inventory. In track facilities, 300 thousand tonnes of the total mass of metal frameworks of bridges require replacement.

The situation is no better in other branches of the transportation system. For instance, the seagoing fleet, which in the years of the USSR was the sixth-largest in the world, has markedly diminished. The share of it which went to Russia turned out to be out of balance, and the age of the Russian vessels proved to be much greater than that of those which went to the other independent states. More than third of the wharf facilities of Russian ports require repair and reconstruction. According to predictions of experts, most of the second-generation aircraft inventory must be written off by the year 2000 due to exhaustion of service life. But because of a lack of resources, the program for renewal of the aircraft inventory is being delayed. The air disaster at Irkutsk once again confirms the fact that this problem has to be resolved, otherwise the number of accidents and disasters will grow. There are also problems with pipeline transportation. The time has come to renovate a large number of pipes and compression equipment in a number of main sectors, since the questions of safety of further operations will greatly depend on this.

Now other factors also affect the rhythm of shipments. These include problems with energy resources, the change in transportation economic ties, and legal questions. Difficulties arise with respect to unhindered passage of cargoes over territories of adjacent states without abridgement of the interests of Russian shippers and consignees. In these cases, the need often arises to divert the shipments in other directions, or to switch to other types of transportation. Or it is simply necessary to change the shipment deadlines. This is one thing when the cargo is civilian, but quite another when it is military, and often poses a potential danger during transport.

Even this cursory listing of the problems of the country's transportation system suffices for one to understand that under these conditions, it is quite problematic for the Armed Forces to meet the requirements of military doctrine with respect to the transportation factor. In what way can we raise the mobility of units and formations? The choice has been made, and as I see it, it has been made correctly in the prevailing situation. In the doctrine, a course has been set toward priority development of military transport aviation.

But this is clearly insufficient to raise troop mobility. Military Transport Aviation can accomplish only a comparatively small part of the deployment of the Armed Forces or the regroupings they carry out. So we must consider the transportation system of Russia as a whole for this purpose: Rail, water and air transport and oil pipelines in combination, in specific strategic sectors, taking into account the transportation support of the particular theater of military operations. Each type of transportation must have its own reserves, and troop mobility must be achieved first of all through these reserves. But as I see it, in normal mode Military Transport Aviation must ensure against "bottlenecks" in the transportation system and perform the most urgent movements of troops and cargoes. But in general,



defense transportation needs at this stage must become the subject of special scientific research.

Alas, there are no specific developments on this topic. And not only the immediate future is vague. Military doctrine still does not influence the strategic development of transportation in Russia either. At present a special targeted state program, "Transport Rossii" [Russian Transportation] is being developed, in which the questions of its stability, profitability, controllability, manning and much else must be considered.

It would be good if the questions of transportation support of the Armed Forces were also fully reflected in it. In particular, in the near future we must take a serious look at questions of preparation of new points for unloading and loading troops and temporary transfer areas, development of military requirements on new transportation resources, and also on the means of control, and the transportability of new types of armaments and military equipment. We need the appropriate approaches to the development of new high-speed roads. This is only one example. At present, the possibility of construction of a high-speed Moscow-Brest-Warsaw-Berlin-Paris rail line is being examined. It will allow our country to join the Unified High-Speed Net with a track gauge of 1,435 mm. But this in turn will greatly complicate the technical support and restoration of this line on the territory of Russia from the standpoint of defense requirements. And even now many such problems are arising.

The tone is now set by the economy in transportation strategy. The basic volume of railroad construction in the foreseeable future will go to the Asiatic part of the country, in connection with the economic conquest of new regions. The construction of the Berkakit-Yakutsk railroad line will be a kind of beachhead for the future creation of a supporting system of railroads in the eastern part of the country with possible extension subsequently to Magadan and on to Chukotka, Kamchatka, and the U.S. transportation system. The Surgut-Urengoy-Igarka-Norilsk line under construction is intended to provide all-weather communications with the Norilsk mining and metallurgical combine.

Talk that the Russian economy will grow Siberia has already become a cliché, but what will grow the combat capacity and mobility of the Armed Forces?

And finally, under present conditions the problem of "transportation and conversion" is a very important one. In my view it requires the closest attention from the standpoint of all structures and priority financing, because this is precisely the case in which, by switching defense enterprises to peacetime channels, one can both effectively influence the development of the Russian economy and help raise the combat capacity of the Army and Navy. The production of transport planes, dry-cargo ships, tankers, road-building machinery and so forth indisputably will most effectively raise military potential, whose level is set by the military doctrine of Russia.

I think that this direction in conversion of military industry must become one of the highest priorities.

## PEACEKEEPING FORCES

### Col-Gen Kondratyev on Russian Peacekeeping Forces

PM1702135194 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 16 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Colonel General Georgiy Kondratyev, Russian Federation deputy defense minister: "Russia's 'Blue Helmets'"]

[Text] With the change in the geopolitical situation in the world the participation of states, blocs, and public and state structures in peacekeeping activity is put forward as a priority avenue of their foreign and military policy.

The process of the formation of the CIS and also of states which do not belong to this Commonwealth on the territory of the former USSR and the existence of contradictions within them and in some cases between them have led us to an understanding of the need to create peacekeeping forces. Under present conditions, when the European states that are CIS members are displaying no interest in resolving armed conflicts by their own efforts, Russia remains the only state with the military and technical resources to conduct operations to maintain and restore peace and is confirming this by its practice.

Of course, Russia directs its main efforts toward settling crisis situations and armed conflicts in the regions directly adjacent to its borders, since stability in these territories is of vital importance for the Russian state and its citizens, 25 million of whom live in nearby foreign parts. It has been and remains the only force capable of separating the warring sides and sitting them down at the conference table. Life itself shows that no international organization or group of states can replace our peacekeeping efforts on the territory of the former USSR.

At the same time we by no means rule out the enlistment of peacekeeping forces under the UN or CSCE flag if, in the world community's opinion, the need for that arises.

Russia's responsibility as a permanent member of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security and as a state which bears the main brunt of peacekeeping activity on the territory of the former USSR is reflected in the Russian Federation Constitution, the law on defense, the military doctrine, and other normative acts which indicate directly that Russia assists the efforts of the world community and various organs of collective security to prevent armed conflicts and maintain or restore peace by the decision of the UN Security Council or in accordance with international commitments.

Thus for the first time peacekeeping in Russia has been promoted to the rank of state policy.

The history of our state's peacekeeping goes back to 1973, when the first 36 Soviet military observers took part under the UN flag in the operation to monitor the conditions of the cease-fire in the Near East.

In subsequent years military observers have taken part in peacekeeping operations under UN auspices in Egypt, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, on the Iraq-Iran border, in the Western Sahara, Cambodia, Mozambique, and the former Yugoslavia. On two occasions Russian military observers have been in Abkhazia along the river Gumista where they confidently fulfilled their duties and the bloodshed was halted for a while. And only the warring sides' unconstructive policy prevented an end to the war in that region at the time.

There was also a good chance of ending the war on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border in September 1992 when to implement the terms of the defense ministers' Sochi agreement, Russia, Georgia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan were to assign military observers to five zones of responsibility. But only Russia did this.

To this day 105 Russian military observers are continuing this hard service in many of the planet's trouble spots.

The failure to take decisive steps in nearby foreign parts could plunge former regions of the USSR into even greater bloodletting and the flames of war could move directly to Russian territory. In accordance with interstate agreements the Defense Ministry, without waiting for the adoption of a legislative base on the peacekeeping forces, formed nine battalions of Russian troops and sent them to South Ossetia, the Republic of Georgia, and the Dniester Region of the Republic of Moldova in the summer and fall of 1992.

At the same time at the request of the Tajik Government units of the 201st Motorized-rifle Division were ordered by the Russian leadership to perform peacekeeping tasks and in the fall of 1993 CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces from Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan were formed and introduced to the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The development of events in the south of Russia itself (the situation in Ingushetia) and the absence of legislative acts on the peacekeeping forces and the mechanism for activating them made it necessary in order to end the bloodshed and maintain law and order on the territories of North Ossetia and Ingushetia in accordance with the Russian Federation President's edict to create a combined group of troops of about 12,000 men from the troops of the North Caucasus Military District and the Internal Affairs Ministry internal troops. Today the numerical strength of the Russian Army servicemen performing peacekeeping tasks is over 16,000.

The experience of the Russian "Blue Helmets" participation in settling military conflicts in nearby foreign parts enriches world experience of peacekeeping. Thus their introduction to zones of armed confrontation has been carried out under conditions of continuing fire and their mission included separating the warring sides. Another new element is that alongside Russian peacekeepers representatives of the conflicting sides and not only of neutral states are participants in the operation to restore and maintain peace.

The establishment of Russia's peacekeeping forces is taking place under complex conditions. We realize that the settlement of armed conflicts is the common business of states of the relevant region and the world community as a whole. Consequently the burden of expenses should be shared between them. This principle has been reflected in a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements within the framework of the CIS.

But most regrettably as of today in all trouble spots of the former Union, Russia, as the mediator in the solution of conflicts and with contingents of peacekeeping forces, which surpass all other participants in the peacekeeping operations in terms of personnel, equipment, and weapons, sometimes being several times larger, receives no compensation for its participation.

Moreover, funds for conducting peacekeeping operations are not allocated from the federal budget and the financing of the participation of the military contingent in peacekeeping operations is through Defense Ministry funds.

The question of compensating for expenditure on these purposes through subscriptions by states within the CIS framework in accordance with the protocol of the Tashkent meeting of heads of CIS states (May 1992) remains unimplemented.

Many politicians in the West are now speaking increasingly frequently of our allegedly minor participation in peacekeeping operations, unfairly restricting the numerical strength of the peacekeeping forces to a battalion in Yugoslavia and observers. In our view the new but noble mission of preventing bloodshed should not be restricted to the political interests of individual states but should be determined by the quantity of the forces and funds used in humanitarian missions. It would be fairer to view expenditure on financing these operations as a direct proportionate contribution by Russia to the UN budget for peacekeeping operations and to grant these operations a UN (or CSCE) mandate).

In connection with the well known events in our political life no legislative acts have yet been adopted on Russia's peacekeeping forces. Their status has not been determined. The armed forces contingents performing peacekeeping functions are only assigned as peacekeeping forces by orders of the defense minister. The mechanism for supplying (activating) these forces has not been regulated either.

When planning operations to maintain and establish peace it is essential to proceed from the premise that peacekeeping tasks should be performed not by line units of the armed forces but by specially created professionally trained peacekeeping forces equipped for the purpose. Their numerical strength and composition, the procedure for their use, and a whole series of other questions must be precisely regulated by the state. Unfortunately not everyone in our country yet understands that the creation, staffing, and use of peacekeeping forces must be determined legislatively by the supreme organs of state power and not by the Defense Ministry.

Therefore in our view the priority task is the elaboration and adoption of a Concept for Russia's participation in peacekeeping activity and a law "on the procedure for supplying peacekeeping forces for participation in peacekeeping operations." It is also essential to approve their status (position), that is to put a legal normative basis under Russian peacekeeping.

At the same time one or two motorized-rifle divisions of the Ground Troops (15,000-16,000 men) must be transferred to a new organizational staff structure meeting the requirement for autonomy when subunits perform peacekeeping missions. We have now voiced proposals for putting these forces outside the treaty framework for conventional arms limitation. It is also necessary to create the appropriate material training base for training them. The first sections of the training centers for the 27th and 45th motorized-rifle divisions have already been virtually created. But for the higher quality training of personnel for operations in unusual conditions it is necessary to improve them considerably. And again the question is based on the financial famine which the armed forces chronically experience.

The creation of Russia's peacekeeping forces should in our view be implemented on the basis of the principles of the compliance of their organizational structure, composition, and numerical strength with the requirements of military doctrine, with the concept of Russia's security, and with its international commitments, centralized leadership, the maximum use of the existing military potential and existing structures, and a consideration for the continuity of national traditions, the norms of international law, and the experience of other states.

They must include Defense Ministry units and subunits (military contingents), military, civilian, and militia personnel (the leading staff of the mission, observers, and experts), and communications, support, and servicing and maintenance subunits.

Staffing with privates and sergeants should be (and already is) only on a voluntary basis. Contracts should be concluded with people who as a rule have already served in line units. Today there are obviously not enough

professional servicemen under contract in the peacekeeping forces units. That is the result of the discrepancy between material incentives and the risk to life and the conditions of service of the "peacekeepers."

Peacekeeping forces' subunits must be staffed fully before their training for peacekeeping activity begins. Right now because of difficulties over staffing subunits often have to be "assembled" at the last minute before being sent to armed conflict zones.

By a decision of the Russian Federation Government an Interdepartmental Coordination Commission has been created to pool the efforts of ministries, committees, and departments on questions of peacekeeping activity. Its organizational and legal documents are being drafted. A Sector [napravleniye] for Leadership of the Peacekeeping Forces has been operating in the Defense Ministry for over a year now and controls the training of peacekeeping forces subunits and their fulfillment of missions. Unfortunately, because of its small size a number of issues of a state law nature and of international and public peacekeeping activity are beyond the sector's purview. These questions are resolved by many directorates of the Defense Ministry but for more high-quality and effective work it would be desirable to unite these peacekeeping functions in a single body.

In connection with the growth of the scale of the peacekeeping forces' participation in the maintenance of peace, in the United Nations the structure of the organs of management is being improved and a professional military staff is being formed for the operational control of forces assigned by the United Nations. A special committee for improving peacekeeping operations is being instituted under the UN Security Council.

Theoretical questions of the preparation and implementation of peacekeeping operations are also being elaborated, in particular the NATO and U.S. concept for settling crises and armed conflicts and the concept of second-generation operations, and vigorous work is being performed to create UN "reserve forces."

Russia is taking an active part in all these questions. In particular the question of including the 27th motorized rifle division in the UN "reserve forces" has been successfully resolved and consultations are under way on questions of peacekeeping activity between Russian representatives and international organizations (the United Nations, CSCE, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO, and others) and on a bilateral basis. In July 1994 it is planned to hold the first joint Russian-U.S. command staff peacekeeping exercise. Russia's 27th Motorized-rifle Division and the United States' third infantry division will take part.

Russia's "Blue Helmets" now stand between the warring sides in conflicts. By their activity they ensure cease-fires and create conditions for a definitive settlement of conflicts by political means. Despite a number of unresolved questions, they are honorably performing their hard service, so essential today in many regions.



## UKRAINE

### 'Rising Tensions' Over Military Economic Crunch

#### Finance Directorate Head Comments on Shortages

94UM0191A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
22 Dec 93 p 1

[Article by Major-General Ivan Shtopenko, chief of the Finance Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (MO) of Ukraine: "The State Has Fallen Into Debt to Its Defenders"]

[Text] *There have been more and more letters to the editors in the mail of NARODNA ARMIYA lately (the content of one of which is presented below).*

*"I appeal to you in the name of the employees of the military hospital," writes trade-union member Yaroslav Mykhaylovych Salabay. "The approach of paydays in the last few months has caused discontent, nervousness and various types of discussions and gossip among people. That is because no one knows whether they will be paid the proper wages on time or not.*

*"Whereas the pay used to be delayed only a few days, in September we were paid on the 18th of the month instead of the 5th or 6th. The same thing happened in October. More than half of it went by, and the pay had still not been issued. And that is while the latest price increases were occurring. People were left without money, without the means of existence.*

*"The hospital employees have a natural question for the finance workers: How much longer will this go on? This is a mockery of the people. Matters have gotten so bad that the patients are not getting food, since the hospital has nothing with which to pay the stores..."*

*Letters with similar content, as you know, are being sent to other places besides the central publishing organ of the Ministry of Defense. Many of them have arrived directly at the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, so the editors of NARODNA ARMIYA appealed directly to the Chief of the Finance Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Major-General Ivan Shtopenko, with the request to comment on the situation that has taken shape lately with the payment of monetary sustenance to the servicemen, as well as wages to the employees, of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.*

The profound socio-economic crisis that has struck the state has hit first and foremost the least well-protected segments of the population; among whom, notwithstanding the host of legislation that has been passed, are the servicemen and the members of their families. The Ministry of Defense, owing to the insufficient receipts to the state treasury, is being financed only allowing for the available resources of the state budget. The financial status of the Armed Forces of Ukraine remains extraordinarily difficult and critical under

those conditions. The troops were financed in 13 increments in November alone.

But even these crumbs actually arrived at the recipients through the banks only after delays of up to two weeks. The National Bank made the decision back in July to strengthen monitoring of the trustworthiness of bank documents. Wire receipts of monetary sums (and that is how we send them to the troops for the sake of speed) were to be confirmed by the payer bank therein, and the funds transferred to the military units only after the receipt of the appropriate confirmation. There are cases where there have been good profits from dishonest transactions.

All of this has led to the fact that the servicemen and employees of the armed forces were paid late at some garrisons for October—November. And it will be even harder to provide people with the money they are due for December with this sort of financing for the armed forces. This is intolerable. The servicemen and employees should receive everything due to them on time and in full.

I do not want to be less than straightforward. There are no funds to pay for food, fuels and lubricants, or municipal and other services, owing to which a number of military compounds have been cut off from sources of everyday support. The employees of the military repair enterprises, whom we are unable to pay for repairs performed on hardware and military property, are at the brink of a social explosion along with the military units.

The command of the military districts and branches of the armed forces, the chiefs of garrisons, units commanders and certain subunits, entirely naturally, are also appealing personally to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and to the Finance Directorate to rectify the situation as soon as possible, and provide temporary financial assistance in this truly hopeless situation.

It must be stated that both the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Finance Directorate are well aware of the situation that has resulted. Everything possible is being done to eliminate the tensions in the military collectives, and to instill order in monetary support for the servicemen and employees of the armed forces. The Minister of Defense of Ukraine has personally met with the highest leaders of the state several times, and appeals have been sent over his signature to the President of Ukraine, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the acting Prime Minister of Ukraine and the chairman of the board of the National Bank of Ukraine setting forth the situation that has taken shape with financing for the armed forces, and warning of the rise in social tensions among the military and civilian collectives.

The commanders of units, the socio-psychological service and the finance bodies are exerting a great deal of effort to explain to servicemen that this is a temporary difficulty, but the measures that are being implemented

are not finding understanding among the personnel, since the situation is repeated every month. Many servicemen are filing requests for discharge from the armed forces, since they cannot provide for their families. Not to mention those without apartments, who are unable to pay for their temporary spots.

As bitter as it may be to read these telegrams, what can you do—they are the truth. I repeat once again that the Ministry of Defense is doing everything possible to ease the situation with the financing for the troops. It must be frankly stated that the ministry has no money. Everything that is received from the State Budget is sent to its recipients immediately.

The president and government of Ukraine, despite the difficult economic situation in the country, have made a very important and vitally necessary decision pertaining to the social protection of servicemen and the members of their families—to provide food rations for the servicemen of the armed forces and their military formations created in accordance with legislation, starting on 1 October of this year. And that is good support for the families of servicemen in today's difficult situation.

The pay for servicemen has been tripled overall starting 1 December. That is now the fourth increase this year.

There is thus no reason to lose faith in improvements in the situation, both in Ukraine as a whole and in the armed forces in particular. We are relying on the fact that the state will not leave its defenders without assistance in this difficult time for all the people, the more so as we are receiving proper support on most issues from the president, the government and the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine.

### Measures for State Support Projected

94UM0191B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
5 Jan 94 pp 1-2

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Viktor Shvirov on meeting with journalists by Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and First Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Anatoliy Lopata: "Building a Strong Army is Difficult Without Money and Harmony"]

[Text] Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and First Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Anatoliy Lopata met with the editors of a number of the central newspapers of Ukraine, as well as the creative staffs of radio and television. In the course of a more than two-hour discussion, Anatoliy Vasylovych related some of the results in building the armed forces and the problems and difficulties of this difficult matter, and answered a host of questions.

NARODNA ARMIYA has already introduced Colonel-General Anatoliy Lopata to its readers, and there is probably no need to present his biography again. We will

nonetheless emphasize once again that Anatoliy Vasylovych linked his life with the army some thirty five years ago. After completing general military school, he served as commander of a platoon, company and battalion, chief of staff, regimental commander, deputy division commander, commander of a division, a corps and first deputy commander of a group of forces. He has completed two military academies—imeni M.V. Frunze and the General Staff.

It was not easy for Anatoliy Vasylovych to make the time for the meeting with journalists on this day. He nevertheless found an hour or two for the conversation with us. Thanking us for the attention that the employees of the press, radio and television have devoted to the armed forces and their problems, he stated that the main result of the two years of building the army is the fact that independent Ukraine has its own army. That is first. Second, we have the opportunity to look back today and analyze what has been done and what has not, and on that basis to define more concrete ways of realizing the program of military organizational development. The level of leadership of the armed forces today, and first of all the activity of the General Staff in this area, has become much higher. And it is there that I see the consequences of the work of my subordinates.

Third, we have finally clarified the status of the armed forces staff. Today it has the name of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. And that is no small feat.

Fourth, we are building our army today on a quite solid legal foundation. I have in mind here the laws "The Defense of Ukraine," "The Armed Forces of Ukraine," and the Military Doctrine, which was recently adopted by our parliament, along with other legislation.

I would also like to say something about this. Our cadres today—the officers, warrant officers, NCOs and soldiers—are people who have clearly answered the question of whom they are serving and how they are serving. We have been lucky to preserve the combat readiness of our troops at a level that guarantees the reliable defense of the peaceful labor of the people of Ukraine under difficult conditions. And that is convincingly testified by the results of the recent performance evaluations for the past training year.

Unfortunately, Colonel-General Anatoliy Lopata continued, there are shortcomings and mistakes in our work. In the past year, for example, we were not fortunate enough to fulfill entirely the program relating to the training of units and subunits. Why, you ask? There is one reason—not enough matériel or funds. We had to cut back the training time of flight personnel in aviation units, say, owing to the acute shortage of fuels and lubricants, and we were not able to conduct regimental tactical exercises in the full amount with the use of vehicles and other means on which the professional proficiency of the commanders and their subordinates depends to a considerable extent.

Consider this: It has been estimated that for an army to fulfill the tasks entrusted to it successfully requires somewhere around 3.6 percent of the gross national income for its maintenance and development. This is the ideal—that is, if the state already has well-formed statehood and developed armed forces. Ukraine is still on its way to that. So everything being supplied to the army today is not sufficient. The armed forces, for example, were allocated just a third of the amount we needed last year, and even less if the uncontrolled inflation is taken into account. The financial inflows, in short, are barely enough to feed and clothe the people and pay them. There is simply nothing left for the rest.

There is also no money, most unfortunately, to supplement the inventory of combat vehicles, or for the development and manufacture of more effective models of weaponry. What has and will the army live on? To a significant extent on the former reserves of logistical matériel and military property. The reserves, meanwhile, if they are not replenished, will be exhausted sooner or later. As for the money, Minfin [Ministry of Finance] is also seeking out opportunities and passing them on each month for the needs of the armed forces. But the officers, warrant officers, workers and employees are nonetheless receiving their pay late these days. This, in turn, is having a negative effect on their attitude toward the work and the well-being of their families. It is especially difficult for those who reside in remote garrisons where there are not always kindergartens, schools, stores, or bus lines with the closest inhabited areas. Whatever one may say, everything is not as simple as it could seem to some.

The state and the MO [Ministry of Defense] are nonetheless doing a great deal to ease the lives of servicemen and the members of their families. The question of issuing food rations to officers and warrant officers was positively resolved recently in particular, as well as cigarettes for soldiers and NCOs. There is no doubt that the issues that have acutely faced the people in uniform will also find understanding in the government.

We return, however, to the problems connected with the renewal of hardware and weaponry. I would not be surprised if some of you were to ask me how it could have happened that we have such a mighty defense industry as ours, but the army today is still using what it got from the once-mighty and "indivisible"? We really did get a mighty scientific and industrial potential after the collapse of the Union. It must be said that the armed forces themselves have a solid production base—there are several dozen repair plants alone. But they, like the enterprises of the military-industrial complex, are in a difficult situation today. Quite a few of them, owing to the absence of funds in the Ministry of Defense for the procurement of hardware and weaponry and their repairs, as well as the ordering of new models of weaponry, have been forced to seek out ways that would permit them to at least make ends meet in these difficult times.

The problem of military science, without which the army cannot manage, is no less acute. Everything would appear to be understandable here. But what is actually happening? Just a hundredth of what is required has been invested in the development of military science today. A great deal of scientific work has been curtailed owing to the lack of finances. We have considerable scientific potential at the same time. It just needs to be preserved and strengthened with funding. The need, however, does not always match the capabilities. The Ministry of Defense is losing excellent cadres of scientific personnel, who will scarcely be coming back in the future, as a consequence.

Other difficulties being experienced by the army could be cited as well, said Colonel-General Anatoliy Lopata. But it will live on nonetheless, and take on new forms and outlines. I am an optimist by nature, so if you ask me what I would like to see for our armed forces in the future, then I would answer without reflection—to be respected by the people and the state. How can that be achieved? There is certainly no unequivocal answer to that question, as it is complex and multifaceted. And nonetheless, it seems to me, many of these problems could recede by themselves if we are able to raise the prestige of military service and the prestige of the military person in society. So once again, how? You will not achieve anything here by punishment or some willful decisions, and could even make matters worse. Let us make a small excursion into the recent past in order to understand and look into the reasons for the decline in prestige of military service.

More or less better conditions have been created for people in the spheres of trade, business and entrepreneurship over the last five or six years or so. That has had an immediate effect on the armed forces. Military cadres, and not the worst of them, began to flow out of the ranks. This process was not halted after Ukraine began to build its own army. I do not want to say that business and trade are not needed by our society. But without reliable people devoted to their homeland serving in the army, we cannot talk about a strong state. I would like to see, that is, intelligent youth loyal to their Fatherland come to us.

I also touched at the beginning of our discussion on the problem of financing the army. I would like to see our armed forces have a budget that would be sufficient not only for their maintenance, the training of personnel and the upkeep of hardware in combat-ready condition, but also for the development of military science, the creation of new models of hardware and weaponry etc. Only in that case will our troops be engaged in what they should be, that is, raising the level of their combat readiness. But one can only think about that now; time does not wait. And that is where this could lead.

I will refer as an example to a problem connected with the development and creation of our hardware and weaponry.



Everything our army is equipped with today is hardware and weaponry of the former Soviet Army, which is, by the way, not eternal and has entirely concrete service lives. A completely new tank, say, can be operated for a span of fifteen or twenty years. The vehicle is obsolete upon the expiration of that period, and it must be replaced. Financing is needed today, in order to place an order for a new model of weaponry, for scientific development, and then for the manufacture of the vehicles at enterprises in the military-industrial complex. Taking into account the fact that the average time period for the birth of a new model of a weapon, depending on the complexity of the work, is seven to fifteen years, one may say that if money is not invested in the development of weapons today, then in seven or fifteen years we will not have them.

It would not be quite correct to say that no one understands the ruinous nature of this situation. Ask any of our workers and you will be convinced of that. The understanding is possibly worse at higher levels. If, say, we want to get our finances in order, then people appear who will say that perhaps we could wait for the future for our armed forces, and let them survive through the reserves that they have. But everything that used to be in the army is coming to an end today. It has actually already lived and maintained its combat readiness for two years thanks to internal reserves. Today we need to think seriously about the future of the armed forces, that is, about their further improvement and development. And in all of this we have still not said anything about the accumulation of material resources and reserves for difficult times.

Colonel-General Anatoliy Lopata emphasized, in answering a question regarding what the ideology will be in the army, that the leadership of the armed forces is doing everything to see that it has one, uniform ideology—the state ideology. To put it in more concrete terms, then we will try first and foremost to see that every serviceman—officer or warrant officer, sergeant or soldier—is a citizen of his Fatherland, and that his level of training and readiness would permit him to fulfill his patriotic duties to defend the independent Ukraine with honor. That is first. Second, I also see my task as seeing that there is unity, harmony and understanding of their tasks among the servicemen with regard to the security of our state. Avoiding discord in the thoughts of soldiers, sergeants and officers is facilitated to no small extent by the work to avert the influence of political parties and movements on the military collectives. It is no secret that such influence exists in Ukraine. I would like to remind them once again that our army is not needed for political battles, it is needed for the protection of the interests of the state and its land, sea and air borders, and for the maintenance of peace and harmony in society. And there are not, and cannot be, even the slightest actions here by those who have quite different aims and interests.

With a view to continuing the discussion of this topic, the chief of the General Staff was asked a question regarding the political situation in Sevastopol and, in

particular, the motives for the recent murder of the chief of the press center of the Black Sea Fleet, Captain 1st Rank A. Lazebnykov. That city, said Anatoliy Vasylovych, is becoming a tangled knot of political problems and many unresolved issues pertaining to the further existence and presence of the ChF [Black Sea Fleet] on our land. As for the murder of the head of the press center, neither the armed forces nor the Ukrainian Navy have any relation to that whatsoever. The opinion of the chief of the General Staff is that there were no political motives at all at the heart of that tragic incident, the more so any of the conflicts that existed at one time between the sailors of the ChF and the Ukrainian Navy. Something else is concealed here.

The journalists were also unable to avoid asking about some of their own problems at this meeting. The discussion concerned in particular the fact that it has become more difficult for the members of the press to obtain information pertaining to military topics, and whether that was connected with any prohibitions. That is in reality not so. The armed forces of Ukraine, emphasized the chief of the General Staff, have never been closed to the mass media. But here is something to worry about. Quite a few commentators have appeared here recently who are, without any authority or rights whatsoever, sharing with this or that correspondent their ideas pertaining to this or that factor or incident, and are frequently passing that off as the stance of the Ministry of Defense. I, said Colonel-General Anatoliy Lopata, am categorically against that treatment of the issue. If we want to tell our people about the life of the military collectives, then we should turn to the people who know what they are talking about, what the essence of the problem is. Taking advantage of this opportunity, I would like to confirm once again what I have said many times before: Ask our specialists, ask me, ask our chiefs of directorates any question at any time if you please, and no one will fail to inform you of anything. By the way, we will never close the gates of a unit to journalists, we will not conceal problems from them connected with non-regulation relations, with desertion from the army. In confirmation of what he said, Colonel-General Anatoliy Lopata related in quite a bit of detail how many of our servicemen are on the run today, and what reasons prompted them to take such a step. There are currently fifty-three soldiers "on the run" in the Carpathian region, for example. The motives that impelled them to leave their military collectives are very diverse. The people left their units, however, as a rule not because they were beaten or driven from them, but rather because many of them are simply not ready to bear all of the difficulties of military service in a steadfast manner.

The army is not able to solve this problem alone. It exists, one might say, at the boundary of military and civilian activity. Much here depends on the schools, parents and labor collectives, and on their work with regard to the patriotic indoctrination of the pre-draft youth.

Seeing alternative service as one realistic way of restoring the situation in the military collectives, the journalists were interested in hearing from the chief of the General Staff how the call-up for that service was proceeding, what difficulties are arising. Reminding them of some of the provisions of the Law of Ukraine "Alternative (Extra-Military) Service," Colonel-General Anatoliy Lopata observed, not without regret, that hundreds of youth who have expressed the desire to work, for example, in construction or at treatment centers, hospitals or other places are not being called. Some fear the longer term of service, others are unaware, and still others... There is, in short, much here to think about and work on.

The discussion next turned to national problems and, in particular, what the composition of the army will be. In accordance with the principles of military organizational development, said Anatoliy Vasylovych, the armed forces of Ukraine have to be popular rather than national. I like the name of our newspaper NARODNA ARMIYA on that plane. The people [*narod*] are a union of many peoples and nationalities. Look how many there are in our country. Living here, aside from the Ukrainians, are Russians, Belarusians, Moldovans, Poles, Germans...

Why am I talking about this? Because if we want there to be peace and harmony in our independent state, then it is very important to have a well-disposed and understanding attitude toward each person, no matter what nationality he may be. The fact that each member of society is passionate about Ukraine and defends its independence is no less important in turn. And if that is so, then he is obliged to enjoy all the same rights as Ukrainians. There will otherwise not be harmony in society, and the state will not have a mighty and combat-ready army.

At the end of the meeting the journalists were interested in the thoughts of the chief of the General Staff on the nuclear weapons that are located on the territory of our state, ways and options for dividing up the Black Sea Fleet, the procedure for the transfer and future use of military compounds after the disbanding of military units in the strategic forces and a great deal more. Colonel-General Anatoliy Lopata, answering all of the questions clearly and exhaustively, appealed to the journalists with the request and wish to be very considerate and delicate with regard to covering the life and activity of the armed forces, and called for objective writing on current event and more vigorous and purposeful work in favor of the army, to strengthen its reputation and raise combat and mobilization readiness.

#### **Regional SOU Leader Discusses Military Doctrine**

AU0802090294 Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU  
in Ukrainian 1 Feb 94 p 2

[Interview with Colonel Mykola Vasylykevych, head of the Lvov Oblast organization of Ukraine's Officers

Union [SOU], by Mariya Bazelyuk; place and date not given: "Ukraine's Military Doctrine Rules Out Full Unilateral Disarmament"]

[Text] Ukraine's Officers Union has always occupied a firm position defending our state independence. It took an active part in creating Ukraine's Armed Forces, and later—in their building. Here is an interview with Colonel Mykola Vasylykevych, head of the Lvov Oblast organization of Ukraine's Officers Union.

[Bazelyuk] Colonel, it is believed that servicemen are not supposed to engage in politics, something for which SOU has frequently been criticized. However, how can one remain outside political life when questions of the military doctrine, the Black Sea Fleet, or Ukraine's nuclear disarmament are being resolved?

[Vasylykevych] Quite true, servicemen are not allowed to take part in the activity of political parties, however, this should not be confused with the work of public organizations, such as Ukraine's Officers Union or with the participation in state-building processes in general. Article 4 of the law "On Associations of Citizens" forbids the creation of political parties within the Armed Forces. However, Article 6 of the provisional Statutes of the Internal Service reads that servicemen have all socioeconomic, political, and personal rights. The creation of the Armed Forces is politics. From the very first days of our state's existence, patriotically minded Ukrainian officers and generals began to elaborate legislative documents on the Armed Forces. For example, Colonel Vitaliy Lazorkin, jointly with a group of officers, elaborated at least two variants of the military doctrine that were published in the press. General Oleksandr Rol, the present head of Ukraine's Officers Union, proposed his own variant of the military doctrine. Incidentally, Oleksandr Rol has been registered as a candidate for [Supreme Council] deputy at Halych Electoral District No. 260.

[Bazelyuk] What is the character of Ukraine's military doctrine?

[Vasylykevych] To begin with, it must be clearly understood that the military doctrine is a system of views of the possible character of a war, preparation of the country for war, military building, and comprehensive provision of the Armed Forces. It has three subdivisions: the military-political, military-technological, and military-economic aspects. As a matter of fact, servicemen may only take part in the elaboration of the military-technological aspect, whereas the other two are the prerogative of the Supreme Council and of the Cabinet of Ministers.

Ukraine's strategic tasks in the defense sphere comprise the defense of its state sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity. In other words, the military doctrine has a defensive character.

[Bazelyuk] In that case, how can one account for the presence on our territory of the 43d Missile Army, which has not, to this day, sworn allegiance to Ukraine?

[Vasylkevych] In the past, Ukraine's Defense Minister issued an order, in accordance with which all those military units and subunits that are in charge of storage and use of nuclear munitions, were included into the 43d Missile Army, whose command is subordinated to the Ukrainian military department. Therefore, they were supposed to take the oath, something upon which SOU insisted during meetings with former Defense Minister General Kostyantyn Morozov. All the more so, since it was found, during the meeting in Vinnytsya with officers of the Missile Army and from opinion polls, that 80 percent of officers and warrant officers in the 43d army wish to take the oath. Now, that the military doctrine has become a state document, all those who serve in Ukraine must take the oath.

[Bazelyuk] Ukraine, which, in accordance with the military doctrine, rules out full unilateral disarmament, is today giving away its nuclear weapons. Why do you think such metamorphoses are taking place in our country?

[Vasylkevych] The military doctrine specifically states that, in the future, Ukraine intends to become a nonnuclear state and that it links the destruction of nuclear weapons with identical actions on the part of other nuclear powers. It has recently been stated quite frequently that nuclear weapons may become a great misfortune for Ukraine. There is some truth in this. For example, the SS-19 missiles deployed in Ukraine were manufactured at Moscow plants, and some missile warheads are also of Russian manufacture; it is true that, in 1994, the warranted service life of some of them is due to expire and, in this connection, certain difficulties may arise. However, SS-24 missiles for example, were manufactured at our own Ukrainian plants, and one does not have to be a great strategist to understand that they may be reprogrammed for a shorter range of action. If we do, after all, give up our nuclear potential (which, to me, seems too generous), then, after the warranted service life of nuclear charges expires, the SS-24 missiles may be converted into missiles with conventional warheads.

[Bazelyuk] However, there are demands that we urgently transfer them to Russia, because we need fuel for our atomic electric power plants [AES's].

[Vasylkevych] You know, even though I am not a specialist in this sphere, I am certain that Ukraine extracts uranium ores and even has facilities to enrich them to the concentration of 0.7, however, having enriched them to that level, for some reason, it ships them to Russia, where they are brought up to the necessary concentration, following which only some of them return to Ukraine in the form of fuel for our AES's. This was stipulated well in advance, but I am far from believing that Ukraine is unable to resolve the problem of the complete enrichment of uranium ores.

[Bazelyuk] It is maintained that we do not have military specialists at the level that may work with nuclear and space weapons. If so, why can they not be trained?

[Vasylkevych] In the past, there were more than 30 higher military educational institutions and a number of research institutes on the territory of Ukraine. I can say with certainty that there are military specialists in Ukraine who have taken and continue to take part in the development of the most up-to-date military technology and weapons. It is a different matter that the reform of military education was not conducted properly, and today we need cadres that are capable of commanding formations, armies, and so on. As has become known to us, the minister of defense has taken upon himself the personal control of the Administration for Military Education, having replaced its leadership. Even today, Ukraine's Armed Forces have enough specialists capable of training highly qualified personnel to service advanced military technology.

## BALTIC STATES

### Current Status of Latvian Armed Forces

944K0684A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
4 Feb 94 p 5

[Article by Irina Litvinova, IZVESTIYA: "The Latvian Army: 'Green Beret' Experience Plus Soviet Training"]

[Text] The security of the state is becoming a priority for the government; Prime Minister of Latvia Valdis Birkavs has stated so. It has been announced that defense expenditures will be increased, despite the runaway budget deficit.

Latvian military men are happy: So far the organizational development of the Armed Forces has been sputtering for strictly financial reasons. To be sure, helpers have come along. Germany sent the uniforms of the former GDR Army, a little bit of materiel, and naval cutters. This country is paying a great deal attention to the Latvian Army. The German military attache has handed a present to Latvian Minister of Defense Valdis Pavlovskis—two sets of high-grade video and audio equipment which are used in the conduct of military inspections. Experts from Paris have visited in order to learn what assistance France could provide. Riga requested assistance on the issues of communication, transportation, military medicine, the Navy, and other spheres. Military instructors who have trained Latvian "Zemessardze" ("militiamen") have come from Great Britain. The Minister of Defense of Belgium has offered army materiel, weapons, and other resources released as a result of reductions in the Armed Forces of Belgium. Finally, the Swedes and the Danes have provided continuous assistance: this includes consultations, materiel, and monetary subsidies. The Americans are sympathetic: a military delegation has just visited Latvia.



In the words of Latvian Minister of Defense Valdis Pavlovskis, a report has been submitted to the National Defense Council analyzing where a military threat to Latvia may originate. The content of the report is not yet known. Meanwhile, newspapers have been writing about Russia in a harsh tone, shaping their own concept of a possible threat and potential enemy.

According to the Constitution, President Guntis Ulmanis, Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Forces of Latvia, also heads the National Security Council. But, of course, the Ministry of Defense plays first fiddle. Latvian military commanders in the upper echelon combine the experience of "green berets" and participation in the war in Afghanistan; at issue are both the Minister of Defense and the Commander of the Defense Forces.

Current Minister of Defense Valdis Pavlovskis (who turns 60 this year) is a civilian. However, he has decent combat experience: He reached the rank of Captain in the U.S. Marines. He commanded a "green beret" unit in Vietnam. As he told journalists, he "taught guerrilla tactics" at an officer academy in the United States.

Valdis Pavlovskis speaks Latvian with a slight accent: He was born in Riga, but spent his entire life in emigration. Pavlovskis was active in organizations coming out against the occupation of Latvia by Soviet troops. He returned to the Republic during the national renaissance period and soon took the position of deputy of Talavs Jundzis, the first Minister of Defense of independent Latvia. Jundzis, one of the activists of the People's Front, now heads the Baltic Center for Strategic Research. Valdis Pavlovskis was elected a Deputy in elections to the Saeima [parliament] this summer on the ticket of the governing party The Latvian Way.

In an interview Pavlovskis complained that Balts abroad have had to make a great effort to explain to the world why the governments of Baltic countries did not even try to offer resistance to the Red Army in 1940. In the words of the Minister of Defense, if something similar recurs, we need to show to the world: we are capable of fighting for our freedom. Commander of the Defense Forces Dainis Turlais voiced a similar point of view during a conference: "Our main task is to protect the country against an aggressor at least for a few days so that the public of the world and its organizations will be able to respond to the conflict."

The order discharging Colonel Dainis Turlais from the Soviet Army was signed by Marshal Shaposhnikov. Turlais, the former Chief of the Operations Section of the 40th Army (he fought in Afghanistan for three years), gave up a promising career in Russia, discontinued studies at the General Staff Academy, and returned to Latvia to build its armed forces. Dainis Turlais is 43; he is energetic. The new, old-style Latvian uniform fits him like a glove. In Turlais's opinion, the Defense Forces of Latvia should consist of 10,000 people. Attention should be focused on border guard formations. Rifle battalions within the country should assist them if necessary.

However, the security concept and the defense plan which is now being developed will still change because literally the last few weeks have compelled many changes in the concepts of the Latvian military, who are inspired by the support of NATO specialists.

For now, Latvian military cadres are being trained mainly within the Republic. The Academy of National Defense of Latvia is housed on the premises of the School imeni Biryuzov, one of the best in the former Union. The academy is headed by Valdis Matiss, likewise a former colonel of the Soviet Army: He headed a department at the Frunze Academy. The current military attache of Latvia in Russia, Gunars Alkonis, headed a Department of instruction at the same academy. Tactical intelligence is his specialty. Latvian officers are also invited to study abroad, but poor knowledge of foreign languages is an obstacle. Incidentally, the language problem also surfaced during joint exercises of the defense forces of the three Baltic states: In what language are commands to be given so that everybody would understand—not in the Russian language of occupation, really? The Minister of Defense of Latvia ordered that the system of commands and organization of communications adopted in NATO be mastered this year.

Only citizens of Latvia are drafted for service in its armed forces. However, some are not in a hurry to do their patriotic duty. They evade the daily round of the army and desert their units. Drinking and dedovshchina are flourishing. They have already become the reason for fatal accidents. Here, two border guards shot each other; there, a young guardian of the border, after firing at his comrade, went further away from the post and shot himself. The taunting of new recruits in a convoy regiment ended in tragedy: young soldiers driven to despair by outrages in the unit decided to flee. Three Latvian boys tried to cross the border in order to hide out in Russia, but the Latvian border guards apprehended them. Some junior commanders were relieved from their positions following an inquiry. Incidents in the Defense Forces are dwarfed by the "glory" of the dashing "Zemessardze": loss of weapons, murders, drunken disorderliness. The "Zemessardze" are a peculiar structure. "Patriots make up the militia"—this is how Girts Kristovskis, recently Militia Chief of Staff (currently Minister of Internal Affairs) characterized his comrades. Activists of the People's Front and more radical organizations of that time became "Zemessardze." The trouble is that patriotism is no substitute for training and discipline. For a long time members of the militia in spotted camouflage smacked of "Makhno's guys" possessed by the national-patriotic idea. To be sure, attempts have been recently made to give them a more or less civilized appearance. At any rate, there are fewer scandals associated with these people, who are armed and very dangerous. Evaluating the year 1993 in an interview to the newspaper DIENA, the Minister of Defense observed: "The relationship between the Defense Forces and the militia has improved perceptibly. It is now much easier to find a common language to achieve common objectives." Latvia was the first among the republics of the

former Union to introduce alternative service, but soon gave it up. It was ineffective, and control was lacking. Labor service was introduced, but it is virtually defunct, too. There is unemployment in the state, and those who draw benefits for months do not have enough slots to use their energies. The Ministry of Defense has developed new rules for induction into the military service: It is envisioned reducing the number of categories of individuals ineligible for the draft. However, the plan is to reduce the duration of service to one year, with the exception of those who will have to master advanced materiel.

How many soldiers are there in the Latvian Army? According to data from the newspaper NEATKARIGA CINA, at present the Defense Forces have 1,500 soldiers and 150 officers. Six hundred soldiers and 30 officers serve in the naval forces. At the border, 338,000 [as published] soldiers and 340 officers are in the service. The Navy consists of 15 vessels (nine are at full readiness). The Air Force has two An-2 planes and two L-410's (one is in operation). There are six helicopters. The Latvian Army has to date been using mainly former Soviet weapons. A batch of Czech assault rifles has been purchased. Head of the Cabinet of Ministers Valdis Birkavs stated that Latvia, like Estonia, intends to buy weapons from Israel.

Since the beginning of the year the armed forces of the three Baltic states have noticeably stepped up coordination of their actions. Preparations are underway for joint exercises of rifle companies; in February they will be held in Estonia, in July—in Lithuania, and in October—in Latvia. As Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission Aleksandrs Kiršteins said, pooling their efforts will make it possible for the Baltic states to create a powerful echelon of defense against a potential aggressor.

#### **Baltic States Plan for Military Cooperation**

94UM0169A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
15 Jan 94 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondents Captains 1st Rank Vladimir Urban and Valeriy Gromak, under the rubric: "Military Review": "If We Can Just Hold Out for Another Year"—After That the Baltic Countries Hope To Form a Military Alliance"]

[Text] All military alliances are similar to each other. And perhaps the only question to which the answers will be different is: "Why is the bloc being created?" Literally a year from now we will become witnesses to the birth of a new alliance—the Baltic Alliance. And this is not a prediction but a visible prospect. So, this question is already appropriate: "Why?"

#### **We Have Sent A Note to NATO**

As had been anticipated, a sensation due to Lithuania's entry into NATO did not occur. But President Algirdas Brazauskas' official request, which was sent to the North Atlantic Organization at the beginning of this year, once

again confirmed the strategic goals not only of that country but also of the Baltic states as a whole.

In the middle of December, the general opinion that only NATO is capable of guaranteeing the security of the Baltic republics was expressed at a meeting in Tallinn of the three presidents—Algirdas Brazauskas, Guntis Ulmanis and Lennart Meri. It is erroneous to think that these conclusions were arrived at under the influence of the "Zhironovskiy factor" in the Russian parliamentary elections. We think that this is only a reason for the outcome because, in a joint statement on the meeting's results, even the presidents stressed that attempts for a rapprochement with NATO arose, not under the influence of the elections in Russia, but because the Baltic countries have already been long interested "in closer ties" with that military bloc.

It is characteristic that last summer and autumn we saw in local politics the banner of the creation of a regional security system. And the priorities of cooperation began to be seen more clearly as winter approached.

At a meeting of the armed forces (defense forces) Commanders-in-Chief of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and this was in October, it was announced for the first time that the Baltic states need their own "Baltic NATO". And the need to create a "unified Baltic countries military system according to the NATO type" was officially confirmed already at the prime ministers December meeting.

According to certain data, they plan to sign a comprehensive treaty on a defensive alliance already at the end of this year, immediately after, as they think here, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia and Estonia. And during the time remaining they propose developing a package of specific agreements in the military sphere which will help to immediately begin the realization of the main treaty.

Now obviously the time has come to answer the question: "Why is the new bloc being created?" Lithuanian Minister of National Defense Linas Linkyavichyus expressed that most frankly when he said in a national television interview that the Baltic countries "should not knock at the door of the collective security system with their hands extended" but that they need to have their own effective military structures which will then be added to NATO.

#### **One Battalion Is Already Standing Roll Call**


What documents already exist? The Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense had already prepared one of the drafts of the treaty on military cooperation during the summer and it was sent to the Latvian and Estonian ministries of defense. It provides for the creation of a unified air defense system, joint protection of ground and maritime borders, and the exchange of operational information. Furthermore, it is considered advisable to have a common training facility to train troops and a Baltic arms development and production program.

For now we know that on the whole the Lithuanian draft was supported by its neighbors. They decided to create a "hot line" between the three ministers of defense and to exchange military attaches as "operational measures", and they also planned to strengthen the eastern borders in the near future. They plan to discuss these problems in more detail in January at the prime ministers meeting in Riga.

It is understandable that the development of military cooperation will primarily depend upon the level of

"rapprochement of the politicians". Right now a working group has been created to develop the charter of the Baltic countries presidential council. (A statute on the Baltic Assembly, a distinctive Baltic parliament, has already been adopted—Authors' comment). Later, as usual, the creation of all of the vertical structures of the new alliance will begin.

Analysts agree that only the proposals on the organs of military command and control could cause serious disagreements. If you take the Lithuanian variant as a basis,





you can hardly restrict yourself to the armed forces Commanders-in-Chiefs conference (council). A permanent organ in the form of a unified command authority will most likely be required. But even this diagram is not at all flawless. If, for example, you count on the entry of the Baltic republics into the North Atlantic Organization in the relatively near future, the organs of joint command and control that are being created will simply remain unnecessary.

Well for the time being the politicians have only begun to discuss the problems of a military alliance and the military personnel themselves have already taken part in the matter. The October commanders-in-chief meeting that was mentioned here made a joint decision on the creation of a "Baltic Battalion" by the end of 1994 which will then be placed at the disposal of UN peacekeeping forces.

They plan to deploy the battalion at Alitus (Lithuania). It will have a strength of 650 men. The structure: command structure, staff and three companies (Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian). A Lithuanian officer will become the commander, a Latvian officer will be deputy commander, and an Estonian officer will be chief of staff. The leadership and staff will be changed annually. They plan three exercises, an infantry company from each country will participate, in order to create the battalion this year.

But what if the UN does not require this battalion? Or if the leaders of the three countries do not decide on the participation of this subunit in peacekeeping operations? Estonian Defense Forces Commander-in-Chief Major-General Aleksander Eynselt thinks that even if the politicians do not determine their positions, the creation of the battalion will become "one more step toward the military cooperation of three countries".

#### But CNN Will Be the First To Arrive to Assist

As we know, any military alliance assumes that armies are structured on approximately identical principles. But if Estonia has already begun the transition to NATO standards (it concluded a contract for the delivery of \$50 million worth of Israeli arms—small-arms and antitank weapons, light air defense systems, etc.), Latvia is counting primarily on "humanitarian weapons assistance" from Germany and Sweden, and for now Lithuania is oriented toward Russian arms.

In the future, Lithuania intends to resolve part of its own light weapons needs using its own resources. An experimental enterprise to produce military output ("Vityaz-2" machine-pistols, hand grenades, etc.) has been created based on Kaunas NII [Scientific Research Institute] of Construction and Architecture. Estonia plans to independently produce small-arms ammunition according to NATO standards.

There are differences in the organization of the armed forces and "standardization" must entail changes in legislation. Time will be required to do that. Enormous resources will have to be spent on the creation of an air defense system and on real air forces that are practically nonexistent right now. The budgets of all three countries are incapable of supporting these costs.

So, the new alliance's capabilities "to support defense" will not emerge from the purely political sphere for a long time yet. It is no accident that one Finnish analyst has noted without irony in this regard: "It would probably be more correct to characterize the current strategic doctrine of the Baltic states as defense oriented on CNN. The idea consists of the need to defend yourself... until the entire world is able to learn that you have been subjected to attack".

But you can rest assured that the Baltic states will not have to carry out this "dream". Indeed, the impression has formed that Latvia and Estonia are increasingly proceeding from Russia's allegedly inherent hostility toward them in their international policy. So one can anticipate that they will also begin to utilize the new alliance in order to present themselves, as before, as "hostages" of their Eastern neighbor. And then appeals will follow to fill the existing "security vacuum" with the assistance of the Western states.

As for Lithuania, while submitting a request for entry into NATO, it especially stipulated in advance that its desire is not directed against third countries. But even Baltic military integration, in which Lithuania has been quite definite, will inevitably affect the displacement of the Baltic region states' cooperation with the West in the military sphere. And this can already be considered to be a challenge to Russia.

#### The First Measures For the Creation of a Military Alliance:

- establishment of a "hot line" between the ministers of defense;
- obligations to strengthen the states' eastern borders;
- the exchange of military attaches;
- the conduct of joint exercises (February 1994—on the territory of Estonia, July 1994—on the territory of Lithuania; October 1994—on the territory of Latvia) in the context of creating a unified "Baltic Battalion";
- monthly meetings of the heads of the main staffs (in the beginning of January 1994 in Tallinn, they discussed the specific problems of the formation of the "Baltic Battalion" and they will next meet on 14-15 February in Riga).

## CAUCASIAN STATES

### Georgian Artillery Fires Into Abkhazia

94UM0223A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Feb 94 p 3

[Report by Vitaliy Denisov: "They Are Firing Again on the Inguri"]

[Text]

### Abkhazians and Georgians Accuse of One Another of Heating up Situation

The situation along the Inguri river on the border between Abkhazia and Georgia flared up once again on the morning of 6 February. Georgian troops opened artillery fire on positions of the Abkhazian armed forces. This was reported by the press service of the plenipotentiary of the Republic of Abkhazia in the Russian Federation.

At the same time bands from Georgian formations stepped up their activities in Galskiy Rayon.

In the meantime the press center of the Republic of Georgia's Ministry of Defense has issued its own assessment of the events. According to the Georgian side, under the pretext of combatting bands from the formations, Abkhazian formations numbering up to 2,500 men are engaged in actions against the civilian population in the region, continuing their ethnic cleansing in the territory under their control. According to the same source, Georgia's government troops have not yet taken action in response.

The latest exacerbation of the situation has demonstrated once again that the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict cannot be resolved without a political settlement. Nor can one fail to consider the possibility that the events of 6 February could have been undertaken by forces on both sides of the Inguri which do not like the idea of establishing normal bilateral relations between Georgia and Russia.

## ARMS TRADE

### V-Adm Kravchenko of Baltic Fleet on Auction of Obsolete Equipment

WS1102171994 Kaliningrad KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 94 p 7

[Interview with Baltic Fleet Vice-Admiral Viktor Kravchenko by Captain First Rank V. Gromak under the "Pressing" rubric; place and date not given: "Used Combat Ships Come Under the Hammer"—first paragraph is KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA introduction; questions published in boldface]

[Text] The beginning of this year witnessed an auction of obsolete military assets—one medium-sized warship and three smaller ones. I opened my conversation with Vice-Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, first Deputy Commander of the Baltic Fleet, with a question concerning this particular event.

[Kravchenko] In line with the decision of the Main Directorate for Material Resources at the Defense Ministry, the Baltic Fleet was allowed to hold a closed auction of outdated equipment—one medium-sized and three smaller warships. Four firms participated in the auction. The initial bid increased by one-and-a-half times by the end of the auction. The three small ships were purchased by a St. Petersburg firm, which will break them up for scrap. The medium-sized warship was also sold to the St. Petersburg firm. After it is revamped in accordance with the requirements of the register, the medium-sized ship will acquire a second civilian life.

[Gromak] Viktor Andreyevich, how will the money that was raised be distributed?

[Kravchenko] Sixty percent of the money will be transferred to the Baltic Fleet Command's current account. This share will go toward the construction of military housing, while the remaining 40 percent—to the Main Directorate for Material Resources at the Defense Ministry.

[Gromak] Who was allowed to participate in the auction?

[Kravchenko] All those who wished to do so. We had only one condition: To sell the ships on the domestic market alone.

[Gromak] Please tell us about the need to sell the fleet's property in the Baltic states, which has been going on for several years now. It is only now that we had the first event, but only as an experiment....

[Kravchenko] We lost two years in selling all our obsolete ships. If the fleet commander had had permission (and there is no shortage of inspection bodies) to market all unnecessary and outdated hardware at prevailing prices for the region, we would have sold everything long ago. At the same time, we would not have requested a nickel from either the government or the Defense Ministry for the construction of housing for the troops and the fleet withdrawn from the Baltic states. Our estimates prove this. Until now, however, the Central Administration for Material Resources has held this issue in its fist, and the fleet has been permitted very little. Only some insignificant deals....

[Gromak] As far as I know, the Main Directorate has its representatives in the Baltic states who engage in the sale of fleet property....

[Kravchenko] Yes, it does. However, the situation in the Baltic states is paradoxical. Riga, Liepaja, Paldiski, Tallinn—the Baltic Fleet will stay there for only four more months. A special representative for the sale of movable property was appointed by decree of the Russian Defense Minister last year. He arrived in August very eager to work. He promised to sell all the outdated ships in three-months time. Thus far, he has been selling them without success. Several contracts for the sale of certain vessels were concluded last year, but none of the ships were sold. The reason is that the prices determined by the Main Directorate for Material Resources were too high for this region. Now the Lieutenant-Colonel has concluded a deal for the sale of two used surface ships. I do not know, however, whether it will be accomplished. The representative is also negotiating the sale of all obsolete vessels in the Baltic states with a U.S. firm. Time flies, however. The fleet command has prepared a letter to Colonel-General Toporov, deputy Defense Minister, with its proposals and a request to make this process more dynamic....

### Ukraine Offers Submarine to Iran

94UM0223B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Feb 94 p 3

[Report under the rubric "Military Reports From Abroad": "Ukraine Has Offered To Sell Iran a Submarine"]

[Text] The Saudi newspaper AS SHARQ AL AWSAT has reported that Ukraine has offered to sell "a considerable portion of its share of the former Soviet Navy" to countries of the Persian Gulf.

Citing a "Washington source," the newspaper states that the sale would include missile and torpedo boats, destroyers and minelayers. Ukraine has also offered to sell a submarine to Iran.



## DEFENSE INDUSTRY

**Voronin on Industrial Crisis, Naval Construction Halt**

PM1102200194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 10 Feb 94 pp 1, 2

["Topical interview" with Gennadiy Voronin, chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry, by Vladimir Gundarov; date and place not given: "Russia's Naval Prestige Bound To Sink Below 'Red' Line"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Gennadiy Petrovich Voronin is an academician of the International Engineering Academy, a doctor of economical sciences, a member of the British Institute of Naval Engineers, an Honored Machine Builder of Russia, and a State Prize winner. He is Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry.

[Gundarov] Gennadiy Petrovich, you have devoted all your life to shipbuilding and you are well acquainted with all the stages of boom and decline in the Russian Navy's history. In your opinion, what kind of stage is it going through now?

[Voronin] A stage of decline, of course. It takes time to do what we have to do to overcome this stage in accordance with the new military doctrine—with smaller numbers but higher quality, as the saying goes. But so far there has not been enough time for the Navy to acquire new qualities, that is for it to obtain new, high-precision weapons, more modern ships and command and control systems, and so on. Speaking in broad terms, we currently have no military equipment program, whereas in the past we had plans for 10-15 years in advance.

[Gundarov] Just how long do we still have to wait?

[Voronin] We have been waiting for a program for over 18 months. It has now been finalized and signed, but it is not yet an official document which could be sent to our plants. I think it will be approved in the first quarter of this year. But the program is not dogma. Obviously it will still be subject to amendment, hopefully in the direction of increasing the fleet's combat strength.

[Gundarov] The press has repeatedly expressed the opinion that the current reduction in the number of Naval ships is the consequence not only of the USSR's geopolitical disintegration and the economic crisis in Russia, but also of mistakes made in drawing up the preceding shipbuilding programs....

[Voronin] Everything can be doubted and criticized with the benefit of hindsight. For example, many people say that we should not have built aircraft carriers; they say it was too expensive. But what is cheap? At that historical stage, given the military doctrine and given the confrontation with NATO and in particular with the United States, our shipbuilding program designed to take us

through the year 2000 was, I believe, correct. It was elaborated and approved at collegiums of various ministries: Defense, Shipbuilding, and others.

I do not deny that mistakes are made in any business. We sometimes philosophize that everything should be decided collectively: By some kind of oblast committees, soviets, or collegiums. Nevertheless, the role of the individual will, I think, always influence specific decisions. Recently I went to America and England and saw how things are done there. There the role of the individual, judging by what happens, is simply staggering. Although outwardly it is less noticeable, maybe because everyone there has more freedom.

[Gundarov] We are now in Russia, where there have always been people with a preference for certain types of ship. So it would be interesting to find out which ships you have a preference for.

[Voronin] I have a preference for the Navy as a whole. I have carefully studied U.S. naval doctrine. By the year 2000 their combat effectiveness will have increased 100 percent. Not through the number of ships but through the quality of new weapons and power-generating systems; in short, through science. Everything there is resolved in a comprehensive manner. At the same time it should be noted that many countries have decided to build small aircraft carriers designed to take 15-20 Harrier-type aircraft. I believe that we too should have these aircraft carriers in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. They could be built in St. Petersburg or Severodvinsk. We have the ways on which to do that.

But I am concerned by what the Americans are doing now while we are doing nothing. We have started work to salvage old ships and submarines. While the United States is practically ceasing its involvement in salvaging and is converting old ships into training ships. A ship can be made ready for combat again within a month or two.

[Gundarov] Do you yourself believe that?

[Voronin] Generally it is hard to believe in something 100 percent. But I know that the work is being done. I do not think that they will be able to convert all old ships into training ships, but here we often write off even quite new ships for scrap.

[Gundarov] For example, the aircraft carrying cruiser Kiev?

[Voronin] Its fate has still not been decided, but it is predetermined.

[Gundarov] Why can we not take the same road as the Americans?

[Voronin] We are probably prevented from doing so by a kind of "special Russian genotype." All the time we are trying to make economies without investing money in anything. In two years we have not built a single surface ship. But the problem of repairing old ships is not being solved either. So far, only the salvaging of submarines

has been "stoked up" because ship-repair plants, which have no other orders at present, have clutched at this work like a straw.

[Gundarov] What is in store for the Navy in the near future?

[Voronin] We have worked out a program through 2003 in which we have taken account of the new military doctrine's demands. The program is based above all on the real situation in industry. Every plant has a so-called "red" technological line below which the plant must not go, in order to prevent the disintegration of production sectors. The illogical thing is that conversion has proceeded apace, that is, it has been several times greater than that originally planned. For example, we have enterprises where the main production decreased 80 percent in one year. In this situation no economic formula works any more. That is why, when elaborating the economic program, we took as our basis the task of maintaining production. But even our minimal program, it turned out, costs four times as much as the budget available to the Defense Ministry. I know that the Defense Ministry is currently battling with the Finance and Economy Ministries. To avoid a total collapse we have been forced to take a risk: To put new systems, instruments, and units into production without having official documents for doing so.

[Gundarov] Are you not afraid that in five years or so people will at best start criticizing you for building ships without a program and therefore for making more mistakes?

[Voronin] There is something else that we have to fear: Being accused of doing nothing. After all, science cannot be stopped, but what we are doing is not essential. We know how and on what a potential enemy is working, how a process is proceeding throughout the world, and what new systems, component base, and new technologies are being developed. Of course, we too are compelled to carry out this work, but, it turns out, with our eyes shut.

[Gundarov] Still, is it not easier to work with our eyes open, even if on a minimal program?

[Voronin] I do not want to reveal all our secrets. I will merely note that an enterprise which has been able to get into a foreign market and make a dollar profit uses it not for its own social needs but for finding solutions to state tasks, including scientific developments. We are hard-put to compete with the Japanese, who already have the fifth generation of radio electronics in production—molecular electronics and biocomputers. But should we not at least keep our finger on the pulse? Irrespective of whether the new parliament gives money or not. That is life.

[Gundarov] At the moment Russia has no enemies, politicians claim. Maybe the need to build new ships intensively has also ceased?

[Voronin] Sometimes I am asked a simple "peasant" question: Why can U.S. submarines dart around Severodvinsk while we cannot do the same near their country? Moreover, the opposing side refuses to hold any talks on cutting naval forces, considering itself a great naval power and guarantor of peace. Not only the United States is looking after its fleet. Work to build up China's naval forces has now been launched as never before. Hundreds of representatives of various firms and departments in that country are coming to us. I have met many of them and formed the conclusion that they have set themselves the task of making their country one of the most powerful naval powers in the near future. Recently I visited South Korea, where I met the president of the "Khala" [as transliterated] firm. In 18 months they intend to construct a new state-of-the-art shipyard. South Korea is currently the world's second biggest shipbuilder and will probably soon be the biggest. Even that small country intends to begin building submarines—diesel submarines for the time being. While China is already interested in nuclear-powered submarines. Those two countries' strategy is to invest colossal amounts of money in their own naval forces. We have already sensed this during business contacts.

[Gundarov] Do you notice a desire on the part of our government to maintain Russia's naval might?

[Voronin] No. In our country, as is often the case, words are at variance with actions. Judging from the state orders which shipbuilders now have, our main customer is foreign rather than our Defense Ministry: Forty percent of domestic shipyards' capacities are starting to work for the West.

[Gundarov] In that case, what awaits the industrial complex which works for the Russian Navy?

[Voronin] We are waiting for the state to settle accounts with shipbuilders. I will cite just one figure. The state owes the "Sevmash" production association 130 billion rubles. For several months we have been promised that this money would be paid, but the debt has not yet been cleared. Hence, the enterprise has no circulating capital and the production chain is being destroyed. In short, all this is a string of truisms about which a considerable amount has already been said.

[Gundarov] Do you have specific proposals as to how to maintain production?

[Voronin] The matter is complicated by the fact that, on the one hand, conversion programs apparently exist but, on the other, they are not being implemented because finance for them is lacking. Therefore we are not elaborating proposals but specific subprograms for every plant. They do not have to choose right now. They are getting to work fulfilling any orders: Whether they be for peasants, oil or gas industry workers, or along ecological lines.

[Gundarov] And at the same time shipbuilding technology is being destroyed?

[Voronin] Yes, from the viewpoint of shipbuilding construction we are, of course, losing out.

[Gundarov] Maybe this is a consequence of the fact that there is no Navy lobby in the government?

[Voronin] To some extent I agree with you. There are many lobbyists of various persuasions. But as far as the Navy goes I do not see its lobbyists. Yuriy Yarov has a better grasp of the Navy's problems than others in the government. But unfortunately he is engaged in resolving other questions. But I do not sense in certain other people who have reached the crucible of power any understanding of the tasks facing the production complex, which in particular provides for the Navy's needs. This occurs because these people have not passed through the plant school. The moment has now come when nobody wants to hear the exhortations of practical people, and they themselves are called antireformists. But practical people would not have made the colossal mistakes we are now observing in the management of industry. The problem of cadres, I believe, is now the most pressing. Incidentally, I am for reforms, but they must be carried out in a more evolutionary way.

[Gundarov] What would you do first of all if the situation in which the Navy found itself depended entirely on you?

[Voronin] It is just the same as asking a mechanic at a technical servicing center what he would do first of all with a broken machine. First he would probably have a look at it. If we start at the beginning, I am convinced that industry could withstand 5 percent or a maximum of 10 percent conversion. Foreign experience demonstrates this. As conversion increases the production process becomes unmanageable, because it comes into conflict with science and economics. It is therefore hard to say what should be done first of all when everything has disintegrated.

Wars are raging all over the world. The situation in the Near East is complex, and it is becoming acute in Asia. The brake has been taken off the U.S. Navy. I think I would review the shipbuilding program and adopt a more careful attitude to reducing it. Obsolete ships, which are not combat-effective in a modern war, can be cut. But in fact we are cutting ships which have been in service only 15 years instead of 25.

Second, whether we like it or not, plants must not be allowed to fall below the "red" line. Otherwise, no edicts or orders will save production from collapsing.

[Gundarov] Gennadiy Petrovich, in ending our conversation, what would you—the man who is building the Navy—like to wish the Navy's sailors in the new year of 1994?

[Voronin] It is hard to find more optimistic people, although figuratively speaking they have to "fight" every day: When cruising, on combat service, or on alert status. I would like to wish that their optimism never deserts

them. I am convinced that better times are ahead for the Navy, because we have a demonstrable trump card enabling us to be a naval power. And no political battles can take it away from us.

### **Ministry of Defense Appeal on Unpaid Arms Debts**

94UM0223C Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*  
in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 1

[Report under the rubric "News": "The Debts Have Not Yet Been Paid"]

[Text]

#### **From Moscow**

Despite all the decisions issued by the President and the government, funds have not yet been allocated for liquidating the debt on the State Order for 1993 and the initial financing of the State Order for 1994. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense believes that payment of the debts presently constitutes one of the most important state priorities.

In connection with this, Russia's Ministry of Defense has issued another report to the government on the extremely difficult situation which has developed at enterprises which filled defense orders for 1993, but have still not received the money earned.

### **Antonov Aviation Complex Role in Ukraine's Military Industry**

#### **Radetsky Visits Design Bureau**

94UM0189A Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian  
17 Dec 93 p 1

[Unattributed news item: "Minister of Defense of Ukraine Visits KB imeni Antonov"]

[Text] Minister of Defense General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetsky yesterday visited the Experimental Design Bureau [KB] imeni Antonov and was familiarized with its prospects and capabilities. The Antonov KB, as is well known, is the leading scientific-production base in Ukraine engaged in projects in the sphere of aircraft construction. The AN-124 Ruslan and An-225 Mriya aircraft are well known around the world today.

But economic difficulties have not bypassed the "Antonovites" either. There are not enough funds, and the disruption of economic ties is having a negative effect. The task for the future, however, remains the same for the Antonov KB: Work for the benefit of Ukraine, and for the benefit of its armed forces. The discussion concerned just that, among other things, during a meeting of Minister of Defense General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetsky with Antonov KB General Director Petro Balabuyev.

An account will appear in an upcoming issue.



**Radetskyy, Oliynyk Briefed on Design, Production**

94UN0189B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
21 Dec 93 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Senior Lieutenant Serhiy Zhurets: "Ukrainian Aviation Has Solid Wings"]

[Text] *As we have already reported, Minister of Defense General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetskyy, Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments and Armaments Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Colonel-General Ivan Oliynyk and Directorate of Industrial Orders and Industrial Liaison Chief Major-General Viktor Vashchilin visited the aviation scientific and technical complex (ANTK) imeni Oleh Antonov, which is the leading scientific and production base of Ukrainian aircraft construction.*

The level of development of science and industry of a nation has traditionally been defined, and is defined, by achievements in aviation as well—both civil and military. The Ukrainian aviation scientific and technical complex imeni Oleh Antonov has reason to be proud. It is enough to mention the An-124 Ruslan and An-225 Mriya aircraft, well known around the whole world. The "Antonovites" have also done a great deal for the development of military and military-transport aviation. A whole family of "An's" has served and is serving in the army: The An-2, An-8, An-12, An-26, An-30, An-72 and An-124.

But new times advance new demands. The building of effective and mobile Ukrainian armed forces is simply impossible unless the army is provided with contemporary models of hardware, including aviation hardware. That is how to explain the attention that the leadership of the Ministry of Defense is devoting to the emergence and development of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex, with an important place in it occupied by the ANTK imeni Oleh Antonov.

The deep traditions of aircraft construction, the widespread use of computer technology in the work and the adoption of new technologies are providing an opportunity for the Kiev specialists to develop aviation products that are the equal of the most advanced international demands. The representatives of the military department were convinced of that with their own eyes.

The Minister of Defense devoted considerable attention, while being familiarized with the prospects and capabilities of the ANTK, to the new transport aircraft with the working name of the An-77. The development and construction of this model is one of the few examples of very close collaboration between Ukraine and Russia, based on an international agreement. The An-77 surpasses the capabilities of analogous aircraft, both civil and those of military-transport aviation, in both freight capacity and in speed, altitude and range. Less than half of the necessary funds, however, were directed toward

the requirements of the An-77 project, as was emphasized by ANTK imeni Oleh Antonov General Designer Petro Balabuyev. Moreover, the lion's share of that money was funds that the design bureau had earned through its own efforts. That is obviously insufficient. The first model of the new transport aircraft is planned to be ready to go out to the airfield for trials by the end of the month, and another model will have to be built and tested for objective results. It is difficult to say when this will be done. The Ukrainian aircraft-building industry, after all, is experiencing far from its best times: Skilled specialists are leaving because of the poor pay, and the disrupted business ties provide no opportunity for the timely performance of the necessary work.

Kiev has been visited more than once this year, however, both by representatives of the ministries of defense of Great Britain and France and by representatives of the FLA—an organization of countries in the European Community to which France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Spain belong. FLA specialists have been engaged for a long time in the development of a design for an analogous aircraft; they have not even begun the design engineering. The Ukrainian aircraft builders, however, have built the first aircraft, which virtually conforms to the FLA requirements.

The Kiev ANTK, by the way, can offer the nation and the armed forces more than a new transport aircraft. The arsenal of the design bureau has many more innovations, from a powered hang glider to an aerospace system based on the widebody Mriya aircraft as a launch platform. This system provides the opportunity to put a satellite into space with the assistance of rockets launched from the An-225 during aircraft flight. Furthermore, the cost of such a method is only one seventh that of a conventional vertical launch. And there is no need to explain the importance of our own satellites for the development of civil and military space.

Also discussed at the meeting was the fact that the ANTK imeni Oleh Antonov has an opportunity to take up the resolution of such problems as the development of trainer aircraft. General Designer Petro Balabuyev indicated that attention should be turned to the training of American military pilots. They first fly for thirty hours on trainer aircraft at the first level of difficulty, and then 75 hours on aircraft of the second level of difficulty; only after that do the pilots begin to master the combat aircraft directly. That way is both safer and more economical, which is very important under contemporary conditions when fuel is scarce.

"We are ready to develop such trainer aircraft for the needs of our military aviation," said Petro Vasylovych. "The need for them will arise sooner or later, after all."

So then, time will tell what problems they will be able to solve on the road to a modern, truly effective and mobile army. But we need to rely on two solid wings—industry

and science—in order to attain that goal as quickly as possible, the more so with the intelligent expenditure of state funds.

#### First An-70 Result of Interrepublic Cooperation

94UM0189C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
22 Jan 94 p 1

[NA news item under the rubric "Event": "The First An-70 Exists!"]

[Text] The new An-70 transport aircraft could be considered the latest achievement of the Ukrainian aircraft builders, following the An-124 Ruslan and An-225 Mriya aircraft. President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev decided to become personally acquainted with the first model of that aircraft, visiting the Kiev Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex imeni Antonov together with President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk. The leadership of the military departments of Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, meanwhile, have displayed an even greater interest in the new aircraft. And that is not surprising. The chief customers for the An-70 aircraft, after all, are the ministries of defense of Russia and Ukraine, who are ready to put this aircraft into service. All the more so as the development and construction of the new transport aircraft is one of the few examples of very close collaboration between Russia and Ukraine, based on an international agreement. President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk pointed out on that score that economic integration is an objective necessity in the international relations of the CIS countries.

It was pointed out that the An-70 transport aircraft has capabilities surpassing those of all existing transport aircraft. (The editors will talk about the An-70 in more detail in an upcoming issue.) This aircraft is planned to be manufactured at aviation enterprises in Ukraine, Russia and Uzbekistan. The first series-produced An-70 aircraft, however, will appear in the skies, at best, only in 1996.

### SECURITY SERVICES

#### Yeltsin Names Deputy Counterintelligence Directors

94UM0224A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
3 Feb 94 p 1

[News item from Moscow: "Vacancies in Counterintelligence Gradually Being Filled"]

[Text] President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin has ordered the appointment of directors of the main directorates of the Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation.

They include the deputy directors of the Russian Federation's Federal Counterintelligence Service Lieutenant-Generals Andrey Bykov, Aleksandr Strelkov, and Valeriy Timofeyev.

#### Duma Security Committee's Agenda Outlined

PM1702132194 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 15 Feb 94 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with Viktor Ilyukhin, chairman of the State Duma Security Committee, by Valentin Maslennikov; date and place not given: "Without Bias or Timidity"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] In 20 years Viktor Ilyukhin progressed from ordinary investigator in a Penza backwater to First Deputy Chief of a USSR Procurator's Office Main Administration; he headed the administration overseeing the application of laws on state security. He became politically known after he instituted criminal proceedings against Gorbachev, General Secretary of the then-ruling CPSU, for which he was dismissed from the Procurator's Office. He is now Chairman of the State Duma Security Committee. At the editorial office's request Viktor Ivanovich shares his thoughts on the plans and prospects for the work of this most important section of the new parliament:

[Ilyukhin] Many people are troubled by my party membership: How come a communist has been elected to such a responsible post in a legislative organ of a democratic state? But I do not see that this interferes in any way with a collegial organ's fruitful work. Incidentally, all three of my deputies belong to different parties which society also regards equivocally. Viktor Pimenovich Mironov represents "Russia's Choice," Sergey Semenovitch Boskholov the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, and Nina Viktorovna Krivelskaya the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. They are all first-class jurists and professionals in the best sense of the word.

From the very first steps in our joint work we have set aside our party bias and sought a common language and mutual understanding. The committee has a total of 20 members and the volume of work is enormous. It is encouraging that the other committee members are also highly qualified jurists. We have expert lawyers, people with experience of working in courts and internal affairs organs, and attorneys with a wealth of practical experience.

At our very first session we found out that a collective of like minds is forming and that everyone is concerned about one thing: The lack of a clear concept of the country's national security, thought out in the finest detail. So first of all we will be working hard to elaborate one.

Not an easy task, because we are faced with a whole range of interconnected problems which are difficult to solve. Taking national security to mean first of all the consolidation of a state's territorial integrity and unity, we are singling out four main facets. They are borders, customs, federal security services including border troops, and, of course, economic security. All this needs to be clearly enshrined in legislation.

The next set of pressing problems is **legal support for the fight against crime** on the basis of a long-term, wide-ranging program which includes scientific substantiation, finances, cadre policy, and many other things.

The implementation of this program is also directly linked with the **direct protection of the person and his individuality**, which we are wont to talk about a lot but which we in fact push into the background. So an urgent change of emphasis from words to deeds is needed. Incidentally, what is required in this respect is a review of the state of emergency legislation, which must also protect people first and foremost and not be reduced to sharing out authority.

Finally, the fourth set is **an expert criminological assessment** of all draft laws passing through the Duma, irrespective of who has prepared them. It is up to us to detect all the flaws in legislative acts which could substantially complicate the criminogenic situation in the country.

Of course, the committee will not be able to cope with this volume of work alone. We plan to bring in expert specialists and scientific subdivisions of practical experts. Discussion papers are already available. We are finding good understanding in other Duma committees.

At the very first session we defined our priority tasks. They include finalizing work on the Law on Combating Corruption. The attention to this question is easily explained: The crime rate is increasing, there is a tidal wave of illegal acts, and bribery and mercenary string-pulling have corroded the entire state executive mechanism, including the law-enforcement organs. This retards any healthy transformations in Russia.

Mafia clans are already dictating their policy not only at the neighborhood level but also in entire cities and oblasts, and in some places they are even taking control of legislators' activities. This will continue as long as an official at any level is dependent on his boss' will and whim. He must obey only the law and must serve it faithfully and truly.

The law had already been prepared by our predecessors and adopted by the Supreme Soviet, but it was not signed by the president. In my view, the reason is not the shortcomings it undoubtedly contains but the struggle between several schools of law, whose representatives were unable to agree among themselves but were able to persuade the president to postpone the law's adoption. Through the efforts of two committees—ours and the one on legislation and judicial reform—we have already held a first hearing on the law and we will soon be submitting it for consideration at a Duma session sitting. It cannot be postponed any longer.

Two other draft laws are next in line—"On the State Protection of Judges and Employees of Law-Enforcement and Control Organs" and "On the Protection of Witnesses, Victims, and Other People Assisting in Legal Proceedings." They brook no delay either. Because judges and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]

employees are being murdered, witnesses and victims are being intimidated, and their families are being kept in fear. How can a judge or court official who is besieged, totally dependent, and lacking life's essentials be objective? What is the use of a militiaman who does not feel that he is backed up by state protection? How can the evidence of a witness be relied on if, outside the precincts of the court, he is not protected from the criminals he is accusing?

We predict that these laws will not have an easy passage through the Duma. Not because deputies do not understand their importance and timeliness but because some legislators will think that the state cannot afford them at the moment. Nevertheless, this expenditure must be made if we seriously intend to fight crime and really protect people.

The committee has extensive plans. We have a great deal to do to improve the criminal and criminal-procedure codes and we will be taking part in the drafting of laws on the Prosecutor's Office, the legal profession, the Constitutional Court, and many other things.

I want to single out especially the upcoming work to legislatively enshrine the new status of the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS]. This is a difficult question which will certainly provoke many disputes and disagreements. In my opinion, the president exceeded his powers by disbanding the Security Ministry. The new Constitution does not give him the right to autonomously destroy and reform institutions of state authority. In place of what is, especially now, a vitally essential part of the law-enforcement system yet another presidential special service has been formed. There are too many of them as it is.

Something similar can be observed with the MVD. Essentially the enforcement structures are being removed from Prosecutor's Office oversight and judicial and parliamentary control, and levers of authoritarian power are being strengthened. During its reorganization the FCS lost its investigation apparatus. This is a blow to its capability. The shield remains but the sword has been taken away.

I grant that some people will not agree with me, but I will defend my opinion both inside and outside committee sessions. A considerable number of these complex debates lie ahead of us.

Just take the question of borders. It is no longer possible to put up with the large-meshed sieve into which they have now turned. But to construct new ones will require at least five to seven years of intensive work and expenditure equal to twice or three times Russia's annual budget (without drinking, eating, or spending a cent on anything else). There is one solution: To agree with our close neighbors on a single external CIS border.

They cannot protect it by themselves—as eloquently demonstrated by Tajikistan's experience. That means that we must form joint border troops—which requires



an interstate accord. We must not shy away from each other but act hand in hand. What is of help here is both our historical experience and the recognition of the prospect of the inevitable unification of the collapsed Union on a new basis.

West Europe's experience indicates the same: Strength through unification. Most of our countries' inhabitants think the same: Because they were cut for real when they were separated, borders were drawn through families and futures. In my opinion, the only obstacle now is leaders' political ambitions.

I by no means want to switch the conversation about our committee's plans to the political plane. But when national security is being discussed there is no escaping politics. Our committee does not consider itself to be

exceeding its powers in putting forward some urgent demands and recommendations to the Federal Assembly, the country's government, and the Russian president. In particular, in order to achieve our national security the country's and the Foreign Ministry's leaders must urgently agree with all CIS countries that the latter will not wholly or partly join any military bloc opposing Russia. And I believe that a strict demand should be put to our Baltic neighbors: One of the mandatory conditions for the withdrawal of our troops from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is a pledge on their part not to join any military bloc with other states and not to allow foreign military bases to be located on their territory.

So, the tasks facing our committee are complex and crucial, just like the concept of security itself.

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